HISTORY OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD IN WORLD WAR II
By
Arthur Sydnor Barksdale, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR
Portsmouth, VA 1945
Table of Contents
(Continued)
Chapter X: New Construction
Summary of Work
Battleship Construction
The LST Program
The DE Program
The Big Flat Tops
Destroyers and Miscellaneous Other Vessels
Chapter XI: Manufacturing
Chapter XII: Safety and Industrial Accidents
Safety Section
Saturn Fire
Bldg. 173 Fire
Scott Center Fire
St. Helena Fire
Chapter XIII: Speeding War Production
Part Four: Personnel
Chapter XIV: Employment
Increase in the Payroll
Labor Board
Turnover
Exit Interviews
Vocational Training Program
Chapter XV: Selective Service
Loss of Men to Draft
Women as Replacements
Chapter XVI: The Direct Recruiting Program
* * * * * * * * * *
X. NEW CONSTRUCTION
Summary of Work
As has already been noted (Ch. II; Sec. 2), nine destroyers were laid down in the Norfolk Navy Yard during the period of the Fleet rebuilding program of the thirties. Of these nine, however, the last four, the USS ROWAN, USS STACK, USS MORRIS and the USS WAINWRIGHT were not completed until after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe.
Using the completion date of the ROWAN, September 23, 1939, as a convenient starting point, the record shows that between that date, three weeks after Hitler's invasion of Poland and V-J Day, the Norfolk Navy Yard turned over to the Fleet six destroyers, the four mentioned, together with the USS SHUBRICK and the USS HERNDON; one battleship, the USS ALABAMA; two Essex class aircraft carriers, the USS SHANGRI-LA and USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN; ten destroyer escorts, the USS REUBEN JAMES, USS SIMS, USS HOPPING, USS LANING, USS LOY, USS REEVES, USS FECHTELER, USS CHASE, USS BARBER and the USS LOVELACE; twenty LST, 333-352 inclusive; three minesweepers, the USS RAVEN, USS OSPREY and the USS AUK; a tug, the USS WAHTAH; fifty LCM; and a number of YW, YFs, YRDs, and YSDs. In addition a battleship, the 45,000-ton USS KENTUCKY and an aircraft carrier, the 34,000-ton USS TARAWA, were under construction, and in the case of the TARAWA nearing completion at the end of the war. In all, a total of 42 combatant vessels were delivered to the Fleet during the war, with the TARAWA and the KENTUCKY raising the number to 44.
The complete list of vessels handled by new construction follows.
Counting the LCMs and other smaller craft, the total number of Norfolk-built vessels completed after September 1, 1939, is 101. Several additional vessels begun at other shipyards were brought to the Norfolk Navy Yard for completion. They are so indicated. Included in the table are five destroyers completed prior to the war, so that the list gives the overall picture of all new construction since World War I. (See App. D, Vessels Built Prior World War II.)
Click on link, then click image again in browser to enlarge
Battleship Construction
Reference has already been made to the placing of the order for construction of the USS ALABAMA, BB60, in November 1938. (Ch. V; Sec. 6).
The ALABAMA was one of three 35,000-ton battleships of the Class of 1938. The sister ships, both of which were constructed in private yards, were the USS INDIANA built by the Newport New Shipbuilding & Drydock Company at a contract cost of $49,540,000, and the USS MASSACHUSETTS built by the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation at Quincy, Mass., at a contract cost of $49,815,000.22 The ALABAMA's cost is listed by the Yard at $45,185,602 (Ch. VIII; Sec 2). These amounts, of course, by no means cover the full cost of the ships, the figures representing only the cost of hull and machinery, to which approximately $26,000,000 had to be added for each ship for ordnance and other items of ship's equipage not provided by the building yards,. The total cost of each of the three battleships was estimated at from 70 to 75 million dollars.
22 AP Nfk.Vgn-Pilot, 10 Nov. 1938
A fourth battleship of the Class of 1938, the USS SOUTH DAKOTA, a slightly modified INDIANA class, was built by the New York Shipbuilding Company at Camden, N. J., at a contract price of $52,000,ooo.23
23 Ibid., 15 Dec. 1938
The keel of the ALABAMA was laid on February 1, 1940, on Buildingways No. 1. An elaborate ceremony was staged with Secretary of the Navy Edison and Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia who delivered the principal speech, among the many notables present, including members of Congress and representatives of the Governors of Virginia and Alabama.
The ship was launched on February 16, 1942, at another colorful ceremony befitting the Yard's first battleship launching [TEXAS, 1895]. Commissioned on November 10, 1942, the vessel was turned over to the Fleet on that date.
Being the first such vessel ever built in the Norfolk Navy Yard, the ALABAMA presented many problems to the Yard's New Construction Division. Among these problems were those of launching the vessel, and of later installing the heavy 16-inch guns and turrets. Exhaustive tests were conducted in the Taylor Model Basin prior to the launching in order to assure its success. The narrow width of the Elizabeth River posed some factors of uncertainty, but the use of more than 600 tons of drag chain effectively slowed the vessel so that the launching was completed with precision.
The job of fabricating the turrets for the big battleship was a particularly difficult one, since the turrets were built practically in the open, the turret assembly building at that time being too small to house the entire job. The Turret Shop was subsequently enlarged to provide for the fabrication of turrets for the USS KENTUCKY and the USS LOUISIANA, and although the LOUISIANA order was cancelled the task of constructing the KENTUCKY turrets was made easier, the shop being at work upon that job at the conclusion of the war. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Yard used a water leveling method for the ALABAMA turrets, the only Yard to do this job in this manner.
An interesting experiment in connection with the building of the ALABAMA was carried out. Loud speakers were installed at the buildingways in order to provide music for the workmen who built the ship. Following the old theory that men work better to music, the New Construction Superintendent gave the workers "incentive" programs from the classics to swing at regular intervals throughout the day. Literally the ALABAMA was built to music.
While the ALABAMA was under construction, two additional battleships were assigned to the Navy Yard for construction. These ships were the BB-66, KENTUCKY, and the BB-71, LOUISIANA. (Files BB66/S1(1) and BB71/S1(1)).
This order came to the Navy Yard in a dispatch from SecNav on September 9, 1940, coinciding with the fast pace which national defense had reached by the late summer of that year. The LOUISIANA order was later cancelled, and the construction of the KENTUCKY was deferred until the last year of the war.
The KENTUCKY was to be one of six ships of the IOWA class of 1939-40, a 45,000-ton vessel. The LOUISIANA according to the SecNav dispatch was to be of "new design".
Planned as a 58,000-ton super battleship, the LOUISIANA was to have been one of five ships of the MONTANA Class of 1940, but none of these vessels was ever built. The ships were to have carried twelve 16-inch guns and to have had a length of 903 feet and a beam of 120 feet.
The plans were to build the KENTUCKY on buildingways No. 1 as soon as the ALABAMA was launched, and to build the LOUISIANA in the new building dock as soon as it was completed. The original plans called for construction of all of the MONTANA class battleships in building docks.
This order represented approximately $200,000,000 worth of work for the Navy Yard, funds for which were contained in the $5,251,000,000 Defense Appropriation Bill of 1940 signed by the President to give the Navy 200 new ships and provide the two-ocean Fleet. This big order gave the Yard all it could handle in New Construction. (Cdt. ltr. BuShips, 21 June 1941, FS/S1/L9-3(44-87)).
Both these battleships were sidetracked soon after the U. S. entered the war to make way for higher priority landing craft and escort vessels, but not before the keel of the KENTUCKY had been laid. War demands swift decisions and frequent changes of plans, and one of those changes of strategy brought about the "launching" of the KENTUCKY less than four months after keel-laying.
On March 7, 1942, the KENTUCKY's keel was laid on the ways where the ALABAMA had been built. In sharp contrast to the color and fanfare which had marked the keel laying of the ALABAMA and of other warships, the keel of the BB-66 was laid without ceremony. Only the workmen who were to build her and officials of the Yard were present as the first I-beams and plates went down for the hugh vessel. Preliminary fabrication of parts had been underway for months and the Yard was ready to turn the full force of its constructive power to the new battleship.
The Navy's LST program, however, intervened. When it was decided early in 1942 to construct these vessels on a mass production basis, (Sec. 3), the most immediate problem was that of providing space for the work, and it became obvious that the big building ways would have to be called into use if the ships were to be completed in the time allotted.
On May 20, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the Norfolk Navy Yard to suspend until further notice all work on construction of the LOUISIANA to permit construction of other vessels immediately required (BuShips ltr 27 May 1942) to assure early victory.
The only work which had been undertaken on this ship was the laying down of the body lines and preliminary work in the mold loft (Cdt. ltr. BuShips, 23 June 1942), so that this suspension occasioned little difficulty. Certain material which had been purchased was diverted to future use on the KENTUCKY.
But as far as suspending the KENTUCKY was concerned it was a different story. The bottom structure had been practically completed and much of the material for the ship assembled. Nevertheless, this bottom structure was removed, the "Launching" occurring on June 10, 1942. After the launching, the KENTUCKY bottom structure was towed to a point in the Elizabeth River opposite the lumber storage yard where it was secured to await resumption of work.
At that time the Yard did not consider that the tank landing ship program would result in an overall delay on the KENTUCKY inasmuch as the Yard had been unable in the preceding seven months to obtain all of the steel necessary to meet the battleship's building schedule. (Cdts ltr BuShips, 23 June 1942). It was planned to interrupt work on the KENTUCKY for a period of approximately six months after which it would be placed in Drydock 8, then expected to be completed by midsummer 1942 where construction could proceed.
Considerable delay did occur, however, as Drydock 8 was used first for LST construction and then for building the aircraft carrier USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, and the double bottoms of the big battleship were not placed in the building dock until December 7, 1944, the third anniversary of Pearl Harbor.
But material for the ship had been received in the meantime, and some fabrication had been done (MN 20/43) and by V-J Day the vessel was estimated to be more than thirty-five percent complete with a tentative launching date set for mid-1946.
The LST Program
On May 19, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy placed with the Norfolk Navy Yard an order for the construction of twenty tank landing ships, craft of which there was then no counterpart in the Navy. The strategy of the war simply dictated that such a ship be built. Landing upon enemy beaches had to be made if the war was to be carried to our foes, and in order to land on the beaches equipment had to be provided. The Tank landing craft first called ATL's were to be of shallow draft capable of running on a beach, opening bow doors and depositing men and machines directly on the land. They were to be large vessels more than three hundred feet in length.
A conference of representatives of the various Navy Yards was held in New York early in 1942 (LST/S1(1)), to discuss allocation of the vessels. At that time a total program of some 490 ships was planned, although this number was subsequently increased. The Norfolk Navy Yard representative, Captain T. B. Richey, Industrial Manager at that time, agreed to build eighteen of the vessels, but when the assignment was made following the meeting the number was set at twenty.
This number was considered large particularly in view of the three battleships then assigned and the nine Destroyer Escorts which had been ordered in January (Sec. 4).
However, with the removal of the KENTUCKY bottom structure from the big ways to make room for the craft and the nearing completion of Drydock 8, the Yard went to work on the big order which was given top priority by the Navy Department.
The first LST keels were laid on July 15, 1942, four of them on the buildingways from which the bottom structure of the KENTUCKY had been removed, and the other four in the newly-completed drydock. On the ways were LSTs, 333-336, while LSTs 337-341 were laid down in the dock.
The size of the dock, however, was great enough to permit the building of six of these tank landing ships at one time, and on August 21 two more LSTs, 341 and 342, were also laid down in the dock, the delay being due to failure to receive the necessary I-beams for the keels. With these last two LSTs begun, the Yard had under construction by late August ten of the twenty LST's assigned to it.
The Norfolk Navy Yard did a job on the tank landing ships. The word from Washington was that speed was the first essential and the Yard turned to on the work.
On October 15, 1942, the first four LSTs, No. 33-336, were launched from Buildingways No. 1 in the Yard's first mass launching ceremony. The curious looking craft were towed across the river and berthed at the new piers at St. Helena for completion and fitting out.
Two days later two more LSTs, the 345 and 346, were laid down on the big buildingways, and October 19 the keels for the LST 343 and 344 were likewise placed on the same ways.
In November the second LST launching occurred when the six built in Drydock 8 were launched. This group included the LST 337-342.
The next day keels for LSTs 351-352 were laid in Drydock 8, and on November 10 keels for the LSTs 347-350 were laid in the drydock, starting six more of the landing ships.
The group of LSTs which had been laid on the buildingways in October, the 343-346, was launched on December 15, 1942, and the final six were towed from Drydock No. 8 on February 7, 1943.
LST 333 was the first delivered, the ship being turned over to the Fleet on November 22, 1942. This vessel was lost in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1943. Also lost during the war were the LST 342 in the Solomons and the LST 348 off Italy. The last delivered was the LST 352 which was completed on February 28, 1943.
Speed of construction on the LST program was obtained largely by mass production methods with as much of the ship as possible being prefabricated. The Dravo Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pa., acted as the leading Yard for the program, and plans and procurement of materials was handled by that company. Design agents for the vessel was the firm of Gibbs and Cox of New York City,.
During the period of building other new construction was subordinated to the LST program. Special units were set up in the Yard to expedite the program particularly in the procurement of materials with the Supply Department assigning a section the job of speeding the flow of the LST machinery and steel. Coordinating the procurement of materials, the assembly of supplies and outfits and fitting these factors into the production schedule was a tremendous task.
For the successful prosecution of the program, the Yard won praise (CM 21 Aug. 1943) on several occasions, both from the Navy Department and from the Forces Afloat. Throughout the war the LSTs proved their worth. No ship in the Navy was used for a wider variety of duty, LSTs serving even as hospital shuttle ships and floating repair shops.
In addition to the twenty tank landing ships, the Norfolk Navy Yard also built fifty LCMs, the fifty-foot tank lighters designed as landing craft for mechanized equipment. This program was undertaken on March 20, 1942, and the entire fifty had been completed by August 21.
The original order given the Yard called for construction of 150 of these landing craft, but this was reduced to the 50 which the Yard completed. The reduction was ordered because of the higher urgency of other programs.
These landing craft were prefabricated in the Sub-Assembly Building, No. 261, and put together on the concrete platform between the buildingways and the Sub-Assembly building on the site of Bldg. 198 which had been torn down.
The LCMs are the largest landing craft normally carried by and identified with transports and cargo ships. The type built in the Navy Yard is capable of carrying a medium tank or about 30 tons of cargo ashore. They were ten-knot craft powered by two 225 h.p. diesels. Windlasses and stern anchors are used to work them off the beach.
The DE Program
Prior to the assignment of the LSTs to the Norfolk Navy Yard, the Secretary of the Navy had assigned nine destroy escort vessels for construction but work did not begin on these ships until the LST program was in full swing. This order came on January 10, 1942, with the Yard being directed to build destroyer Escorts 153-161, inclusive.
The destroyer escort was a new type of Naval vessel. Almost as large as a destroyer, it was to have less speed and less fire power but was to take over the destroyer's task of convoying supply ships. Getting the supplies across to Britain and Russia was the first major job to be done in that Winter of 1942; and in the not-too-distant future loomed the task of transporting our own fighting units to foreign shores and supplying them. The need was urgent for convoy vessels to shepherd the merchantmen from German submarine attack. The DE was to be in large measure the answer.
The mass production of these vessels presented many problems. First was the problem of where to build them. The destroyer ways were available and a hull could be launched every six weeks (DE/S1(1), but that did not turn the vessels out at a rapid enough rate. So the use of Drydock No. 2 for this purpose was arranged.
This dock had been used for New Construction previously, but the picture was altered after our entry into the war for this dock could take a damaged destroyer and the need in early 1942 was to keep every repair facility open. Still the need for escort vessels was so urgent that it was decided to use the dock for their construction.
Before any DE keels could be laid, however, the order was considerably increased. To the original assignment of nine, the Secretary of the Navy added sixteen more in a dispatch on June 8, 1942, and on August 8 an order for eleven more of the ships was placed with the Navy Yard which made a total of 36 DEs assigned in all.
On october 14, 1942, this number was reduced by the canceling of orders for 26 of the DEs and the transfer of these vessels to other yards, leaving the Navy Yard ten in all DE 153-161 inclusive and DE 198, all of which were built.
On September 7, 1942, keels were laid for the first two of the escort vessels. They were the DE 153, REUBEN JAMES and the DE 154, the SIMS. Both these vessels were laid down in Drydock 2.
Five months was required for their construction in the dock, the two vessels being launched on February 6, 1943. The REUBEN JAMES was commissioned on April 11, 1943, and turned over to the Fleet on April 19, the first DE delivered by the Yard. The SIMS was completed on May 9, 1943.
The third DE built was the HOPPING, DE 155, which was laid down on the Buildingsways No. 2 on December 15, 1942, and launched on March 9, 1943. The fourth and fifth, the REEVES, DE 156, and the FECHTELER, DE 157 which was lost in the Mediterranean in May 1944, were built in Drydock 2, following the REUBEN JAMES and SIMS. All ten of the vessels were built either in that dock or on the destroyer ways.
The last of the ten completed was the LOVELACE, DE 198, which was finished on November 15, 1943, and turned over to the forces afloat, completing the ten DEs assigned to Norfolk. The keel for this ship was laid on Buildingways 2 on May 22, 1943, and the ship was launched less than two months later on July 4, 1943, in an Independence Day observance marked also by the launching of the LANING, DE 159, and the LOY, DE 160, from Drydock 2, the final DE launching.
The LANING set the record for construction from keel to completion, slightly less than four months elapsing between the two dates. With the keel of this vessel laid on April 23, 1943, the ship was delivered to the Fleet on August 18, 1943.
So well did the DE program progress, indeed, that on February 16, 1943, the Yard asked BuShips (DE/S1(1)) to assign construction of two additional escort vessels. The "success of farming out hull construction" was assigned as the reason for the request. It was estimated that the keels could be laid about July 5, 1943, and that the vessels could be launched by September 20, 1943, one to be completed late in November and the other late in December.
The letter to BuShips pointed out that the speed of construction was due in part to subcontracting work such as stocks, sub-asssemblies, etc., to the Virginia Bridge Company, Roanoke, Va. The same mass production prefabrication techniques which had made the LST program click so well also enabled the Yard to turn in a fine performance on the destroyer escorts.
Farming out was done on much of the new construction during the war. The contractors were lined up for the Yard by two agencies, the Industry Cooperative Division of the Navy and the Smaller War Plants Corporation. Cities in which contracts were secured in addition to Roanoke included Norfolk, Newport News, Reidsville, N. C., Charlottesville, Va., Westchester, Pa., Miami, Florida, and Brooklyn, N. Y,.
The Bethlehem Hingham Yard served as design agent and central procurement agency for the DEs built in the Yard.
The additional ships requested by the Yard were not assigned, although the management was anxious to get them to provide a cushion for absorbing men not then required in the outfitting trades for the vessels to be completed at later dates.
In line with this request for more DEs, it is interesting to note that the work had progressed to a point where on February 26, 1943, in a letter to BuShips the Yard requested permission to resume work on the battleship KENTUCKY. As has been noted, preliminary work on the machinery and hull sub-assemblies was done during the interval in which the bottom structure lay tied up in the river.
The importance of the destroyer escort program was emphasized on April 23, 1943, by a communication from BuShips to the Yard - "The enemy submarine threat to our convoys is such that the importance of the destroyer escort program cannot be over emphasized."
Five other destroyer escorts in addition to those built in the Yard were also completed by the Norfolk Navy Yard after having been begun elsewhere. These vessels were transferred to Norfolk from the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydocks Company of Newark, N. J., and the Dravo Corporation of Wilmington, Del. Ranging from 46% complete in the case of the BREEMAN, DE104, to 73% complete in the case of the ATHERTON, DE169, the vessels were completed as follows: ATHERTON, DE 169, September 17, 1943; BOOTH, DE 170, September 30, 1943; CARROLL, DE 171, November 8, 1943; THOMAS, DE 102, December 4, 1943; and the BREEMAN, DE 104, December 27, 1943.
The Big Flat Tops
The largest capital ship new construction program which the Norfolk Navy Yard engaged in during World War II was the aircraft carrier program, three 34,800-ton Essex class aircraft carriers having been built during the war. These vessels were the USS SHANGRI-LA, CV38; USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, CV39; and the USS TARAWA, CV40.
The order for these three carriers was placed with the Navy Yard in a SecNav dispatch on August 7, 1942. The ships were the same class as the CV20, the USS ESSEX which was launched in Newport News on July 31, 1942, the first of the new fleet of big flat tops that was destined to carry the war to Japan.
The first of these vessels to be begun in the Navy Yard was the CV38, then unnamed. The keel was laid on January 15, 1943, on Buildingways No. 1, from which the second group of four LSTs had been launched in December.
Two months later on March 15, 1943, the keel for the CV39 was laid in Drydock No. 8, following the launching of the final group of LSTs from that dock. Lacking additional facilities to accommodate a third capital ship, the Yard could not lay the keel for the CV40 until one of the other two ships was completed.
The big flat tops were given high priority by the Navy Department because of the necessity for combat carriers in Pacific operations. With the work well underway on the DE and LST programs, the Yard devoted the full energy of its new construction division to these vessels. All of the tank landing ships had been launched by the time the keel of the CV39 was laid, but the destroyer escorts were under construction on Buildingways No. 2 and in Drydock No. 2 simultaneously with work on the two big carriers, so that the early spring and summer of 1943 saw the Yard carrying its heaviest new construction load.Few ships built in the Norfolk Navy Yard aroused as much interest on the part of the employees as did the SHANGRI-LA. The usual practice in assigning ships for construction is to assign them simply as hull numbers, and to designate the name of the vessel subsequently. In the case of the CV38, the name SHANGRI-LA was not assigned until August 1943, a year after the ship had been ordered. The announcement from Secretary Knox of the naming of the vessel was greeted with enthusiasm by Yard personnel.
The story of this name is perhaps well known, but it bear brief repetition here. The originator of "Shangri-La," was James Hilton in his novel "Lost Horizon," the name being given to a mythical location in Asia. Questioned by reporters as to where the American planes which bombed Tokyo in the first raid on the Japanese capital came from, President Roosevelt quipped that they came from "Shangri-La". Much later the actual source of the attack was disclosed as the USS HORNET, the ill-fated aircraft carrier which was lost in the battle of Santa Cruz, October 16, 1942, with B26s under command of the then Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle making the raid on April 18, 1942. From the President's grim wisecrack came the name of the CV38.
To build this vessel a nationwide war stamp and war bond campaign was conducted, especially among school children, who bought the stamps to raise funds for the carrier. Upon the completion of the fund raising drive, the name of the ship was assigned, and Norfolk was given the privilege of building her.
This nationwide interest in the SHANGRI-LA followed the ship through the final stages of its building, and the most colorful launching ceremony in the Norfolk Navy Yard's history resulted when, on February 24, 1944, the ship, Norfolk's first aircraft carrier, went down the ways.
Present of the ceremony was Mr. Hilton, author of the book; and Mrs. Doolittle, wife of the General, who christened the vessel. The Governor of Virginia, Colgate W. Darden, Jr., made the principal address. The largest throng ever gathered in the Yard saw the ceremony. War time restrictions stripping launching ceremonies of most of their colorful trappings were in effect, but for this significant event regulations were relaxed sufficiently to permit all Yard employees and their families to be present for the occasion. The Yard newspaper "Speed Victory" estimated the throng of 100,000.
Commissioned on September 15, 1944, the SHANGRI-LA was delivered to the fleet on November 1.
The LAKE CHAMPLAIN, second of the carriers, was launched from Drydock No. 8 on November 2, 1944, without ceremony, the christening commissioning being combined on June 3, 1945. On the same day the ship was turned over as completed. The original completion date for the CV39 was March 1946. Even despite the stepping up of this delivery date, progress on the LAKE CHAMPLAIN was slowed during the spring and summer of 1944 because of a labor shortage, which was by that time acute (Ch XIV; Sec 3 et seq) and because of the fact that the repair load had then reached its peak. A shortage of electricians, in particular, slowed the CHAMPLAIN job, although the Yard was able in part to make up for the shortage by shifting helpers from other trades to assist the electricians with such work as pulling cable. After this carrier was towed from the dock, the bottom structure of the KENTUCKY took its place.
At the christening ceremony, Mrs. Warren Austin, wife of the Senator from Vermont, served as sponsor. Later the same day, when the ship was placed in commission, Captain Logan Ramsey, USN, paid high tribute to the workers who had built the vessel when he said, "It is my considered opinion that today the finest aircraft carrier ever built is the United States Ship LAKE CHAMPLAIN."
The third of the carriers, the TARAWA, was built on Buildingways No. 1, her keel being laid March 1, 1944, following the SHANGRI-LA. Fourteen months later she was ready for launching, going down the ways on May 12, 1945. This ship was not commissioned until after the end of the war.
Names for the battle of Tarawa, the big flat top was christened by Mrs. Julian C. Smith, wife of the Major General who commanded the Second Marine Division in the battle.
For the construction of the tree big aircraft carriers, the New York Navy Yard acted as the leading yard and central procurement agency, Mass production methods similar to those employed on the smaller vessels were also used on these ships, considerably speeding up the time of construction. Prefabrication of parts and central purchasing of equipment enabled the vessels to be completed in far less time than similar construction had required before the war. The SHANGRI-LA required 23 months from keel to delivery, the CHAMPLAIN 27 months and the TARAWA 21 months from keel to commissioning.
Two additional carriers, CV54 and CV55, were assigned to th4 Yard for construction on January 22, 1945, for delivery in August and December 1947, to be built as duplicates of the Philadelphia assigned CV45, but this order was cancelled on March 27, 1945. (CV54/S1(1)).
Destroyers and Other Miscellaneous Vessels
Six destroyers were delivered to the forces afloat after the outbreak of war in Europe, as has been noted, but only two, the USS HERNDON, DD638, and the USS CHUBRICK, DD 639 of the Bristol Class of 1940-41, ordered on December 16, 1940, were actually under construction during the war.
For destroyer construction the Yard was particularly commended. The construction of the MORRIS won the following statement by the Board of Inspection and Survey: " In general the structure and workmanship throughout were excellent and the vessel was more nearly complete than most others recently seen. The Building Yard is to be complimented upon the prompt and effective way in which completion and outfitting items have been taken in hand and upon the very moderate amount of necessary work outstanding at the time of trial."
And of the WAINWRIGHT: The WAINWRIGHT is the second ship of her class built by the Norfolk Navy Yard to be presented for trial. Like the first (the MORRIS), she was in an exceptionally advanced state of completion. The Yard had undertaken promptly the items found during the shakedown to require correction or adjustment . . . The condition of the vessel evidenced a most commendable effort on the part of the Yard to present the ship for trial substantially complete, and close intelligent cooperation between the Yard and ship toward this end."
A Commandant's circular in July 1940, citing this favorable comment, said: "Commendation, such as the above, from the Board of Inspection and Survey is extremely rare, and consequently the Yard has every right to feel proud of those two ships."
"The Board of Inspection has stated that the last four destroyers (ROWAN, STACK, MORRIS and WAINWRIGHT) built at this Yard are the finest in the Navy."
Of the war-built destroyers, the HERNDON was first, the keel being laid on August 26, 1941, on Buildingways 2. This ship was launched on February 5, 1942, the first combatant vessel launched in the Yard after the beginning of the war, the slightly more than five months on the buildingways at that time constituting an extremely fast building time. The SHUBRICK was on the ways, however, for only 60 days, establishing what is believed to be a record for this type of construction. Laid down on February 17, 1942, on the ways where the HERNDON had been constructed, the SHUBRICK was launched on April 18, 1942. The ceremony was simple and without fanfare.
The Commandant's Memorandum on the launching of the ship stated that as befitting the times there were to be no speeches and no invitation issued. Yard work was not suspended and only those who could be "spared from their duties" attended. The construction time of 60 days compared with an average 18 months required for ships of the TUCKER-DOWNES class.
Although speedily launched, a long delay ensued before the completion of the two vessels, the HERNDON not being completed until February 15, 1943, and the SHUBRICK March 31, 1943. The delay resulted because of higher priorities assigned other vessels and the inability to get main engines. For many months during 1942, both vessels were tied up at a pier awaiting machinery. They were completed at St. Helena.
Rounding out the new construction program of the Norfolk Navy Yard during World War II were a number of smaller craft, including the RAVEN, AM55, OSPREY, AM56 and the AUK, AM57, three minesweepers, the first two being delivered in April 1941 and the latter in April 1942. In addition a tug, the WAHTAH, YT 140, the YF 257, YF 287, YW 59 and the YRDs 3, 4 and 5 were built. The YSDs 38, 39, 40 and 41 begun at the Charleston, S. C., Navy Yard were also brought to Norfolk for completion.
The only two types of combatant vessels which have not been built in the Norfolk Navy Yard are modern cruisers and submarines. Cruiser construction, however, was sought by the Yard at several different times. Before the heavy new construction order of 1940 and 1941 and at the time when other yards were getting cruiser construction, Admiral Simons was anxious to bring this type of work to Norfolk despite the fact that at that time the Yard did not possess the necessary facilities. The buildingways were in use and the only dock available for new construction, No. 2, was too short to take a cruiser, although it served admirably for destroyer work.
Undaunted the Admiral declared that he could solve this difficulty by building the ship in two parts, the major portion in Drydock 2 following the launching of the MORRIS and WAINWRIGHT, and the bow elsewhere, and then welding the parts together in one of the larger repair docks which had to be kept open for emergency use. In news stories in the local papers (Nfk.Vgn. Pilot, 25 February 1939) the Commandant said that he believed no such shipbuilding feat had ever before been attempted. His proposal was by no means a stunt, he said, but was a serious effort to increase the work load of the Yard, but cruiser work was not assigned to Norfolk.
XI. MANUFACTURING
The final major productive activity of the Norfolk Navy Yard during the World War II was manufacturing. As the table on dollar value of production (Ch. VIII; Sec. 2) shows, more than two hundred million dollars worth of manufactured products were turned out for the Navy during the six years of the war.
High on the list in importance among these manufactured products was the building of small boats (Boat Shop His. Memo, A12(3)). Between Pearl Harbor and V-J Day, Shop 68 turned out 2,680 small boats and performed repairs on approximately 3,000 others from ships and shore stations. The Norfolk Navy Yard's Boat Shop is recognized as the leading naval small boat building plant on the East Coast both for new construction and repair. Boats of all types from whale boats to Admiral's barges were built throughout the war.
Diesel engines for small boats were also manufactured in quantity. During the thirties gasoline engines for small boats had been built in the Yard but diesels replaced them beginning in January 1935. The motor blocks and other major parts were cast in the Foundry and the engines were assembled by the Inside Machine Shop. Three types of engines, 25, 26, and 105 horsepower were constructed. Many of them went directly into the small boats built in the Yard while hundreds of others were shipped out to other Naval establishments.
Paints and varnishes were produced in quantity, the Yard serving as the chief supply point for other East Coast activities. A paint laboratory (His. Memo A12(3)) was maintained providing for constant research to increase the quality of marine paints.
Many other manufactured products were turned out during the war for the Fleet and for other navy yards.
These items included foundry products such as anchors, chains and turret castings which were produced in large quantities.
Oxygen and other industrial gases were manufactured for the Yard as well as for other Naval establishments.
Metal furniture was produced for many of the Naval vessels constructed during the war and miscellaneous sheetmetal articles were manufactured. (See X17, His. Memo. Shops, A12(3)).
Turbine blades, propellers for destroyers, bomb casings, bomb racks, other Ordnance manufacturing and spare parts for various types of machinery were among the many other products which came from the Navy Yard's shops.
Manufacturing declined during the war, however, as the ship repair increased. Products that could be purchased outside were farmed out in accordance with Navy Department policy (SecNav ltr, 28 January 1941, FS/L9-3(87)"A"). A Commandant's letter to SecNav on March 6, 1941, lists a large number of such items that had by that time been farmed out to ease the manufacturing load in the Yard.
XII. SAFETY AND INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
The Safety Section
At the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939, the Safety Section of the Norfolk Navy Yard consisted of a Lieutenant (jg) designated as Safety Officer and one clerk-typist. They operated as a minor subdivision of the Shop Superintendent's Office and were located in Building 33. (Ch. IV; Sec 6).
At that time compensation reports to the United States Employees Compensation Commissioner were handled by the shops and the Labor Board. Statistical information concerning lost-time accidents, and the days chargeable to accidents, was compiled in the Labor Board and provided to the Safety Officer. Data concerning man hours worked was accumulated by a clerk in the Shop Superintendent's Office and turned over to the Safety Officer. The Safety Officer and his clerk computed the frequency and severity rates and prepared only the few reports required at that time.
No separate allocation of funds for either personal protective equipment, or safety devices, or machinery-guarding, or safeguards of any sort had been made. Any work of this nature was conducted at the discretion of the Shop Superintendent and charged to shop expense. There were no field forces available to assist the Safety Officer in the investigation of accidents and the elimination of the causes of accidents.
The method of compiling accident statistics in use then was radically different from the code of the American Standards Association, which has been adopted by the Navy Department as standard, therefore direct comparison between the experience at that time and the experience as shown today is impossible.
The Yard was rapidly expanding at the time both in area and personnel, and in 1940 at the recommendation of the Safety Section and the Medical Department six sub-Dispensaries were established at various locations in the Yard area to furnish convenient medical treatment. (Med.Dept. His. Rept. LLP/P2).
During the building of the ALABAMA, the New Construction Superintendent became convinced of the necessity of some method for the control of hazards and dangerous conditions, and organized a group of laborers from Shop 72 to patrol the ship, reporting and correcting obvious accident hazards and fire hazards.
This initial group functioned with encouraging success, but it was soon realized that being laborers they were in a poor position to talk to mechanics about unsafe practices that they might observe, therefore the membership of the group was revised to include mechanics in November 1942. It is significant to note that the operation of this group was confined to New Construction activities exclusively, consisting of the Buildingways, Drydock No. 8, Drydock No. 2, Turret Shop, Pier 6 and St. Helena, the latter two locations being used primarily for outfitting. This was the start of the Safety Marshal Corps. Safety Marshals did not come under the cognizance of the Safety Officer during this period.
In late 1940 the Safety Officer was given one civilian assistant. This number was increased to three by November 1942. Safety indoctrination of new officers was established in early 1941, and much of the time of the civilian assistants was spent in this work. In the meantime funds had been allocated for safety work and a Safety Charge Job Number was set up in January 1942.
In December 1942 at the direction of the Safety Officer, the Shop Masters appointed Shop Safety Marshals who, under the supervision of the Safety Officer, were to follow up on accident control in the operations of their respective shops. The Supply Department was not included in this arrangement until March 1943 at which time they appointed four Safety Marshals which made a total of 27 men for the Yard. In May 1943 the New Construction Safety Marshals were brought under the cognizance of the Safety Officer.
In the meantime the Safety Section was expanded. The Safety Officer's billet was taken by a Lieutenant Commander, several junior officers were added as assistants, and some civilian employees were designated as Safety Inspectors and Safety Engineers. In addition to his regular duties, the Safety Officer was charged with the responsibility of setting up the Passive Defense Organization covering organization of various groups required in Air Raid Defense. (Ch, VII; Sec. 1).
In order to accommodate the increased responsibility, the office was shifted to Building 68. At this time the Safety Officer was designated by the Commandant to be the "Official superior" of all civilian employees in the Yard, in so far as the United States Employees Compensation Commission is concerned, and to assume full responsibility for the transmitting of all accident reports and investigation to the U. S. E. C. C.
Assumption of this responsibility by the Safety Section required additional clerical help and expansion of the office space, with the result that in the spring of 1943 the office was again moved to larger quarters. The second floor of Building 64, south end, was fitted up as the yard Safety Office and is in use today as the headquarters of the Safety Section.
Prior to 1943 the procurement of personal protective equipment was normally left up to the in the individual shops with little or no guidance in the matter of selection of correct equipment. Actually little equipment was used or was available in the Yard. During 1942 authorization was received in the yard to establish a central tool room to act as a distributing center to various shop tool rooms in housing safety equipment and supplies. At the same time authorization was given to procure equipment and supplies as necessary as approved by the Safety Officer.
In general this list included rescue breathing apparatus, hard hats, goggles, gloves, safety shoes, toe guards, aprons, respirators, ladder safety shoes and many other types of devices for the protection of the individual worker. All safety equipment and supplies are made available to workers without charge except safety shoes. A safety shoe store established in March 1944 by a private contractor operates inside the Yard on shifts convenient to yard workers. Several types of safety shoes for men and women are sold at normal cost to yard workers.
In the early part of 1943 arrangements were made in Shop 31 to clean, sterilize and repair certain types of personal protective equipment. This beginning, though small, has developed into a fairly large size project. The sterilizing and repair of the equipment has since been transferred from Shop 31 to Shop 74 where an average of about ten thousand units are cleaned and repaired every month. The equipment of this nature in the yard today constitutes a volume and variety of such an extent that practically any type of emergency or normal work procedure can be handled.
Although comparison of current accident frequency and severity rates with 1942 and prior dates is impossible, comparison can be made with 1943 and 1944. The 1943 frequency and severity rate was 23.2 and 1.39 respectively and in 1944 these rates were 19.06 and 1.79. The 1945 accumulative rate including September is 13.17 and 1.02. Examination of these figures shows a substantial reduction in both frequency and severity which can be translated into definite evidence of improved productive efficiency thereby justifying the cost and effort of the entire accident prevention program.
2. The Saturn Fire
During 1944 and the early part of 1945, the period of the Yard's heaviest work load, four major fires occurred, one of them with heavy loss of life.
The first of these, and the greatest tragedy in the modern history of the Norfolk Navy Yard, occurred on April 27, 1944, when fifteen employees of the Yard lost their lives and twenty other employees and two Navy enlisted men were injured in a fire aboard the USS SATRUN, AK-49, then undergoing conversion.
The SATURN was a hot job. Welders, burners, joiners, shipfitters and laborers were working simultaneously below decks building refrigeration spaces in an effort to complete the conversion from AK to AF within an availability which had been shortened from 75 to 60 days.
A little over an hour after the night shift came on, sparks or hot metal from a welder's torch fell into a pile of cork which had been painted with a bituminous primer containing petroleum spirits preparatory to installation in the refrigerating spaces. Flames leaped up quickly and within a matter of minutes heavy smoke and fumes filled the ship's hold. The fire itself never became very large and damage to the ship was minor, but the carbon monoxide so quickly generated proved fatal to the workmen who could not get out. Only five of those in the hold escaped.
The fire which had started at 6:20 p.m. in No. 3 hold on the third deck level was all over by 6:45. But Navy Yard firemen and medical units carried on first aid and resuscitation efforts until 8:30. Efforts to revive 15 of those overcome were not successful. The deaths were recorded as suffocation. Damage to the vessel was estimated at $12,410 with the total cost of labor and replacement set at $23,900.
The disaster shocked the Navy Yard and a Court of Inquiry (AF40/L11(1)) was convened at 8 a.m. the following day by order of the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District to investigate the circumstances connected with the fire.
For many days thereafter the Court probed into the circumstances surrounding the tragedy. Two major points were emphasized in the findings: first that the conditions under which the work was being done that of "calculated risk" offered a definite fire hazard, and second that the Yard needed a better and more effective type of safety organization.
The Court of Inquiry found "that the organization of the Safety Office is inadequate for an activity of the type and size of the Norfolk Navy Yard. The Safety Officer has been performing many collateral duties simultaneously. Furthermore his educational background is not that of a safety engineer. Safety marshals were insufficiently trained and demonstrate a lack of experience in safety measures."
The Court further held "that there existed a general lack of appreciation of the necessity to provide for the potentialities of fire and the attendant danger to personnel concerned under the circumstances.
"That although various conferences had recognized the danger of permitting welders, joiners and painter to work simultaneously within this hold, there was a general neglect on the part of the officers and leading men concerned to take, or cause to be taken, definite precautions to lessen the danger of such a disaster as occurred, namely; (a) Insufficient fire watches provided to cover the various operations and the various deck levels; (b) Inadequate equipment provided welders and burners as required by Manager's Notice 23/42; (c) Inadequate ventilation to remove combustible gases as required by Manager's Notice 23/42; (d) Initial preparation of the cork adjacent to welding and burning operations; and (e) Inadequate provision of usable access and escape."
The Court recommended "that an adequate safety organization headed by a thoroughly qualified safety officer be established in the Norfolk Navy Yard."
The Court further recommended "that the Safety Officer and his staff be clothed with the necessary authority to carry out his duties, and that he be not encumbered with collateral duties which might interfere with the proper performance of his functions."
It is also recommended "that a procedure be established whereby upon the arrival of commissioned vessels in the yard for repair, overhaul, or alteration, the Fire Chief and Safety Officer be ordered to report to the Commanding Officers of such vessels to confer with them . . . (and) should make definite recommendations as to precautions considered necessary."
In endorsing the findings of the Court over to ComFive the Commandant stated: "The need for having the safety organization headed by a thoroughly qualified Safety Officer has been appreciated a long time, has been under consideration many months and has been under discussion with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy's office. The real problem is one of close administration and able administrative leadership of the Safety Office and safety personnel."
The work, diligence and interest of the Safety Officer were highly praised by the Commandant. The prospects of procuring a better safety officer than the incumbent were poor, he said, and he stated that he was satisfied to retain him unless the Department had a better man.
The Commandant disagreed with the recommendation that the Safety Officer be clothed with the necessary authority to carry out his duties, pointing out that the position was an advisory one, and that if it were otherwise it would conflict with administrative and executive authority of all levels of management.
With reference to collateral duties the Commandant stated that the Safety Officer had also been assisting the Personnel Relations Officer with rationing and transportation and that efforts had been made to get a qualified officer for these tasks.
The Commandant pointed out that "the prosecution of the war effort demands the meeting of relatively short availability dates and, incidentally, the acceptance of costly labor charges and some risks not comparable with peace time safety standards especially on urgent and rush repair and conversion jobs. Higher levels of management must assume responsibility."
The conclusion reached by ComFive in approval of the findings of the Court of Inquiry was well summed up in one statement of the endorsement: "There was a relaxation of vigilance in the Navy Yard. The result was this disaster."
Although there may have been no direct connection between the SATURN fire and the subsequent strengthening of the Yard's safety organization, such a strengthening of the Safety Section, did occur in the latter part of 1944. A number of revisions of Commandant's Orders concerning safety were made and added emphasis was placed on the enforcement of proper safety practices and common sense safety rules.
3. Building 173 Fire
The second serious fire to strike the Navy Yard occurred on August 4, 1944, when Bldg. 173, Shop 01 office and ships' storage building which at that time contained the principal part of the commissioning outfit for the SHANGRI-LA, CV38, was totally destroyed by fire. Loss of the ship's outfit was serious, but completion of the carrier was not delayed. Necessary material from the outfit of the CV39 was transferred to the CV38 to allow its completion, and equipment for the LAKE CHAMPLAIN was re-procured.
The cause of the fire was never determined. A Board of Investigation (N19(173-5)) convened by the Commandant, after lengthy investigation found only that a Yard machinist employed in the building had smoked and permitted smoking and failed to dispose of oily rags daily in the Equipment Repair Shop in the south end of the building, and that two Yard electricians installed oversize fuses in the building; but said: "There is no evidence, however, to indicate that any of the above offenses contributed in any way to the cause of the fire."
The Board further found "that there was some delay in notification by telephone due to the inefficiency of the patrolman" who discovered the blaze. The fire alarm reached fire station No. 3 six minutes, and headquarters eight minutes, after discovery of the fire.
The patrolman in his testimony stated that he discovered the fire at 3:40 p.m. and attempted to telephone the alarm from the patrolmen's shack under the Borum Overpass, but getting no response from the operator he left the phone with another patrolman and started for a fire alarm box at the north end of the building which by the time he reached it had already been pulled. He said he held the phone four or five minutes waiting for an answer.
This delay, plus the fact that the fire had gained great headway unseen in the corrugated iron-covered building, enabled the flames to reach such proportions that the Yard firemen were not able to save the structure. Indeed, assistance was brought in from the Portsmouth Fire Department when the flames spread to the adjoining storage platforms.
Loss of the building and contents was valued at approximately $521,000. The destruction of the building, a fairly large one, was particularly serious because the storage problem was already acute. It was estimated that replacement of the building could be made for $125,000, but no replacement was made despite a recommendation for a new building to the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
That the structure, in some respects, was a fire hazard and had been noted previously. The wooden floor of the building was saturated with oil from many years use as a paint and oil storehouse. There were no fire wall nor sprinkler systems. A memorandum from the Fire Chief to the Captain of the Yard on March 28, 1944, (N19(173-5)) is quoted in this connection:
"Subj: Bldg. #173, Fire Hazard
"Inspection of subject building revealed very trashy condition in the South End of building.
"This section of the building is being used as temporary ship storage.
"Recommend South End section of this building be thoroughly cleaned so as to eliminate existing hazard.
"Further recommend notification be given party or parties using this storage to maintain good housekeeping practice." /s/W. E. SykesThe performance of the Yard's firefighters in the Bldg. 173 blaze won praise from the Board, and letters of commendation were written to Fire Chief Waverly E. Sykes, Assistant Fire Chief William T. Jewell, firefighters Vernon Carr and Charles Pierce for their "courageous performance of duty with risk of personal injury in extinguishing the fire which had spread to drums of combustible materials some of which were exploding thereby preventing a much greater loss."
As a result of the fire, a memorandum from the Commandant to the heads of all departments on August 25, 1944, directed that such action as necessary be taken to see that all concerned were informed of the provision of fire prevention directives.
4. Scott Center Fire
The third major fire of 1944 occurred on December 31 when the Recreation Building, No. 360, at Norman Scott Center, Group A barracks, was destroyed by fire. The building served as a ship's service store in addition to its recreation purposes which included game and lounge rooms.
A Board of Investigation (N4(123)) convened by the Commandant to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the fire was unable to determine the cause.
The total book value loss amounted to $124,397.63. The building and equipment was listed at $109,700.00. The Ship's Service stock at $13,177.86, the Ship's Service equipment at $1,527.25 and the Welfare equipment at $992.52. In addition to this a loss was suffered by the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia of approximately $8,000 for its attended telephone equipment.
A total of $31,922.53 of the loss was recoverable under the fire insurance policy carried by the ship's service store on its stock and equipment.
The Board found that low water pressure delayed extinguishing the blaze, although this was not held as a contributing factor in the loss of the building. For approximately an hour while the fire, which was discovered at 5:20 a.m., was in progress the pressure was low, and the auditorium, Bldg. 363, to the east of Bldg. 360 was in danger. The intensity of the fire in the ship's service store which was of frame construction without sprinkler system or fire walls, was so intense that the Yard fire division, despite a speedy arrival, was unable to save the structure.
A request was made by the Fire Chief to the Officer-in-Charge of Group A for additional water pressure, but due to the use of messenger service, lack of coordinating supervision, and knowledge of proper operation and functions of the pump house and use of reservoir water, there was an undue delay in restoring water pressure at the hydrants in use.
As a result of the Board's findings on the inadequacy of water pressure, a study was later made by the Public Works Division which resulted in improvement.
As for the beginning of the fire, the Board offered the opinion that had the bluejacket on watch made his rounds more frequently, the fire might have been discovered earlier, and it recommended that sentries be required to make more frequent fire checks.
The Board further found that discrepancies existed in the various official logs which recorded the time of the fire, and as a result of their recommendation to end such discrepancies an automatic timing device was later installed in the Captain of the Yard's office.
The Board finally recommended that a commissioned officer be assigned duty as Yard fire marshal.
Taking note of their final recommendation, the Commandant, Admiral Jones, in an endorsement of the findings of the Board of Investigation, stated that a request had been made to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the assignment of an officer experienced in fire prevention and fire fighting to act as fire marshal.
The year 1944 was a disastrous one so far as fires were concerned. Some idea of the activity of the Navy Yard Fire Department is indicated by the fact that in the 18-month period ending December 31, 1944, the Navy Yard Fire Division responded to 1,005 fire alarms.
5. St. Helena Fire
On the afternoon of January 16, 1945, shortly before 3 o'clock the worst fire of the war occurred when Pier 3 at the St. Helena Annex was virtually destroyed by flames, three ships were damaged, and 169 Navy Yard workers and naval personnel incurred injuries, although the majority of those injured suffered mainly from smoke.
The damage from the fire was listed as follows.
USS SPEED Availability advanced approx. 30 days LSM164 Availability unaffected LSM153 Availability unaffected Tools & Equipment Materials & Supplies Piers, Wharves & Buildings Total The total was subject to a salvage value for rebuilding purposes of $262,700.
Total actual loss: $647,073.00
The fire occurred when sparks from a civilian welder's torch on the SPEED started a small blaze in a GI trash can, which was thrown over the side of the vessel igniting the creosoted timbers and pilings of the pier at the inboard end where the minesweeper was tied up.
Highly inflammable because of the creosote and a coating of oil which had accumulated, the pier was soon a mass of flames out of control. Fire companies from St. Helena, the Navy Yard proper, the City of Portsmouth, the City of Norfolk, the Naval Operating Base, the Amphibious Training Base at Little Creek, and the U. S. Coast Guard responded to the alarm as well as tugs from the Yard and Coast Guard fire boats, but they were unable to save the pier.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in fighting the fire because the flames were centered in the timbers of the pier and wharves beneath the macadam topping. For eight hours firefighters battled the flames before bring them under control, and intermittent blazes continued to smolder until the following day.
The 169 injured person were treated in the industrial dispensary at St. Helena. Ten, including both civilians and naval personnel, were hospitalized with injuries of varying degrees of seriousness. Those treated at the dispensary suffered largely as a result of smoke irritation to the eyes which cased bilateral conjunctivitis. In addition, smoke inhalation, burns, various miscellaneous wounds and injuries were suffered. A light note on the catastrophe was provided by a Medical Officer's memorandum to the effect that among the burned persons were "two burn cases from the restaurant caused by hot coffee." Immediately following the fire on January 18 a Court of Inquiry was convened by order of the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District (L11(144)) to make a complete investigation.
Opinions of the Court included the following:
"That the yard craft Norfolk Navy Yard equipped for fire fighting did not function as an organized fire-fighting component.
"That the fire could have been extinguished earlier with less labor and damage had the efforts of all the fire-fighting forces present been directly controlled by a person qualified by experience for such duty.,
"That the fire stops (creosoted wood plank with a sheathing of incombustible mineral board on each side) were ineffective in that they did not prevent the spread of the fire throughout the length of Pier 3 and along the wharf between Piers 2 and 4.
It recommendations included:
"That effective steps be taken to eliminate the danger of fire from oil on the waters of the Norfolk Navy Yard.
"That laboratory tests be made to determine the degree of combustibility of the coating of oil which has accumulated on the piling and timbers of the piers and wharves of St. Helena Annex, and if such tests disclose an appreciable fire hazard, that steps be taken for periodic removal of the coating, if practicable.
"That without delay there be installed in the timber piers and wharves at the Norfolk Navy Yard effective barriers against the extensive spread of fire.
"That the tugs and fireboats of the Norfolk Navy Yard be equipped with water nozzles at an elevation low enough to permit streams from them to be directed against undersides of the decks of the timber piers and wharves.
"That the tugs at the Norfolk Navy Yard equipped for fire fighting be organized into an effective fire-fighting component of the Fire Division of the Yard under the direction and control of a Fire Chief qualified for this assignment by experience in marine fire fighting, who shall be required to train and drill tug crews diligently in approved fire-fighting methods.
"That the Fire Marshal of the Norfolk Navy Yard be a commissioned officer of appropriate rank qualified by experience in fire fighting, and that his duties under the Captain of the Yard be to take charge of and coordinate fire-fighting operations through two (2) principal assistants, namely the Chief of the Fire Division in control of land fire-fighting apparatus and the Chief in charge of the fire-fighting activities of the tugs.
"That a shore activity in the Hampton Roads area be directed to maintain a properly organized, trained and equipped demolition squad, the services of which shall be immediately available to the Commandant, Norfolk Navy Yard, when requested for demolition work in event such a drastic fire-fighting measure becomes necessary."
As a result of the several recommendations which had been made for appointment of a commissioned officer as Fire Marshal, this billet was created and a specially-trained officer became Fire Marshal on January 31, 1945, working directly under the Captain of the Yard.
Soon after the wreckage of the fire was cleared away the rebuilding of Pier 3 was undertaken and the job was completed at about the time the war ended, ships being berthed there early in September even though all of the equipment was not finished. A fire-proof type of construction was used in the rebuilding. The foundation is of pilings with a concrete retaining wall and a platform containing earth and gravel with a macadam topping forming the deck of the pier.
XIII. Speeding War Production
An important means of stimulating production during the war was provided by the War Production Committee formed in 1943. The Norfolk Navy Yard was at the forefront of naval activities in its Beneficial Suggestion Program. In all more than 18,000 employee suggestions were handled by the War Production Committee from September 1, 1943, when it began functioning, to the end of the war. This large number represented between 15 and 20% of the entire number received by all naval establishments.
An estimated 10% of the suggestions won cash awards with the result that savings estimated at well over the million dollar mark were effected in the Navy Yard. At war's end, cash awards were actually being paid at an average rate of one hundred a month.
Recommendations made by special subcommittee on morale, absenteeism, care of tools and equipment, material conservation and safety and health were of great assistance in increasing the production through related phases of Yard work.
Authority for initiation of the War Production Committee was established in Naval Shore Activities by AstSecNav letter (SOSED-MIE-gg) of April 27, 1943. Commandant's Order 25/43 was authority for establishing and organizing the Committee locally which began actual functioning the first week of August 1943.
The Norfolk Navy Yard interpretation of this directive joined the existing Committee of Awards and the new War Production Committee as one unit for the promotion and processing of employees beneficial suggestions for increasing production with cash awards for suggestors.
For many years prior to World War II a plan had existed for paying cash awards to employees for accepted production ideas. In early years the Committee on Awards was charged with the responsibility of paying a cash award of $10.00 to someone each month, and it is said that sometimes a search had to be instituted to find an employee deserving of the cash.
Later in the development of the Suggestion Plan the Labor Management Committee which had been formed to "consider suggestions for increasing production from any source" in the summer of 1942 (FSL/9-3(87)"C" April 20, 1942), consisting of several Naval Officers and top Yard civilian supervisors, met at an appointed time in a conference room and interviewed any employee who had a Beneficial Suggestion to put forward.
The War Production Committee supplanted these schemes. Its organization called for liaison men in each section of every shop and activity in the Yard, known as sub-section War Production Committee men and totaling almost 400.
The flow of suggestions as stimulated by these sub-committeemen, and collected, numbered, tabulated and disseminated by the Central War Production and Committee on Awards headquarters were investigated and reported on by War Production Committees sitting once a week in each of the 28 shops or activities in the Yard.
Recommendations of these committees were forwarded through the master of the shop or the office head who took action, if within his jurisdiction to do so, and then where necessary to the central Beneficial Suggestion Committee or War Production Steering Committee for review prior to recommending desired action to highest Departmental authority.
Suggestions thus placed in effect had all data reviewed and supplemented as necessary by a Civilian Committee on Awards investigator before forwarding to the Committee on Awards for cash or letter of commendation to the suggestor.
The Norfolk Navy Yard viewed the function of the War Production Committee as the nucleus of the processing plan for suggestions with the previously existent Committee on Awards determining cash value only after all information as to savings and means of placing the idea in effect had been obtained.
The number of suggestions is ample testimony to the efficiency of the program which gave wide latitude to the employees themselves in the administration and processing of all suggestions. The thought that fellow employees were judging whether the suggestion was worthy was the prime reason for confidence in the program.
Previous suggestion participation under plans utilized up to September 1, 1943, netted less than two thousand suggestions in a year of operation. Under previous plans employees had little voice in processing and judging the merits of a production idea.
VOLUME 2
PART FOUR: PERSONNEL
XIV. Employment
Increase in the Payroll
The first substantial increase in the Norfolk Navy Yard's employment occurred in 1938 coinciding roughly with the beginning of work on the 20% expansion of the Fleet authorized in that year and with the beginning of plans for construction of the battleship ALABAMA.
The basic working force during the early thirties was set at 3,000 with a maximum of 3,600, fixed in accordance with the Navy Department's policy for the Norfolk Navy Yard. (AstSecNav lrt 30 December 1931).
The record shows, however, that this authorized figure and the Yard's actual employment, despite the depression years, doubled during the thirties.
At the end of 1933, the year in which the fleet rebuilding program was undertaken, the Yard's payroll listed 3,965 employees. By September 1, 1939, the day the war started in Europe, the number had risen to 7,625.
This growth occurred despite fluctuation at various times during the period. In 1937, for example, the payroll showed a new loss (See Employment Table following), and at other times during the period the payroll was up and down varying with the work load. Sometimes the total number of employees was off as much as several hundred from summer to winter; but notwithstanding these up and downs, the growth for the overall period was steady. Only four years, 1937, 1930, 1929 and 1927, out of the entire period from 1923 to 1943, showed payroll losses and two of those, 1929 and 1927, were negligible.
The year 1938, when the expansion which was to culminate in World World War II began, saw the Yard add more than one thousand employees, the first large payroll increase since World War I. From then onward the growth was spectacular. In 1939 more than two thousand new employees were added; in 1940 the increase was over six thousand; and in 1941 the payroll was boosted by more than fourteen thousand workers, comprising the greatest increase for any one year of the emergency and war periods. Twelve thousand more employees were added in 1942, sending the payroll to its World War II peak of nearly 43,000. The highest point was reached on February 15, 1943, when 43,893 workers were listed on the payroll. From this point until the end of the war the number of employees declined steadily, falling to 31,770 on V-J Day, September 2, 1945.
One of the most vexing problems of employment throughout the war was that of getting qualified workers. During the years when the work load was at it peak, this problem was particularly acute, but it was noticeable for a considerable time before the peak was reached. Even as far back as 1938, when workers were being called for construction of the ALABAMA, some difficulty was experienced in getting the skilled men required.
The long period of stagnation in naval and maritime construction after World War I resulted in a definite shortage in many of the special shipbuilding trades and technical occupations such as naval architects, marine engineers, mold loftsmen, shipfitters and coppersmiths. As a result much of the skilled labor needed for building the ALABAMA and subsequently for the Yard's war time work had to be imported.
The Hampton Roads area is known as an "in-migrant" labor area. With two shipyards such as the Norfolk Navy Yard and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, plus the many other naval and military activities demanding workers and no large centers of population upon which to draw, such as exists for the Navy Yards in New York, Boston or Philadelphia, it has been necessary from the first to bring labor into the area. Had it not been for this in-migration, the war plants of Hampton Roads could not have operated, but it was in this in-migration that the roots of many of the difficulties encountered in employment and personnel lay.
Each of the problems brought about by the rapid increase in the payroll, such as housing, transportation, etc., and the related problems of turnover and direct recruiting will be discussed in subsequent sections.
The table (p200) which follows shows the employment figures for the Norfolk Navy Yard from World War I to V-J Day, September 2, 1945. The figures for important dates such as Pearl Harbor are included although the overall table is based on the year-end figures. The first column shows the total employment, the second the number of per annum employees, and the third the new change for each year. The graph (p201) which follows the table shows clearly the swift increase and then the equally swift decline after 1944.
Click on link, then click image again in browser to enlarge
Labor BoardUpon the Labor Board of the Norfolk Navy Yard fell the main burden of handling the tremendous increase in employment.
The chief functions of the Labor Board are to develop sources of labor supply; announce and conduct Civil Service examinations; establish and maintain registers of Groups I, II, III and IVa24 applicants for employment and issue tender of appointments from these registers; appointing and completing for the appointees the necessary papers in connection with their appointment; maintain records of all civilian employees and compile and submit personnel reports, etc.
24 See also His. Memo. "Effect of the National Emergency on IVb Personnel Procedure", A12(3).
At the beginning of the national emergency on September 8, 1939, the Labor Board was located in Building 33 occupying a space 30 feet by 75 feet. At that time there were 17 employees and there were less than 8,000 employees on the rolls of the entire Yard. Appointments then were effected under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations Governing Employment of Naval Personnel, known as Form 2009, together with the Navy Department directives and Commandant's orders.
With the increase in construction and repair work in the Yard, the functions of the Labor Board increased to the extent that it was necessary in November 1940 to move into the present building, No. 264, a one-story structure 165 feet by 45 feet, located outside the Yard for security reasons to prevent applicants for employment gaining entrance into the Yard. At that time the number of appointments to mechanical positions in the Yard processed through the Labor Board had advanced from 523 during the month of September 1939 to 2,076 during the month of October 1940. By the end of the year 1940, the force of the Yard was over 15,000, almost double the number of employees at the beginning of the national emergency.
The year 1941 saw the Yard force advance to 21,326 by June 30, an increase of more than 5,000 over the end of 1940. Meanwhile, during those first six months of 1941, the Labor Board made 10,424 appointments. The difference in the net increase represented the large turnover due mainly at that time to the lack of housing facilities which caused many employees to resign. Through November 1941 the Labor Board had made 21,414 appointments that year, bringing the total complement of the Yard to slightly less than 29,000 employees on the eve of the outbreak of the war, December 7, 1941. The number of appointments during 1941 made through the Labor Board was greatly accelerated by the cooperation of the Virginia State Employment Service, which on January 1, 1942, became the United States Employment Service.
The increase in the work of the Labor Board made it necessary to construct an addition of the same dimensions which was occupied the first part of 1942. The addition, which is actually a second building, is also 165 feet by 45 feet, and the Labor Board uses the first 60 feet or 2700 square feet of space while the Employment Section occupies the rest.
The most far-reaching and major change in the appointment procedure occurred when on March 16, 1942, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations Governing Employment of Naval Personnel were superseded by the War Service Regulations. On and after March 16, 1942, all appointments, except those limited to specific periods of one year or less, were made for the duration of the war and not to exceed six months thereafter. Following this change in Civil Service Procedure, the Yard began to reduce the requirements for appointment. As the manpower shortage developed and the needs of the Yard increased, requirements for mechanics, which previously had been in most cases a minimum of four years in the trade, were reduced to two years service in an effort to bring needed manpower into the Yard. These sub-eligible appointments were continued throughout the war, the requirements being adjusted in accordance with the needs of the Yard and the labor supply.
The War Service Regulations also embodied an extensive transfer program wherein, under the directives of the War Manpower Commission, the Civil Service Commission authorized transfers to the Navy Yard of employees serving in non-defense government activities or not employed at their highest skills, guaranteeing reemployment rights in their former position at the termination of the war.
During the year 1942 the Labor Board made a total of 38,435 appointments, the greatest number, 4,171, being processed in the month of July that year. That achievement, the busiest year in the history of the Labor Board, enabled the Yard to reach in February 1843 the highest employment peak in its history, 42,893.
War manpower controls were introduced in 1942 (Ch. XVII), and the War Manpower Commission on September 14, 1942, issued War Manpower Commission Directive No. 10 governing transfers of Federal employees, placing responsibilities and functions on the Civil Service Commission.
Shortly after the first of the year in 1943, the War Manpower Commission adopted its stabilization program and controlled hiring plan which vitally altered existing procedures in employment practices. To control job jumping and pirating of workers, all hiring and rehiring of workers was conducted solely through the United States Employment service of the War Manpower Commission. The "Statement of Availability" was introduced, and no worker could be employed under the stabilization plan without a "Statement of Availability" from his former employer or from the United States Employment Service.
In the year 1944, 20,004 appointments were processed through the Labor Board. However, due to the large number of employees being called to the armed forces under the Selective Service System and others leaving the Yard, the Yard force dropped to 37,173 by December 31, 1944.
But the press of work made the need for further expansion of the Labor Board quarters evident in the latter part of 1944, and a fifty-foot addition on the front of the original building was constructed which was completed and occupied at the beginning of 1945.
On January 1, 1945, the Labor Board adopted the official Personnel Action Form 1200 which greatly speeded up and simplified the maintaining or records. In a single typing action with interleaved carbons, copies of appointments, transfers, etc., are made for the employee, the Accounting Department, the shop, the Civil Service Commission and the employees's personal file jacket. This eliminated separate forms previously used for tenders of appointments, transfers rerates and discharges.
The Labor Board which on September 8, 1939, had 17 employees increased its force to a peak of 99 employees in June 1946, while 91 were employed at the end of the war.
Turnover
The average number of persons on the payroll of the Norfolk Navy Yard from the beginning of 1942 to V-J Day was slightly over 38,000. The magnitude of the Yard's employment problem is indicated by the fact that in order to maintain this average during the four years of the war it was necessary to hire 74,390 workers. The following figures show the high turnover with which the Yard had to contend. Image p206 (open in browser and enlarge)
As the above table image shows, in the overall period 1939-1945, 105,802 workers were hired, 80,552 were separated, and the Yard wound up on V-J Day with 31,770.
The following graph, based on the Personnel Relations Division's Monthly Report of Civilian Personnel, No. 695, (LL/P16(3)) shows the trend of accessions and separations from mid-1945 to V-J Day. 25 Image p207 (magnifier is needed to read small print)
25 Due to a slight difference between the actual payroll and the number of "Regularly Engaged Personnel", as computed by the Pers. Div., some discrepancies in figures may be noted between the graph and the table above based on payroll. The trend, howver, is exactly the same.
Exit Interviews
One means of combating the turnover of civilian workers was offered in the exit interview in which an officer of the Personnel Relations Division discussed with the employee his reasons for seeking separation and attempted to keep him on the job. In normal separation procedure, all employees leaving the Yard's employment were required to pass through the exit interview. Not all, however, did so. It is estimated that at least ten per cent of those who quit their jobs in the Yard during the war years simply walked off without any formality, collecting their pay by writing into the Yard at some later date for their checks.
The exit interview system served to provide the Personnel Relations Division with valuable information on Yard working conditions from the worker's point of view, and the data compiled by this section proved valuable in many matters of labor relations.
Exit interviewing began in May 1942. The work was handled at first by two male officers, but in August 1943 one of them was replaced by a WAVE officer. In October 1943 the work of the second interview was taken over by a male civilian employee which arrangement continued till the war's end.
Until early 1944 the two interviewers shared one office with a double desk, but separate offices were used from this time on because of the recognized advantage of private interviews.
Those interviewed included all who wished to resign and who were not returned to the job by the personnel supervisor in the shop. Occasionally other employees came to discuss problems which appeared to them to necessitate resignation, and to determine their status with regard to War Manpower Commission rulings and the draft boards, if they should resign.
The interviewers attempted to return the employee to the job by straightening out misunderstandings, working out arrangements with the shops and referring the worker to other offices for help with such problems as housing, transportation, etc.
At no time could the Yard refuse to accept the resignation of an employee, and in many cases those who wished to resign were not interested in receiving the assistance of the interviewer or of any other officer.
In accordance with the Employment Stabilization Plan of the War Manpower Commission adopted April 18, 1943, it was explained to the employee that this section did not grant releases to employees except in cases where the Medical Officer recommended a medical release because of illness or physical disability. Examination by the Medical Officer in such cases was done only if the employee wished it. All those not medically released were referred to the Civil Service Representative to appeal for a statement of availability, with information from this activity as to the need for their services in the Yard. Those whose appeal was refused at that office were referred from there to the local War Manpower Commission office. The decision as to the right of the individual to have an Availability Statement on the basis of hardship, use of a higher skill elsewhere, etc., rested with that office or a higher appeal board.
It was also explained to all male employees between the ages of 18 and 45 that draft boards would be notified immediately of their refusal to remain at work in the Navy Yard. Some were returned to the job because they did not wish to be subject to call by their draft boards, others because they realized they had no reason to be granted an Availability Statement and they did not wish to take the alternative of waiting 60 days before they could work elsewhere.
In the first three quarters of 1944, between 9% and 13% of those interviewed were returned to their jobs, with these percentages dropping to between 4% and 8% through the rest of 1944 and 1945 until the end of the war. In the spring of 1945 a study showed that about half of those being returned to their jobs resigned within another month.
In another study of exit interviews and the cause of turnover made by the Civil Service Commission in 1944, it was found that 31% of all separations in the first five months of 1944 were in the helper, helper trainee and mechanic learner classifications, indicating, it was said, that the pay scales for these groups were too low for living costs in Hampton Roads.
Peak month of interviews was September 1944 with 1,664, with a drop through the rest of the year and a gradual increase in 1945 to 1,335 in May, the months of VE Day, continuing heavy to the end of the war. A monthly statistical chart, copies of which are kept in the files of the Personnel Relations Officer and of the Employment Officer, showed the breakdown by shops of reasons for resignations.
Vocational Training Program
As the Yard moved to increase its employment at the outset of the emergency, one of the first steps taken was to increase the enrollment of apprentices in order to train additional skilled men. The Navy Department prior to 1939 had sponsored an Apprentice Training Program. This program was small but had served the needs of the Yard during normal peacetime years. Organized training for other civilian employees was done on the job, with the production supervisor being responsible for the training of employees within his jurisdiction.
In 1939 when it became apparent that a tremendous increase in the number of Yard mechanics would be required to accomplish the new shipbuilding and repair program, the employment of Apprentices was greatly stepped up. In 1939 the number employed was 219 and in June of 1942 the enrollment had reached a peak of 1800 apprentices. This enrollment was distributed in the apprenticeable trades of the Yard according to the needs of the trade.
To meet the increased instructional needs for the unusually large enrollment, the Apprentice School was moved from Building 31 to Building 51. Additional classroom space was available in this location. This was done in the latter part of 1939.
Part of the curriculum dealing with social studies was deleted. School time was cut from one day per week to one day every other week. These steps were necessary in order to give the Apprentice the maximum in on-the-job training.
In December 1942 the Navy Department reduced to 5400 the total work and school hours required of apprentices in order to increase the number of rated Mechanics in the Yard. This shortened training period continued throughout the war. (LL/P11)3))
At the conclusion of the war, however, the Navy Department increased the instruction period directing that all Apprentices were to receive 7200 hours of shop and school instruction.
In accordance with the cooperative agreement made between the Veterans Administration, the Civil Service and the Navy Department, the Apprentice Programs in the Naval Establishments were approved for the training of returning veterans. Consequently many veterans were engaged in Apprentice training in the various trades in the Navy Yard by the end of the war. The furloughed Apprentices returning from service took up where they left off. It was anticipated that the Apprentice enrollment would reach 500 shortly after the war, the classes to be composed for the most part of veterans. Return to the four-year plan with additional classroom time and added subjects was expected.
Realizing that training would be an important function of the rapidly expanding shipbuilding program, the Navy Department began commissioning civilian specialists in Industrial Training early in the emergency. These officers were delegated the responsibility for the Civilian Training Program.
Immediate steps were taken to develop a war-time training program that would fulfill the needs of the entire Yard. One of the most pressing needs then and throughout the war was for the development of competent supervisors. Actually it was necessary to promote scores of mechanics with little or no supervisory experience and inadequate preparation to supervisory positions.
In the final analysis it is the supervisory civilian personnel upon whom the burden of production rests. It is a truism that the Naval Officers of any Naval Shore Establishment come and go, but that the shop masters and the civilian supervisors go on continuously providing a continuity in the operation of the Yard, and giving their experience and "know-how" to problems of production. (See App. F.)
The great problem was in the ranks of leading men and those immediately in charge of getting the work done.
To assist these men in meeting their new responsibilities, intensive supervisory training was initiated by the Training Officer. Each supervisor was assigned to specific instructional groups under direction of a trained supervisory conference leader (usually the Training Officer or an Assistant Training Officer).
During these instructional periods, particular emphasis was placed on the human relations phase of the supervisor's job. His responsibilities to management and the duties involved in his job were outlined and enumerated. Proper methods of performing his duties were pointed out. The importance of on-the-job training and safety were carefully studied. Each supervisor was allowed to express his views and opinions on supervisory problems and the probable ways of solving them.
By the end of 1944 every industrial supervisor in the Yard had participated in at least thirty hours of supervisory training.
To supplement that training, carefully selected supervisors were chosen by the Shop Master and the Training Officer. These men were given intensive instruction in Supervisory Conference Leadership Training. After finishing this training, these men were used in handling problems of supervision peculiar to the shop in which they were employed.
Local school officials cooperated very well with the Yard during the war years. The high schools offered pre-induction trade training to prospective employees which proved of value in adjusting the worker to the job. Supplementary classes were also offered which enabled the employee to receive related trade training which he could not otherwise have received on the job. This assisted materially in the employee up-grading program.
The defense training classes outside the Yard in the schools of Portsmouth and Norfolk proved of great value in giving prospective workers training in such mechanical skills as welding, sheetmetal work and machine operation.
Graduates of the defense training classes were accepted by the Yard upon presentation of certificates of completion of training. Most of the courses were conducted free of charge at night so that war workers employed during the day could advance in their trades with the Federal Government bearing the expenses of the courses in a nation-wide training program.
XV. SELECTIVE SERVICE
Loss of Men to Draft
The vast increase in the needs of the armed services meant that the Navy Yard felt the pinch on manpower in the very first months of the war. By the latter part of 1942 the manpower situation in the Yard had become acute. Employees in highly skilled trades were being removed by Selective Service and it was necessary to replace them with far less qualified men. At this time requests to the Selective Service for deferments of employees were based on the information received from the Shops as to the value of the individual employee to the shop.
On September 14, 1942, Directive No. XI from the War Manpower Commission made it mandatory that after September 27, 1942, all requests for deferments for federal employees should be based on the employees' inclusion in a list of key positions, the list to be prepared by each activity. (LL/P14(133)).
On November 11, 1942, the Navy Department authorized the use of "replacement schedule" in requesting deferments. The Yard, however, continued to use the list of key positions method until December 9, 1942, at which time the key position plan was discontinued and the Yard was advised to prepare and operate under a replacement schedule.
Request for deferments through replacement schedule procedure was made mandatory by the Navy Department for all continental shore activities in April 1943. (SecNav ltr 14 Apr. 1943, Subj: Selective Service - Executive Order 9309)
Part of paragraph 1, Part I, of this letter stated "All continental shore activities having civilian employees, but not now operating under an approved replacement schedule are directed to prepare and submit to the appropriate State Director of Selective Service on or before 15 May 1943, after which date no deferments shall be requested except through replacement schedules."
After a great deal of preliminary work over a period of approximately three months, during which conferences were held with the State Selective Service headquarters, a replacement schedule was prepared. The conclusions derived as a result of the conferences were that all employees liable for induction into the armed forces would be replaced on the basis of their skills. This meant that a large number of the unclassified laborers and persons of skills below that of journeyman mechanic, should under the replacement schedule procedure be released within the first six months. This seriously handicapped the war effort of the Yard. For this reason it was agreed that the minimum possible number of such personnel might be placed in the "6 to 12 month" period and in the "over 12 months" period. An effort was made in the first replacement schedule to provide for the release of approximately 35% of the above classifications in the first six months period, 35% in the second period and 30% or less in the third period.
On March 1, 1943, the replacement schedule was accepted by the State Director of Selective Service. Some exceptions were taken by him based on the fact that proportionately there were not enough releases scheduled in the "6 to 12 month" period. Also that the Yard had included too many single men in their teens and early twenties in the "6 to 12" month and "over 12 months" periods. However this schedule was accepted in order to enable this activity to proceed with the releases as planned in the "1 to 6 month" period with the advice that a revision of the schedule would be necessary. The Yard was requested to revise the Schedule as noted by the exceptions. It is to be noted however that the Yard was not required to make changes in the replacement schedule as presented. The first Schedule listed the eligible employees as follows:
TOTAL EMPLOYED - 39,199
ELIGIBLE FOR SERVICE - 12,255
RELEASED:
1st 6 mo. - 3,453 or 28.2%
2nd 6 mo. - 3,254 or 26.5%
over 12 mo. - 5,548 or 45.3%Soon after the acceptance of the replacement schedule, efforts were made to have placed on the replacement schedule from seventy to ninety college graduates as junior engineers whom the Yard proposed to employ upon their graduation. This request was denied. Efforts were made to place men in special technical positions at a later date on the replacement schedule, but the State Director of Selective Service in reviewing the applications which stated the experience of the employee in question, decided that only three in his opinion could qualify as necessary men and five others were accepted who held Engineering degrees. The principal reason for the refusal on the part of the State Director of Selective Service to acquiesce in this request was that the majority of these employees were single and a large number were under twenty-two years of age.
In June the Yard was permitted to submit a supplementary Replacement Schedule which covered a total of 2,805 registrants. These registrants represented employees who were not included on the original replacement schedule due to erroneous entry or omission or to misunderstanding as to their Selective Service status. The State Director of Selective Service did not look favorably upon the release period of some of the registrants in this supplementary replacement schedule as approximately half of them were twenty-two years of age. After several conferences with the State Director of Selective Service, an understanding was reached that in the next Replacement Schedule, which would be presented before September 1, 1943, a definite realignment of the releases would be incorporated.
The first renewal of the replacement schedule became effective September 1, 1943. A supplemental schedule containing names omitted through error and those of new employees was effective a few weeks later. Instructions for the preparation of the Schedule were obtained through Virginia State Headquarters and the Division of SECP in Washington. The chief criterion used in judging those eligible for deferment was the list of critical occupations as designated by the War Manpower Commission on 16 August 1943.
The second renewal of the replacement schedule became effective March 1, 1944. Outstanding among changes was the release of all employees aged 18-21, both fathers and non-fathers.
The third and last renewal became effective September 1, 1944. This provided for the release of all employees aged 18-25 inclusive, with the exception of the highly trained and skilled workers who could not be replaced at that time. For the first time this schedule provided indefinite deferment for all employees who had passed their thirtieth birthday. Later in the year this policy was changed by National Selective Service Headquarters and men in the age group 30-33 were subject to call if they were not "necessary men". In effect this resulted in a minor loss of some laborers and helpers in the 30-33 age group.
The replacement schedule was discontinued upon expiration of the third renewal upon instructions from SECP, which was working closely with National Selective Service Headquarters, and the Yard began operation on a key position procedure. No physically qualified men below the age of 26 could be deferred unless they were college graduates with certain specialized engineering degrees and a minimum of two yeas experience. No physically qualified men below the age of 24 could be deferred. After considerable delay, National Headquarters approved of a six months deferment for four highly specialized and skilled employees in the 21-26 age group. A later bulletin informed the Yard that renewals would not be granted in this age group and that no further requests would be considered. It was expected that the Navy Yard would experience a considerable loss in the 26-29 age group subsequent to March 1, 1945, due to the fact that men over the age of thirty were not eligible for call by the draft, and the number of men under the age of 26 who could be called to fill the draft quotas was relatively small. In actuality, however, the coming of the victory over Japan precluded any serious loss.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty throughout the entire period was after the establishment of the Panel Boards. These boards were created for the purpose of reviewing deferments granted by local boards in areas other than the Norfolk-Portsmouth area. That is, if a board in North Carolina granted a deferment to a registrant working in the Norfolk Navy Yard, they were obliged to send the file of this registrant to a designated Appeal Panel in Portsmouth for the purpose of review. Many men were thus classified in 1-A, subject to call, whose local boards were willing to grant further deferment to them, and the Norfolk Navy Yard experienced some loss in skilled workmen. It is believed that a very serious problem might have resulted had peace not come at this time due to the fact that a large majority of the cases recently reviewed by the panel board were reclassified into class 1-A. Virginia State Headquarters was requested to assist the Yard in obtaining further deferment in such cases but seemed reluctant for the first time to take further action except in exceptional cases. In the case of some highly skilled, irreplaceable employees, assistance was requested from the Director of Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel and an appeal was taken to the President by them. In two cases handled in this way, 2-B classifications were obtained, and it is believed that the precedent this established might have had a desirable effect on the Panel Board which had denied the deferment and might possibly have resulted in a more lenient attitude.
A sharp decline in Selective Service calls occurred immediately after V-J Day. The effect upon the manpower situation became negligible. The Selective Service Section of the Personnel Relations Division had been reduced gradually as the work load in the section diminished. Soon after V-J Day the section was reduced in personnel to one civilian employee. At the peak this section required two officers and approximately 34 civilian employees. The large personnel requirements in this section were necessary because of the great amount of personal handling and checking of records.
Some time and labor was saved by the installation of a Kardex System, and as much use as possible was made of the IBM system in the Accounting Department. The use of this equipment was very limited as it was in almost continuous use by the Accounting Department for its requirements. It is believed that with a small complete unit of IBM equipment for the use of this Section or for exclusive use of the Personnel Relations Division the personnel requirements of the Selective Service Section alone could have been reduced 50%.
The Yard's relationship with the office of the State Director of Selective Service was excellent throughout the entire period. This was accomplished through close liaison with the Navy Representative on the State Director's staff who was able to interpret properly the Yard's numerous manpower needs to the Director. Without his aid it is doubtful whether or not the Yard could have maintained its level of employment as the other members of the Director's staff were not able to visit the Yard often enough to ascertain through actual contact the essentiality of the various trades and occupations consonant with shipbuilding and ship repairs. 26
26 In the final months of the war, a Veterans Rights Office was set up by the Pers. Rel. Div. to assist employees returning from the armed forces. For a description of the beginning of this activity see His. Memo (A12(3).
Women as Replacements
In any discussion of the effect of selective service and the manpower shortage in general on the Yard, it must be noted that the Yard made extensive use of women to replace men wherever possible in mechanical work.
Early in the war General Hershey made it clear that vast numbers of men employed in war plants would be called into the services, and he called on industry to train and use women.
On March 29, 1942, three women were assigned to the shops as Helper Trainees, the first women ever to be so employed in the Norfolk Navy Yard. Many hundreds more women joined these first three during the months that followed.
Outside training classes for the most part provided for the women's training. At the peak more that 3,500 women (Rept. 695, LL/P16(3)) were employed in the shops of the Norfolk Navy Yard. They performed a great variety of work. The majority were rated as helper trainees, but there were women who won mechanic rates. Practically every shop and every activity had its women in mechanical work. They did well at machine work, being particularly adept at precise and delicate operations. But that is not to say that they did not do the heavier jobs. They drove trucks, operated cranes, served as helpers on many types of work and even at one time served as deck hands on yard craft.
XVI. THE DIRECT RECRUITING PROGRAM
Having reached a peak of nearly 43,000 employees in February 1943, the payroll of the Norfolk Navy Yard began to decline even before the war was half over. But, as we have seen, the work load did not reach its peak until 1944. Through 1943, 1944 and 1945 employment declined while the Yard's work, reflecting the growing pressure of allied offensives all over the globe, increased. As the war progressed toward its climax, the Norfolk Navy Yard actually increased its production with fewer civilian employees. The Yard had been tooled for 50,000 employees, which figure Admiral Gygax had publicly predicted it would reach, but by the summer of 1943 the problem became one of keeping the payroll around the 40,000 mark. There simply were not enough civilian workers available, and this fact plus the high turnover caused by selective service and resignations due to poor living conditions, resulted in a steady drop in the Yard's civilian complement during the entire latter part of the war.
That the Navy Yard was able to keep its payroll at anywhere near the required number of workers was due in large measure to labor recruiting. From the middle of 1943 until the end of the war, the Yard depended almost entirely for its labor supply on recruiting of workers from inland areas. Begun by the Civil Service Commission in May 1943 and considerably stepped up by the Yard's own recruiting organization in November 1943, the labor recruiting program produced between November 1943 and August 17, 1945, a total of 18,733 civilian workers (Labor Board Tabulation) sent in to the Yard from the inland areas of North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia, the territory embraced by the Fourth Civil Service and War Manpower Commission regions.
The first "direct recruiting" was undertaken by regular representatives of the Civil Service Commission in May 1943. The recruiting program grew out of requests by Admiral Gygax 27for assistance in meeting the Yard's labor demands.
27 Cdt ltr to AstSecNav April 10, 1943, EN1/L1(9) and Cdt ltr to AstSecNav April 30, 1943, LL/P14(230)"A"
Funds were accordingly set up by SecNav on May 3, 1943, for payment of bus transportation and recruiting was begun.
The program did not produce workers in the quantity needed principally for the reason that the Civil Service recruiting force was relatively small, and because the representatives of the commission being charged with the responsibility of supplying all Government agencies with workers were able to devote only a portion of their efforts to the Navy Yard needs. Hence the Navy Department provided 28 that Naval Shore Activities could make available personnel to exercise Civil Service authority for recruiting purposes. The recruiting was first done through Navy Recruiting stations and Civil Service Offices but was later modified to permit recruiting through the U. S. Employment Service Offices of the War Manpower Commission.
28 Dept. Cir. ltr PS&M/LL/P14(230)"A", August 24, 1943.
Before the Yard sent out its own recruiters, three preliminary recruiting itineraries were undertaken by naval officers from the Yard working in conjunction with representatives of the Civil Service Commission, the first two of these expeditions being in eastern North Carolina and the third in southwest Virginia and southern West Virginia.
The officers put on a publicity campaign through press and radio and interviewed workers in an effort to induce them to accept employment in the Navy Yard. Physical examinations were given by a medical officer who accompanied the recruiting party and transportation was provided to the Yard. The results of these campaigns which ran from October 3, 1943, until about the middle of November 1943 were good with more than 200 workers being secured in this manner.
A full-scale recruiting effort was then launched with 15 civilian employees of the Yard and six naval officers being sent to points throughout the four-state area.
The recruiters were mechanics selected from their shops by their supervisors. Given training in Civil Service procedures and regulations of the War Manpower Commission and designated as temporary Civil Service representatives, they succeeded in the period from November 15, 1943, to December 15, 1943, in securing more than 800 new employees for the Yard.
The recruiting force was then gradually reduced, the output per man was stepped up, and with modifications developed through experience the program continued throughout 1944 (SECP ltr June 26, 1944, LL/P14(230)"A").
The high point for the year was reached in August when more than 1,500 new workers arrived in Portsmouth. The staff of recruiters had then been reduced to approximately 35 men with two officers assigned in a supervisory capacity. The officer-in-charge acted as liaison between the Yard, the Civil Service and the War Manpower Commission, spending most of his time in the field actively supervising the recruiting and handling the promotional and publicity work. The other officer handled the administrative details at the Yard and supervised the reception of appointees.
The Navy Yard recruiters, of course, worked in competition with the recruiters from other war plants, so that in effect one of the major tasks was that of "selling" prospective employees. To this end the Yard put on an intensive publicity campaign throughout the Fourth Civil Service Region, utilizing newspaper stories, radio announcements, interviews and speeches, posters in streetcars, buses and store windows, hand bills, booklets and other printed information about the Yard. Two Navy Yard sound trucks toured the entire region with music and entertainment, giving out facts about Navy Yard employment. Navy war motion pictures were exhibited in court houses, schools and to public gatherings, and returned overseas veterans were used in programs designed to acquaint the public with the Navy's need for civilian manpower. Naval exhibits of various sorts were shown in many communities.
As the program progressed, the pressure on the Employment Service offices in inland communities became increasingly great. Dozens of firms engaged in war work competed for the services of almost every available worker, the recruiting representatives of these firms vying with each other in an effort to offer the applicant more inducements to take jobs with their particular firms.
During the latter part of 1944 and early 1945, the quality of the person recruited deteriorated considerably in comparison with those who had been recruited during the early part of the war. There were simply no available skilled mechanics left in the areas away from war industry, and many men of little skill were recruited for positions which they were not able to hold. In fact some job seekers were recruited over and over again by the various war plants, and the Norfolk Navy Yard along with most other war activities suffered from its inability to get qualified men.
On the whole, however, the War Manpower Commission's Employment Service did excellent work in providing prospective workers for the recruiters, although in some communities a strong tendency existed to keep workers at home for local jobs.
The regular Civil Service, despite its too small organization and lack of funds, also continued to send recruits in to the Yard. But the Navy Yard's temporary recruiting organization functioned almost as a separate organization within the framework of the Civil Service. Gradually it assumed the chief responsibility for supplying the Yard with labor, the regular Civil Service representatives being so overburdened with other demands that they were unable to send recruits to Norfolk in the quantity needed.
The peak in direct recruiting was reached in January 1945 when, perhaps prompted by the wide publicity given work-or-fight legislation, approximately 2,000 persons signed up with the Yard recruiters and came to Portsmouth.
This large number exhausted the housing then available and recruiting was brought to a virtual standstill until additional units became available as a result of vacates. The program continued on a reduced scale from then until June 30, 1945, when most of the Yard's recruiters were withdrawn. A small volume of additional hiring was done thereafter until August by the Civil Service
The lack of adequate housing hampered recruiting efforts throughout most of the program although the Yard made a conscientious and determined effort to solve the problem. The Navy Yard housing office interviewed each incoming recruit and placed each appointee in contact with housing. Many of the recruits, however, arrived in Portsmouth without money, and the providing of financial assistance had to be undertaken in the spring of 1944. A rent guarantee was given, meal tickets good at Yard restaurants were issued, and bus tokens advanced to each recruit needing such help.
The financial help this rendered became a major item in the recruiting program. The following table shows the volume this financial assistance reached:
Aug '44 Sept '44 Oct '44 Nov '44 Dec '44 Jan '45 Feb '45 Mar '45 Apr'45 May 45 Jun '45 Jul '45 Aug '45 Totals Total Gov't Subsistence issued to new recruits & paid by Navy Yard $165,676.55
Amount collected from new recruits $160,990.53
Average amount of loan under Gov't subsistence $9.48
Average cash loan $9.01
Amount uncollected * $4,686.02*The amount uncollected is remarkably small when consideration is given to the number of recruits who, after being granted assistance, never reported for work, resigned after one day or were subsequently discharged.
The wholesale movement of large numbers of workers produced many difficult situation. Establishing home, even for the duration in a crowded war center was for many a worker, transplanted from a small town, a heartbreaking task. Housing was hard to get, fuel and food were rationed, transportation was overcrowded and recreation facilities were poor. Despite careful interviewing at the place of employment and explanation by the recruiters of the difficulties likely to be encountered, many of the new workers arrived at the Yard with little idea of what to expect.
In an effort to assist these workers in adjusting themselves, each new employee was required by the Yard to attend a one-day indoctrination school begun on September 21, 1944, (CM 41/44) designed to acquaint him with the more important aspects of Navy Yard employment.
Even so many of the persons who came to Portsmouth to work in the Navy Yard did not stay more than a few weeks or months.
Had the war planning been farsighted enough to provide better living conditions for Navy Yard workers, the problem of employment might have been more easily solved. Indeed it appears that one of the most serious defects in the war program was the lack of proper provision for the great influx of workers into the Hampton Roads area.
The constant stream of in-migrant workers enabled the Yard to keep its employment much nearer the figure required than it could otherwise have done. But reflective judgment indicates that direct recruiting was an expensive and not altogether satisfactory expedient.
A committed representing the Civil Service, War Manpower Commission, Navy Department and Norfolk Navy Yard, however, in a "Report on Evaluation of the Norfolk Navy Yard Recruiting Program" dated July 10, 1944, (LL/P14(230)"A") stated: "As a result of a careful review of the Norfolk Navy Yard's recruiting program . . . the committee . . . reached the general conclusions that the recruiting as presently conducted is producing worthwhile results in the number of hires, the quality of the hires, and the ratio of hires to turnover and that the program should be continued and expanded."
Continued on nnyww2-4
