HISTORY OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD IN WORLD WAR II
By
Arthur Sydnor Barksdale, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR
Portsmouth, VA 1945
Table of Contents
(Continued)
nnyww2-4
Chapter XVII: Relations with War Manpower Commission
Manpower Control
The Meade Committee Inquiry
Chapter XVIII: Labor Relations
Wages
Hours of Work
Relations with Management
Disciplinary System
Chapter XIX: Housing
Extent of the Problem
Simonsdale
First Portsmouth Projects
New Gosport
Additional Projects
Alexander Park
Summary
Chapter XX: Transportation
Public Carriers
Improvement of Traffic Routes
Rationing
The Club Buses
Water Transportation
Yard Transportation
* * * * * * * * * *
XVII. RELATIONS WITH WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION
Manpower Control
The organization of the War Manpower Commission in the Hampton Roads area began in the latter part of 1942 at which time the Hampton Roads Area Management-Labor Committee was selected by the Regional Office of the War Manpower Commission. On January 5, 1943, a Hampton Roads Area office of the War Manpower Commission was opened followed soon after by the assumption of authority over the United States Employment Service local offices in Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk. Until the time of the location of the Hampton Roads Area Office, there was little contact between the Navy Yard and the War Manpower Commission. Prior to that time, however, the Yard organization had received copies of all the War Manpower Commission's orders and directives.
In the latter part of 1943 the War Manpower Commission realized that the manpower program then in operation was not achieving the desired balance between the demand for and the supply of labor. On December 27, 1943, the State Director was instructed by the Regional Director to establish a manpower priorities committee in the Hampton Roads Area so that a program of controlled distribution of labor within this area could be inaugurated. The Management-Labor Committee concurred in a recommendation made by the Regional Director and recognized the need for some system of control which could be supervised by a Manpower Priority Committee and formally approved the establishment of such a committee.
Upon the receipt of this approval the Regional Office made written request to each of the following agencies that they appoint a representative to serve on the Hampton Roads Manpower Priority Committee and to appoint alternates to serve in the absence of the regular members. The Manpower Commission officially appointed one of their representative to act as chairman of this committee.
War Production Board
War Department
Navy Department
Selective Service
U. S. Civil Service Commission
War Shipping Administration
Office of Defense Transportation
War Foods Administration
Aircraft Resources Control Office
Smaller War Plants Corporation
U. S. Maritime Commission
Office of Civilian Requirements
Office of Labor ManagementThe above representative committee was responsible for recommendations on all matters pertaining to the allocation of manpower, the establishment of proper priorities and the placing of ceiling limits on employment.
To this committee, the Navy Department as a principal member, appointed the Manager of the Norfolk Navy Yard. As an alternative member they appointed the District Civilian Personnel Director. In addition the Manager of the Norfolk Navy Yard obtained permission from the Committee to have the Employment Officer of the Yard meet with the Committee in an advisory capacity. Details for the operation of this Committee were worked out and the first meeting was held on February 15, 1944. At this meeting details of the procedures that were to be followed through the existence of the Committee were discussed and officially adopted. These meetings were held in Norfolk once every week.
A general plan for the control of all male workers in this area was designed, together with various agreements which would permit the use of referral facilities of the Civil Service Commission, the Labor Unions and the large number of private employers. By the end of April, priority ratings had been recommended by this committee for a total of 88 firms employing 85,000 workers. Originally upon the presentation of the proposed plan for controlling referrals of all male workers, when presented to the War Manpower Commission Regional Office and by them referred to the National Headquarters, the local office received the notification that the plan would not be approved. Several plans were advanced to the National Headquarters by the Regional Office for operations in this area, but none were workable. Therefore the disapproval of the National Headquarters was later rescinded and the original plan initiated in the area. Work along this plan continued and in May of 1944 priority ratings for employment purposes and employment ceilings recommended by the Man power Priorities Committee had been approved by the Area Director and were released to the United States Employment Service Offices and to the affected firms. Included in this list were 163 firms which were considered essential and a total of 106,000 workers, with an approved expansion in these firms amounting to approximately 15,000 workers.
The Navy Yard was included in this list with the highest priority possible assigned and with the ceiling established at 40,000 employees. The Yard each month sent to the Office of the Manpower Priority Committee a form which stated the number of employees on the roll, the estimated number of employees which would be needed for the next sixty days in order to maintain the assigned work load and to meet the proposed work load approved for the Yard by the Navy Department. Also submitted to the Committee each month was the actual number of requisitions filed with the Navy Yard Labor Board. This report was broken down by trades. In order for this information to be current, the Master of each shop and the supervisors of the activities were required to survey their needs for the next thirty days before the end of each months and submit to the Labor Board the actual number of workers by trade needed to maintain the estimated work load. In order that this be realistically done, an order was issued that at the end of each month all requisitions on hand at the Labor Board at that time would be cancelled. Therefore for the shops to obtain the required labor through the Board, a new requisition had to be in the hands of the Labor Board at the beginning of each month.
The Manpower Priority Committee was cognizant of the above procedure and this greatly benefited the Yard in its efforts to maintain a high position on the referral list. At various times, of course, certain types of ship were assigned high national priorities and the Manpower Priorities Committee had no choice except to approve a high priority for the Yard based on these priorities. For instance, the building and repair of landing craft at one time carried a high national priority. At another period supply ships, both the construction and the maintenance thereof, carried this high priority, and in the latter days of the war aircraft carriers and certain other ships were placed on the list. (Ch. IX; Sec. 6).
The United States Employment Service local offices were charged by the Area Director with the responsibility of determining the availability of applications for essential employees. The referral procedure for the Civil Service Commission was modified to the extent that all workers were to be referred to representatives of the Commission rather than to the individual federal agencies. This permitted the Civil Service Commission representative to refer such applicants to any job carrying priority equal to or higher than the priority on which the United States Employment Service made referrals. However, employees who could not be employed by the federal agencies before they could be sent to the lower priority agencies had to be re-cleared through the Employment Offices.
By July 1944 the priority plan had become very well established all over the United States. Therefore it became necessary to change the priority symbols in this area in order to comply with the new system. This benefited the Yard, as it placed the activity in an excellent position for recruiting in the Fourth Civil Service and WMC Region because of its high priority rating. As the Yard at that time had approximately 35 recruiters in the region, they were able to obtain workers in preference to their referral to local agencies who had lower priority ratings.
By the end of August most of the activities in this area had been assigned new priority symbols. At this time in order to obtain a closer check on the manpower needs in the area, each member agency of the Manpower Priority Committee agreed to review all data submitted by applicant agencies in which the agency had the major interest. This agreement enabled the Committee to check and verify the degree of production lag and to what extent the actual manpower needs contributed to that lag. It also brought to light whether or not some of the small essential activities were utilizing their manpower to the greatest extent. All larger contractors and suppliers who had presented requests for priority to the Committee were reviewed by the Navy Representative and recommendations made to the Committee upon the advice of this representative. This also enabled the representative to decide just the amount of essentiality and the need for manpower in each of the plants of the applicants. This was true particularly in the smaller local Yards who were engaged in ship repair for the Navy, as they were able to ascertain how much of the manpower was assigned to essential war work and how much was assigned to the non-essential civilian needs.
In November 1944, as a result of a complete review of all firms listed in the two highest priority categories, the committee was able to reduce the total number of firms from 56 to 15. As a result of this review, plans were made for a much closer supervision of employers' orders and for the proper referral of workers. It was finally ordered by the Area Office that the United States Employment Service local offices would be limited in their referrals to the difference between the total current employment and the approved ceiling with an allowance based on the record of attrition presented by the priority firms.
In November 1944 instructions were issued by the Regional Office which provided for the establishment of priority ratings on an employer order rather than on individual establishment basis. Lists of all orders then held by the United States Employment Service local offices and other referral agencies were submitted to the local offices and in turn presented to the Manpower Priority Committee. After the review, the Committee recommended that the priority ratings be set by occupation and this was referred to the Area Directory. The plan of priority rating by occupation was not suitable to the operation of the Yard, as the Yard was given no higher priority rating for such occupations as auto mechanic, chauffeurs, cranemen and laborers than any other activity in the area. For proper operation, the above occupations were more important to the Yard than to other activities as all the operations of the Yard are closely knit. In the case of auto mechanics, these men worked on equipment used by every department. The same was true of cranemen and laborers.
The Navy Representative protested the action of the Committee in assigning low priorities to some of the occupations listed on the Yard order. The representatives were able after consultations to have the Navy Yard order changed so that all occupations enjoyed the same high priority. This was accomplished by having other members of the Committee visit the Yard and ascertain at first hand the conditions under which the Yard had to operate.
The Yard suffered no loss of referrals through the local offices by the assignments of priorities or on any action by the local War Manpower Commission directives. With a high priority rating, the Yard was able to employ the best labor available. The difficulty was that there were just no capable labor unemployed in the area.
In July 1945 a local agreement between the War Manpower Commission and the Civil Service Commission was put into effect. It was felt by all that the agreement would result in a closer cooperation and a closer relationship between these two agencies and that better results in getting the manpower needs filled, particularly those of the federal agencies might be accomplished. This gave the Civil Service Commission an opportunity to fill extreme needs within the various federal activities and was beneficial to the Yard as it was able to obtain the first call on manpower which was qualified to do the type of work peculiar to the Navy Yard.
The Manpower Priority Committee was dissolved in August 1945 with the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific Theatre of Operations. At this time, of course, all manpower controls ceased.
The Meade Committee Inquiry
From time to time during the war criticism of the Navy Yard and its utilization of manpower was heard from different sources. In the main these criticisms were to the effect that the Yard wasted manpower, that there was loafing among the employees, that the plant was overstaffed, and as a result inefficient. Some of these charges were leveled at management, many others were directed at the quality of the Navy Yard worker himself.
The criticisms reached their climax in January 1945 when the Yard became the subject of an inquiry by a congressional subcommittee with a considerable amount of publicity resulting, some favorable, much unfavorable. The inquiry was closely related to the Yard's recruiting of workers and to its utilization of labor under WMC controls.
On November 2, 1944, a Letter-to-the-Editor from a disgruntled former employee appeared in a North Carolina weekly newspaper charging that it was "the general policy of all employees (of the Norfolk Navy Yard) to loaf and kill as much time as possible, and there are two men for every job where only one is needed, and yet they are hiring men every day." The time was only a few days before the general election, and the letter was labeled "Political Advertising" (Encl. A, Cdt. ltr to AstSecNav, Nov. 25, 1944, LL/P13(22)).
The publication of the charges by this former employee of the Yard, who had resigned on October 17, 1944, stating "climate does not agree with family" (ibid; Encl. 2) touched off widespread editorial comment in areas in which the Norfolk Navy Yard had been recruiting labor. Ignoring the "political advertising" angle, many of the papers called for an investigation.
The story, gathering momentum as it went, hit the press in the midst of the hot debate on work-or-fight legislation. Opponents of the labor draft seizing on the loafing charges pointed to the Norfolk Navy Yard as the "horrible example" of why labor conscription was not needed,.
The Yard management, feeling that the Yard's record was the best answer to the charges issued a statement to the press as follows:
"It is a matter of record that the Norfolk Navy Yard meets its repair schedules and returns ships to the Fleet on or frequently ahead of time. The Nary Yard holds the Army-Navy E award for increased production and efficiency. This is evidence that the employees of the Norfolk Navy Yard are loyal and efficient workers."
But this statement did nothing to quell the criticism, and in the middle of January 1945 a subcommittee of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, commonly known as the Meade Committee, made an inspection of the Yard.
Members of the subcommittee, which included Senator Meade of New York, Senator Ferguson of Michigan, and Senator Kilgore of West Virginia, visited the Yard on January 17, 1945. They heard testimony from a number of Navy Yard employees, visited one or two shops and ships to gather evidence of loafing and the misuse of manpower for the manufacture of personal articles and items of furniture for the Navy Yard not directly connected with the war effort.,
The investigators spent only a few hours in the Yard, the visit coinciding with the St. Helena fire. But the charges which they made were front page news all over the country.
Excerpts of the charges made on the floor of the U. S. Senate on January 2229are quoted herewith:
Senator Meade: "The subcommittee found excess manpower, wasted labor, hoarded labor, and enforced loafing . . . each of the members of our subcommittee personally saw idleness and loafing on a big scale. Men stood and sat around in groups, smoking and talking right on the decks of vital fighting ships. Their bosses were not to be seen. The men themselves think there are too many of them on the job. They say they are unable to do an honest day's work . . .
"Men waste valuable time and materials making personal trinkets for their superiors. One man, deferred as an essential worker, spends most of his time on such work. Valuable hand-carved furniture is made in wartime for the use of the shop masters. Many weeks of labor were wasted on one table alone, which our committee saw. While we were in the Yard, work was being done on an ornate checkerboard and on a special table for opening oysters."
Senator Kilgore: "The checkerboard was just one of many we traced down which were made by this one man, who is under 30, with no children, and who apparently devoted all his time for a while to making cigarette boxes from lucite, as well as hand-carved legs of tables for the masters' conference room.
"My State being a coal-producing State, I made a tour of the employment offices in the State, in each of which I found a recruiter from the Norfolk Navy Yard taking experienced miners away from the mines and giving them priorities to go to the Norfolk Navy Yard."
Senator Meade: "Men are told to stretch out jobs and to appear to be working.
"When investigators go through, the men are warned in advance to look busy. They must put work into machines even if they merely ruin metals. A few minutes before the investigators actually appear, another warning is given by a "Paul Revere" who tears through the shop just ahead of the investigators."
29 Congressional Record, Vol. 91, No. 12, 22 Jan, 1945, p. 399 ff.
The Yard's reply to these charges is well summed up in a letter from the Commandant, Admiral Jones, to Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, on January 27, 2945 (LL/P13(22)) a portion of which is quoted herewith:
"Many new employees in the Norfolk Navy Yard are found to be undesirable. They are weeded out. If all employees were experienced and skilled upon arrival, the same amount of work could be accomplished by less employees. We have had to take what we could get and do the best we could with them.
"Over 22,000 employees were taken in during 1944. More than 26,000 left the Yard during 1944. Of these over 9,100 were discharged as undesirable and not fit for retention, even though their services were badly needed. During the month of December 1944 alone there were 1,727 offenses reported and investigated, and as a result 480 employees were discharged. These facts show beyond any doubt that in a few individuals loafing is an inherent habit that will be manifested regardless of the vigilance of the supervisory force.
"Where loafing obtains, it leads to the possible inference that excessive men are employed. This inference is misleading unless the average effectiveness per man is used as a yardstick.
"Excessive manpower does not exist. On the contrary, due to a lack of effective manpower, the Yard is unable to utilize the facilities available to the prescribed productive capacity.
"In many instances the allegations of the Committee members are so vague and ambiguous that it is impossible to identify particular instances of alleged malpractice. This applies particularly to the charge that trinkets, cigarette boxes, candlesticks, etc., were made without proper authority in violation of regulations on a wholesale scale for superiors.
"The Norfolk Navy Yard has not and will not condone any such malpractices as charged by the Meade Committee.
"If the Meade Committee will allow the Norfolk Navy Yard to use its testimony, I shall see to it that the records will be kept inviolate, and that an investigation will be made of each specific charge followed by a report to the Committee of what is found. If this can be done, I shall further see to it that no recourse be taken against any of the witnesses for testifying before the Meade Committee.
"This is the only effective method by which any of the charges can be answered."
A statement from the Secretary of the Navy, James A. Forrestal, was also given to the press, following the general tone of Admiral Jones' statement in defense of the Yard.
Even as early as December, the Secretary had written (SecNav ltr to Senator Byrd, Dec. 14, 1944, LL/P13(22)):
"I am sure that the Norfolk Navy Yard must plead guilty to having a normal amount of loafing or shirking - no more and I hope somewhat less than that which would occur in any well-run business. Navy yards, as well as private companies, are now suffering from a dilution of all labor skills, including supervisory skills which are so important in a taut organization. Whatever loafing or idleness does exist at the Norfolk Yard is insignificant compared with the Yard's overall achievement, which I am pleased to say has been the source of commendatory letters from the officers of the fleet whose ships have been overhauled there."
The spotlight of national publicity shown brightly on the Norfolk Navy Yard for a few days, then gradually faded out. No heads fell at the Yard or anywhere else, but work-or-fight legislation was killed. The criticism, for the most part ill-founded, came to naught and the Yard went on building and repairing ships as it had done before, efficiently and well..
XVIII. LABOR RELATIONS
Wages
During the period of the national emergency and the war, per diem employees of the Norfolk Navy Yard received three general wage increases and per annum employees one. Three major changes were made in working hours.
The wage increases occurred on November 18, 1940; October 13, 1941; and July 6, 1942; the IVb increase was effective July 1, 1945.
During the period of the thirties wages remained at one level and no official move was made to raise them until the beginning of 1940 although the depression cuts were restored.
On January 13, 1940, the Secretary of the Navy directed that a board on wages be appointed to convene February 15 to investigate existing wage conditions in private establishments and recommend rates of wages for civilian employees in Groups I, II, III and IVa for the Naval and Marine Corps activities within the purview of the board.
On February 14 in compliance with the directive, the Commandant appointed (CC 10/40) a three-man board to study the matter and to assemble wage data for submission to the Navy Department. It was the first such board to assemble at the Yard since 1929.
The board met and heard requests from the various trades for increases. Throughout the Sprin meetings were held and the representatives of the various employee groups presented their cases. This data was supplemented by comparative wage scales from other private employers of the Hampton Roads area, and the assembled information was sent to the Navy Department SOSED.
Following the wage hearings during the early part of 1940, the Navy Department announced that effective November 18, 1940, a new wage schedule would go into effect in the Navy Yard. The increases, however, were considerably below what the employees of the Yard had anticipated, and the new pay scale met almost universal protest.
A comparison of Wage Tables No. 1 and 2 will show the increases which were very small. In fact the adjustment was termed by union leaders as merely "simplified bookkeeping."
Many trades, box makers, cupola tenders, divers, drillers, electric cranemen (under 20 tons), firemen, furnacemen, ordnancemen, saw filers, sewers and some helpers received no change in rate while stevedores, gas plant operators, trackmen, locomotive enginemen, brakemen, punchers and shearers, frame benders, rivet heaters, railroad conductors, water tenders, enginemen H&P, linotype or monotype operators, gas welders and shipfitters were given advances ranging from 22.4 cents per hour on down to 1.2 cents per hour. Most other trades were advanced fractions of a cent per hour sufficient to make the hourly rate even money.
Yard employees had anticipated an average increase of about 5 cents an hour in the majority of the trades, and in addition had expected that the increase would be retroactive to June. The unfavorable reaction which was extensively reported in the local newspapers continued for several weeks led by the officials of the Metal Trades Council. A number of protest meetings were held and the dissatisfaction was carried to the Navy Department where further adjustment to increase the scale was promised.
These further increases, however, did not occur until the following year.
On October 13, 1941, the Navy Department announced wage increases designed to bring the Navy Yard wages in line with the rates paid by commercial yards. (See Wage Table No. 3) As the employment mounted, turnover likewise mounted and a part of it was due to Yard workers leaving for the higher pay available in private yards.
The new scale represented an increase of from 48 cents to 96 cents per day in the general trades, ranging from a low increase of 8 cents per day for hammer runners to a high of $2.32 for gas cutters and burners. In all the Yard employed more than 100 separate trades and occupational positions including helpers, laborers and apprentices. All of these occupations with the exception of 15 classifications received increases. The weekly payroll was boosted approximately $110,000 and Admiral Gygax estimated that the average increase amounted to $4.00 per week per workman.
Trades for which wage increases were not ordered protested to Washington and subsequent adjustments were made.
The Navy Department announced a third major wage adjustment to become effective on July 6, 1942 (See Wage Table No. 4), which meant an increase of 8 cents per hour for the general trades under Groups I, II and III, with drillers topping the list with an increase of 12 cents per hour. Trades unchanged in rates in prior wage adjustments, noticeable among which were box makers, sand blasters and molders, were given increases in the new scale.
With various adjustments from time to time for specified occupations, this scale continued in effect for the duration of the war. Technical groups such as planners and estimators, progressmen, and inspectors were advanced to newly created grades, and per diem rates for a number of trades were raised to higher levels. A pay adjustment for shop planners on September 11, 1944, brought an increase of 4 cents an hour to that group. On September 24, a per diem increase of 64 cents went to molders, on October 23, 1944, a per diem increase of 72 cents to crane operators became effective. Continuing on the upgrade, brakemen received a per diem increase of 8 cents on April 23, 1945; drillers received a per diem increase of $1.04 on May 11, 1945. Planners and estimators received a per diem increase of 48 cents on July 9, 1945; chauffeurs received a per diem increase of 24 cents on August 6, 1945; and shop masters and foremen received a graduated advance in their pay scale when they were changed from a per diem to a per annum basis effective August 6, 1945.
The IVb increases which occurred on July 1, 1945, are indicated in Wage Table No. 5. Clerical employees received a graduated advance on the average of 11.6 per cent in their per annum pay scale and a true time and one-half pay adjustment for overtime in excess of 40 hours per week.
Wage Tables Nos. 1-5 follow. They are reproductions of the Yard's complete wage schedule for each of the periods indicated. Table No. 1 shows the wages in effect prior to the first increase; Table No. 2 shows the first increase; Table No. 3, the second increase; Table No. 4 is based on the third increase, but contains also the adjustments which were made subsequently and show the wage scale in effect at the conclusion of the war; Table No. 5 indicated the increase in the IVb scale.
(Magnifier is needed for the detailed pages above)
For the overall period of the emergency and war, the Norfolk Navy Yard's payroll totaled slightly more than half a billion dollars. The following table shows the yearly totals:
PAYROLL TOTALS BY CALENDAR YEAR*
(Per Diem to 9/2) Per Annum to 9/8 TOTAL PAYROLL * Acctg. Dept. Files
On October 10, 1941, a Commandant's Circular (32/41) announced a change in the method of payroll payment from cash to check. The check system had been in effect at Mare Island since 1927 and later had been put in effect at Bremerton. More recently the Pearl Harbor and New York Navy Yards had adopted the system.
The practice was to be started in all Naval establishments, the object being to speed up defense work. Check payment would save one half hour per man per week the Management said, the half hour being the estimated time required for each employee to get his money on pay day. The checks were to be handed out to the workers by their supervisors.
The employees of the Yard reacted strongly against the plan. The principal objection raised by the Metal Trades Council, which took the lead in opposition, was the fact that the individual employees would have difficulty in cashing their checks. The necessity of identification, the inconvenience of trips to banks or stores, the possibility that employees would have to pay service charges, and the burden check-cashing would place on local merchants who would have to carry on hand large sums of cash to handle the checks, and the tremendous additional load on local banking facilities, were pointed out. It was contended that if the banks undertook to cash 24,000 checks a week they would have little time for any other business.
The union leaders of the Yard sought to enlist local support in their opposition to the check plan and succeeded in interesting representatives of the banks through the Portsmouth Clearing House Association. Several delegations visited the Navy Department to present their protests.
However the system was put into effect early in December 1941, and opposition died in the tenseness and excitement which followed our entry into the war.
As employment of the Yard increased and the volume of checks to be cashed grew, bank booths were established outside the Navy Yard gates to provide convenient places for cashing checks. This service begun on April 14, 1943, was set up by the American National Bank of Portsmouth.
Hours of Work
Hours of work were changed several times during the war as the pressure of work became heavier. The basic work week of the Yard was 40 hours, eight hours a day, Monday through Friday, at the outbreak of the war. Some shift work was done as required, and overtime was authorized in specific cases as needed. The bulk of the work was performed by the day shift. Saturday work was done only as required, and there was virtually no Sunday work except in the case of emergency.
As the burden of the Atlantic Patrol fell on the Yard, it became necessary to undertake additional Saturday work (LL/P18(48)). This was made possible through use of the stagger system, employees required to work on Saturday or Sunday being given an equal amount of time off during the following week instead of being paid overtime. Some employees, however, were paid overtime for certain jobs, notably in new construction on destroyers.
The fact that a few employees were compensated for extra work while others were compelled to stagger their working days was held to be discriminatory by employee organizations, and a formal protest against the system was made by the Metal Trades Council in October 1940. The unions contended that all employees required to work after the end of the regular 40-hour week should be paid overtime.
The Yard's management position was that it was following the Navy Department's policy, which favored spreading work as much as possible, using the stagger system or shifts if necessary instead of overtime work (FS/A1-3(750)). The system was ended, however, when the growing work load of 1940 and early 1941 made it necessary to expand the use of shifts and to lengthen the work week and increase overtime for all employees.
Staggered hours were used in another sense during the war to facilitate transportation, the beginning and end of shifts being staggered in such a manner that all employees did not leave or enter the Yard at the same time. (CM 16/42, 11 March 1942).
With the increasing tempo of national defense in the early summer of 1940, the Navy Department authorized Naval shore establishments to increase the civilian shipbuilding forces and to work additional shifts. (SecNav ltr LL/P18(48), 28 May 1940).
On July 22, 1940, as a result, the Norfolk Navy Yard went on a full two-shift basis, running the first shift from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. and the second shift from 3:30 p.m. to midnight (CO 37/40, 12 June 1940).
On September 30, 1940, the Yard went on a three-shift basis, (CO 45/40 23 Sept. 1940) with the hours being from 7:30 a.m. to 3:50 p.m. for the first shift, 3:40 p.m. to midnight for the second shift and 11:30 p.m. to 7:40 a.m. for the third shift. The normal week, however, remained Monday through Friday on a 40-hour basis. But by that time hundreds of men were working six and in some cases seven days a week and receiving overtime pay to a total of 56 hours. (Cdt. ltr SecNav, 22 Jan. 1941, FS/L9-3(87)"A").
On February 6, 1941, the Navy Yard went on a six-day, 48-hour week for all employees (CO 3/41, 6 Feb. 1941). Time and a half was to be paid for all work over 40 hours for all per diem employees, mechanics, helpers, etc., but per annum employees, those in the clerical IVb group, were to continue being paid at straight time even if overtime was worked since there was no law then in effect to provide overtime pay for clerical employees of naval shore establishments. The stagger system was used so that IVb employees would be provided a compensating day off during the week when required to work on Saturday.
Clerical employees of the Yard protested the unfairness of this situation, and the local lodge of the American Federation of Government Employees which represented the clerical, technical and professional employees of the Yard, took the matter to Washington in an effort to have it adjusted.
The authorization for overtime pay was not made until July 30, 1941, when an executive order was signed by the President providing that per annum employees would receive overtime compensation for work in excess of 40 hours a week retroactive to June 3, 1941 (SO 39/41, Aug. 7, 1941). It was the first wage adjustment received by per annum employees since 1923.
The three-shift system for the shops continued in effect until June 21, 1943, on which date it was supplanted by a two-shift system (CO 21/43, 17 June 1943) of nine hours each. The hours of work then ran from 7:00 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. and from 5:30 p.m. to 3:15 a.m. The night shift hours were changed September 9, 1943, to 5:15 to 2:45 (CO 30/43) to permit employees to leave earlier.
The two-shift system proved to be more effective than the three-shift system in the opinion of the Yard management. The general experience was that under the three shift system the second shift was not as productive as the first, and the third shift was less productive than the second. The same experience was borne out with the two-shift plan, the first or daylight shift proving to be more productive than the night shift. The two-shift system was continued until the end of the war when the Yard reverted to its normal 8-hour, 5-day week, although much night shift work was eliminated in 1945.
It is interesting to note that in 1940 consideration was given to a plan for beginning work on the first shift at 5 a.m., with the second shift going on a approximately 3 p.m., in order to take full advantage of daylight hours. This proposal was not adopted, however, because the Yard was able to keep up with its work load with normal hours of work. Daylight saving time was in effect throughout the war.
Relations with Management
Wages and hours, of course, were important matters and subjects of frequent discussion between management and labor throughout the war. Conditions were such, however, that no real labor trouble was experienced at any time during the emergency.
On wages Management adopted the attitude of attempting to meet the demands for increases through recommendations to the Navy Department based on average wages in the immediate locality. In some instances the Navy Department, due principally to limitations imposed upon them by regulations, were unable to acquiesce, in others the increases were made.
Boards of the settlement of many cases and complaints are scattered through the files of many individual employees or are not on record. It is therefore almost impossible to cite specific cases of the settlement of many grievances. But it is safe to say that at no time did dissension of opinion between representatives of Labor and Management reach the point where real strife proved detrimental to the war effort. True enough, the employees and employees' representatives did not always see eye to eye with Management, but when differences occurred they were settled without any permanent ill feeling. Settlements were affected for the most part by frankness in arbitration and discussion. On occasion Management was frank, adopted a stern attitude and Labor gave ground. On other occasions, Labor's arguments were so convincing it was necessary and desirable that Management make concessions.
Outstanding as to unusual agreements reached was that of trade cognizance. Management recognized the necessity of abandoning to a degree the lines of trade cognizance, and after thorough discussion Labor agreed to the temporary abandonment of many items of trade cognizance in the interest of obtaining victory.
Representatives of Labor entered into many phases of the war effort relating to the individual employee such as housing, transportation, food, fuel, etc. Management cooperated with Labor in its efforts to better living conditions, for it was the aim of Management to remedy any unsatisfactory conditions brought to its attention, whether such attention was directed by Labor or whether unsatisfactory conditions were brought to light by individual complaints.
The handling of individual complaints and grievances contributed much to the general satisfactory Labor Relations existing during the war. In these individual grievances and in all dealings with the individual employee, or with Labor groups, frankness, honesty and a willingness to consider the employees' viewpoint brought dividends.
Disciplinary System
Prior to 1930 infractions of Yard regulations were punished by the shop masters. Early in 1930 a committee composed of officer and civilian employee personnel was detained to study and report upon the standardization of punishments for offenses committed by civilian employees of the Yard. By Comdt's. letter LL/P13(3-CLA) dated May 26, 1930, the Commandant approved the report of the committee and authorized the heads of departments to act for the Commandant in imposing punishments upon civilian employees within their respective departments in accordance with the approved table of punishments. Deviations from the limitations of punishments were required to have the specific approval of the Commandant.
This table was in effect in the Norfolk Navy Yard in September 1939. A few additions and changes were made in the period between 1930 and 1942 when it was superseded by Commandant's Order No. 48/42 dated April 24, 1942, which in turn was rendered void by Commandant's Order No. 34/43 dated November 1, 1943. The table of offenses and penalties in effect on August 14, 1945, was authorized by Commandant's Order No. 43/44 dated October 19, 1944. Copies of these tables are contained in File LL/P13(3).
An employee suspected of violating Yard regulations is charged in writing and given an opportunity to reply in writing. His supervisors are requested to attach to the report any information they may have with their comments and recommendation of disciplinary action. After the master of the shop has recommended the penalty to be assigned, the entire report is reviewed in the Personnel Relations Office to ascertain whether it is correct in form, the charges are justified, the evidence is sufficient to support the charges, the penalty recommended is in accordance with the table of offenses and penalties, and confirms to the general policy of uniformity in application of disciplinary measures. The employee is notified by official personnel action Form NAVEXOS-1200 from the Personnel Relations Office by direction of the Commandant of the disciplinary action taken against him. Notification of discharge is signed by the Commandant.
The advisability of prompt action was impressed upon the supervisors and clerks who handle these reports. It is felt that disciplinary actions, in order to be effective and accomplish the desired results, must be handled expeditiously.
Norfolk Form 5-me is used to report all offenses except unauthorized absence for three or more consecutive days. Norfolk Form 28-me is used to report unauthorized absence for three or more consecutive days. The use of this form has displaced the former six-muster discharge. One of two action is possible: discharge or excuse accepted. NAVEXOS-1200, official personnel action form, is used to notify employees of disciplinary action taken with the exception of warnings and acceptance of excuses.
The greatest difficulty encountered during the war involving disciplinary action was the problem of absenteeism and evolving a system to prevent it through the imposition of penalties. It was felt that assigning a suspension without pay as the penalty for the first and second offenses of unauthorized absence had merely the effect of increasing the number of work days lost. Therefore the deferred suspension system was inaugurated in the table of offenses and penalties authorized by Commandant's Order No. 34/43 of November 1, 1943. The suspensions assigned for the first and second offenses were deferred for a period of six months from the date of the latest offense, and an active suspension plus the deferred suspension was imposed as the minimum for the third offense. Except in unusual circumstances the penalty of suspension for the third offense was imposed rather than discharge in order to retain the services of employees whose services might be of value. It was found, however, that there were many chronic offenders who gave little, if any, heed to the deferred suspensions and the warnings of more severe disciplinary action if the offense was repeated. It was also observed that many employees suspended for a third unauthorized absence would be charged with a fourth offense even before the minimum penalty of 15 days suspension had been served.
Therefore in the table of offenses and penalties revised as of October 1, 1944, a deferred suspension was authorized only for the first offense. It is believed that this system of a deferred suspension for the first offense only has had a greater deterring effect on habitual offenders than the deferred suspension for both first and second offenses.
In the Industrial Department, disciplinary charges against supervisors are prepared in the Personnel Relations Division by one of the disciplinary officers for the signature of the Manager. Report of a supervisor's improper conduct or violation of Yard regulations is made in writing to the Personnel Relations Division and a copy of the report is sent to the Shop Superintendent. A letter of charges is then prepared by one of the Disciplinary Officers for the signature of the Manager via the shop master. These letters are routed through official channels, and notification of the penalty imposed or acceptance of statement is similarly handled.
Employees who wish to protest the action taken are required first to discuss the matter with their personnel supervisors. If a satisfactory settlement cannot be reached, the employee may request permission to visit the Personnel Relations Division where his case will be thoroughly reviewed and discussed with him. If the employee furnishes additional information which has a tendency to change the facts originally presented, the disciplinary officer will present the new evidence to the shop for consideration with recommendation for further action.
If satisfactory adjustment of the employee's complaint cannot be made by the Personnel Relations Division, the employee is informed of his right to initiate a grievance under the grievance procedure established by Commandant's Order No, 16/45, April 4, 1945.
XIX. HOUSING
Extent of the Problem
Of all the problems which had to be met by the Norfolk Navy Yard during the emergency and war years, housing probably was the most difficult. The magnitude of the problem brought about by the tremendous increase in the number of civilian workers and naval personnel is shown by the fact that 45 public and private housing projects were undertaken and completed during the emergency. These 45 different projects comprised a grand total of 16,487 units, the great majority of which were available for occupancy by the end of 1943. All of these 45 projects are on the Portsmouth side of the Elizabeth River. None of the extensive projects on the Norfolk or Berkley side of the river is included.
A breakdown shows that twelve public white projects were constructed and five public colored projects. Twenty-four private white projects were built and four private colored projects. The public white projects comprised 9,986 units, while the private white projects offered a total of 3,669 units. The colored public projects consisted of 2,349 units and the private colored projects offered 483 individual units. The problem of housing was of such consequence that its history will be considered in some detail.
The following table30 is a complete list of all the war housing projects on the Portsmouth side of the river: p264
30 Table used by permission of Ports. Housing Authority, the compilers.
Simonsdale
By the spring of 1940 the Navy Yard's payroll had grown to nearly 10,000 employees, and the problem of where to house the new workers had become urgent.
As early as 1938 when the first important fleet expansion was undertaken, Admiral Simons had appealed to Portsmouth real estate men (Nfk.Ldg.Disp. 31 Dec. 1938) to build additional "small modern houses at moderate cost" for the influx of workers expected for the construction of the ALABAMA. Several times during 1938 and 1939 in public addresses in Portsmouth and in news stories in the press, the Admiral pointed to the impending expansion of the Yard as demanding community action, but very little was done until the spring of 1940. By that time the need for new houses in Portsmouth could not be ignored, and the Commandant, having failed to get the response from private builders which he deemed necessary, announced that he was going to try to get government housing for the Navy Yard. To this end he appealed to Congressman Darden and Senator Byrd for congressional action which would provide some 3,200 badly needed units. He proposed that the Federal Government immediately erect a mass housing project in Portsmouth or Norfolk County to take care of the expanding Yard, and declared in a characteristic statement, "I hope I will be here long enough to build a city." (Nfk.Vgn.Pilot 26 March 1940).
The Admiral pointed out that during World War I the Federal Government through the U. S. Housing Corporation had built two projects near the Yard for housing Navy workers, Cradock and Truxton. The shortage of early 1940, he said, was almost as severe as that of World War I. The Commandant based his hope for getting such a project on the fact that the Navy Department had asked Congress to appropriate money for construction of housing units adjacent to Naval stations which needed them. Even after this move by the Admiral there was still reluctance on the part of investors to go into any extensive development program.
A study of the files of the local newspapers for the spring and summer of 1940 shows many stories on housing indicating this reluctance and revealing the reason for it. Fears were voiced that the seriousness of the situation was being exaggerated, and that any emergency housing erected probably would not be needed after a short time. Realtors remembered World War I in which they had prepared for a large permanent increase in the population of the city only to have it fade away after the war, and they recalled their experience with Cradock and Truxton and pointed to the fact that after the war the Government had sold these properties at figures below their actual value, cutting real estate values in Portsmouth. The war in the spring of 1940, as we previously noted, was still to many a "phony war", and investors wanted to be sure of the future of the Navy Yard before they undertook large-scale housing construction. Estimates of how much the Navy Yard would grow varied considerably, and despite Admiral Simons' forthright statements concerning the inevitability of that growth, the opinions of other Government spokesmen as to what the future held were by no means in complete agreement.
Surveys were made by real estate people and in some cases actually showed the supply of houses to be ahead of demand with private construction increasing. The conclusion that the housing situation was well in hand was not unusual. There were honest differences of opinion and the "facts" presented did not always agree.
The problem was to provide low-cost housing for Navy Yard workers and for naval enlisted personnel. The financial return on such projects obviously was not sufficient to attract investment as readily as high rental projects, and this factor was a significant one in the reluctance of investors to undertake private housing for lower income groups.
Opponents of government housing argued that the erection of another "Cradock" would provide only a few month's employment for workers in the building trades, and would by virtue of the vastness of the project cause a slump in building immediately thereafter which might last for years. It was said that Cradock had halted residential construction in the City of Portsmouth for a long period because builders could not compete with the values it offered. Contractors contended that a project of the magnitude sought by the Commandant would compress construction within a period of a few months, which normally would take years, thereby leaving building trades workers without jobs after its completion.
It was also argued that workers coming to the Navy Yard would not be permanent residents of the City, and barracks accommodations were suggested for them. It was proposed that the area along First Street be utilized for this purpose in view of the fact that the Government needed the waterfront anyway. Through all the arguments, which at times became heated, ran one continuous theme of comment - - that every angle of the housing situation must be thoroughly studied before the community agreed to any over-building which might not be absorbed for years. General speaking, the Commandant's proposals were frowned upon.
Said the Portsmouth Star in an editorial on April 4, 1940, "The outstanding business interests of this City are opposed to the methods that have been suggested by Admiral Simons for meeting the local housing situation."
But new workers were coming to Portsmouth daily, and the work load was growing. The average number of ships present in the Yard each day, which had frequently dropped to fewer than ten during the period of the thirties, stood at an average of thirty. The Management estimated that the work load would continue at its peak for at least eight years. The "normal" employment, which had been about 3,500 during the thirties, was then considered to be 10,000, and additional enlargement was expected.
Admiral Simons, therefore, moved to back up his estimates of the housing needs of the Yard with actual up-to-date facts. Circulating a housing questionnaire among the employees of the Yard in April 1940 to determine the needs, the Commandant found that more than 3,000 units were necessary and that more than 1,500 persons wanted to buy homes as soon as possible.
The Admiral forthwith took the bull by the horns. Declaring that workmen were leaving the Yard at the rate of seven a day because they were unable to find houses, he stated publicly that he was going to take orders for houses himself and negotiate directly with construction firms to get them built.
Out of this situation was born "The Commandant's Better Housing Committee, Inc." and the Simonsdale housing development.31 The Committee was an eleven-man group made up of Nary Yard employees appointed by the Commandant, organized for the purpose of procuring adequate housing for Navy Yard employees. A Commandant's Circular No. 26/40, May 16, 1940, gave official status to this Committee, and stated:
"The objectives of the Navy Yard Housing Committee are to form a cooperative group to provide houses for present and prospective Yard employees at the minimum cost to the purchaser; to arrange contacts, as requested, between the employees and other sources having houses for sale; and to endeavor to find out for the purchaser that the property to be bought is adequate and worth the price asked."
31 Admiral Simons' own report on this committee and the circumstances leading to its formation is contained in a letter to ComFiv dtd. 5 Aug. 1940 (N4(40).
R. S. Smith, at that time a clerk in the Material Section of the Yard was named chairman and the Committee incorporated itself under the laws of the State of Virginia.
This somewhat unique group lost no time in getting down to business. Within a week they announced that a community building project for the Navy Yard employees would be started at Olive Branch on the old Suffolk Boulevard. The Committee acquired the land for the project in its name, sold lots to prospective individual buyers, and arranged for these individuals to build houses under the sponsorship of the Federal Housing Administration. More than fifty lots were sold on the first day that Simonsdale was opened to the public, and by the first week in June 1940 Admiral Simons himself had laid the cornerstone for the first home. Eventually 250 units were completed and occupied. In addition to this private development, 150 other units in Simonsdale were erected as a public project by the Defense Homes Corporation.
First Portsmouth Projects
Action on the part of the community toward providing housing did not come until more than a month after the formation of the Commandant's Housing Committee. Meanwhile the probability of mass government housing had increased.
A letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks to the Navy Yard, dated June 27, 1940, (N4(40) stated that Congress had authorized the USHA, or the Navy Department, to provide dwellings for married enlisted or civilian personnel on or near naval reservations or in localities where acute shortage of housing existed which impeded the national defense program. Housing units could be built by either the local housing authorities, the USHA or by the Navy Department with funds allocated to it from the USHA, the legal limit of each unit to be $4,000, although the average cost was only $2,776.
On the following day, June 28, 1940, the Portsmouth City Council at a special session authorized the formation of a Portsmouth Housing Authority under the jurisdiction of the United States Housing Authority.
The indisputable fact that hundreds of new workmen who had no places to live were pouring into the City, plus the Commandant's determination to secure houses for these people if not from local initiative then from direct Federal action, appears to have convinced the City that if it did not act then, the Federal Government would step in and new "Cradocks" and new "Truxtons" would be forced upon them, vast projects which would pay no taxes to the City or County yet would put additional responsibility upon them for municipal services. It appears to have been this pressure, the threat of mass Government low cost housing construction, which finally brought positive action.
The United States Housing Authority was a Federal Agency which had been established in 1937 to provide primarily for the clearance of slums. It was authorized by Congress to allocate funds to local committees, which groups working under its jurisdiction would carry out the projects. With the increasing emphasis on the need for defense housing, the USHA, although a slum clearance agency, assumed the principal responsibility for providing low cost defense housing during the early part of the national emergency period. The local Housing Authorities of the USHA provided a means for local communities to retain control of housing projects rather than having them sponsored directly by the Federal Government.
However, the Commandant, to be sure that action on the housing situation was actually forthcoming, proposed in a letter to the Bureau of Yards and Docks on July 2, 1940, (Ibid.) that a housing project of 800 units be erected by the Navy Yard itself, acting on the authority obtained in the Act of Congress of June 28 giving the Navy the authority to undertake such projects.
He stated that the City of Portsmouth had set up under jurisdiction of the USHA a project of 1,800 units, divided into three sections of 600 each and stated that the City had appointed a Housing Authority. The Commandant stated that it was his opinion that if the Portsmouth Housing Authority proceeded with its plans the question of housing would be fairly well solved. One statement from the letter should be quoted here:
"The Commandant has informed the City Manager and the Housing Authorities for Portsmouth that the deadline for deciding their project is July 15. If for some unforeseen reason it develops that there is undue delay or failure to set up the project, the Commandant will further notify the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and set up his own project."
Norfolk County a short time later set up a Housing Authority. The City of Norfolk likewise followed suit, although this latter action constituted a reversal of position for the City Council had previously refused to set up such an agency.
The Portsmouth Housing Authority immediately made plans for its first mass housing unit, a project to consist of from 600 to 800 units at a cost of about $1,000,000. The whole project was conceived as a slum clearance movement, and the plans then were to utilize the buildings erected for removal of slum families whose substandard housing would be razed after the emergency ended. The units were to be for rental. The high percentage of substandard dwelling units in the City of Portsmouth explained in large measure the insistence upon the slum clearance type of project.
The allocation which the Portsmouth Housing Authority was to receive amounted to some three million dollars in Government funds. Additional projects were to be undertaken after the completion of the first one, which was to be erected on a tract of 48 acres of land owned by the City in Prentis Park. The area was to be taken over by the Housing Authority upon the payment of back taxes.
Still, even after the plans were made, the opposition to public housing continued. The projects as originally planned were to be tax exempt for a period of 60 years. This fact, of course, brought sharp criticism of the Portsmouth Housing Authority's plans, business people taking the position that the Government should pay its own way. It was pointed out that many thousands of dollars would be necessary to provide municipal services such as police and fire protection, sanitary and storm sewer connections, streets and schools.
The fact that Portsmouth was a city of extremely low per capita wealth, due largely to the fact that the Navy Yard paid no taxes to the City, was brought out. The situation in Portsmouth was contrasted with that of Newport News, in which city the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company paid substantial tax revenues. It was further pointed out by the opponents of the mass housing program that the new housing units were not designed to be for any part of Portsmouth's permanent population but were designed for temporary occupancy. Furthermore, the point was made that the objective of the USHA, slum clearance, was being confused with the need which had developed (Nfk.Vgn.Pilot-Editorial, 28 July 1940), and that the people who did occupy the houses would be persons of relatively high income.
An editorial in the Portsmouth Star on July 30, 1940, summed up the prevailing attitude when it declared the Portsmouth City Council had accepted the "lesser of the two evils" - mass rental housing construction by the Navy, or slum clearance through the civilian-controlled Housing Authority.
The editorial said that there was probably no member of the Council who would voluntarily have advocated $3,000,000 worth of rental housing, but faced with the other alternative there seemed nothing else to do. The city was promised by USHA Director, Nathan Strauss, that there would be no mass housing construction within the jurisdiction of the local housing authority other than the slum clearance project.
The first development to be undertaken by the Portsmouth Housing Authority was Dale Homes, a 300-unit project in Prentis Park. The name for the project was selected to honor Captain Richard Dale, a Portsmouth Naval Officer, who was second in command aboard the BON HOMME RICHARD under John Paul Jones in the famed battle with the Serapis and who had also served as first superintendent of the Gosport Navy Yard after it was loaned to the United States Navy.
The Portsmouth Housing Authority considered a number of additional projects, took options on land and so forth, and finally announced plans for the construction of a second project, Swanson Homes. This project was also be be located in Prentis Park, adjacent to the first, and was to consist of an additional 210 units.
On December 18, 1940, the first family moved into Dale Homes, and by the end of the year some 65 families had moved into the project. Swanson Homes was occupied early in 1941.
Many other difficulties than those already noted beset the beginning of the housing projects. Typical of these problems was that of determining the rates to charge for electricity, water and utilities services. The USHA's general practice was to serve the tenants of its projects through master meters, but local interests contended that since these houses were to be occupied by Navy Yard workers of fairly good income that there should be no discrimination between the rates paid by them for services and the rates paid by other residents of the city. This latter view finally prevailed, although the USHA made a determined attempt to provide these services at the lower rates generally charged to tenants of slum clearance projects.
Political implications were also evident in the housing problem. Various political factions charged each other with controlling or attempting to control local housing developments. In particular was this true of the Norfolk County Housing Authority which eventually became inoperative. And there were also evident efforts of property owners to "cash in" on the necessity for housing by raising sale prices and rentals.
New Gosport
Despite the undertaking of the two projects by the Portsmouth Housing Authority, the need for new houses was so urgent in the fall of 1940 that the Navy Department informed the Yard (BuDocks ltr. 5 Oct. 1940, N4(40)) that the Navy was preparing to negotiate contracts for low cost housing in Hampton Roads.
The first housing projects were designed for civilian war workers, but no provision was made up to that time for the housing of naval personnel. Anxious to provide its own housing projects for married enlisted men as well as civilian employees, the Bureau of Yards and Docks assigned a project of 250 units for construction near the Navy Yard. The funds were provided from the forty-four billion (?) dollars allocated to the Navy for Housing. (BuDocks ltr. 17 October 1940, ibid.)
Negotiations were opened immediately by the Navy Yard for purchase of a tract of land on Paradise Creek, near Cradock, which formed a portion of the Maupin farm. This land consisting of slightly over 57 acres was purchased on November 23, 1940, from William G. Maupin for $18,159.88.
Under the direction of the Public Works Division of the Yard, a contract was negotiated for the erection of 250 single houses and work began soon afterward. The project was to be known as New Gosport. Eventually 348 units were provided.
By April 1, 1941, the first units in New Gosport were ready for occupancy and the first families of Naval enlisted personnel moved in. The project, unlike any of the other Government housing projects in Portsmouth, was operated directly by the Navy Yard. A resident manager was appointed by the Yard and police protection and other services were rendered by the Navy. Throughout the war New Gosport enjoyed the reputation of being efficiently operated. As an adjunct of the Navy Yard it provided attractive low-cost living quarters for Navy families.
New Gosport, however, for a brief time was placed under the jurisdiction of the public housing authorities following the consolidation of housing activities under the National Housing Agency in February 1942.
In 1940 and 1941 many Federal agencies dealt with the housing problem. They included the Defense Home Corporation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture which was empowered to provide housing for migratory labor, the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Federal Works Agency which included the Defense House Division and the Public Buildings Administration, and the United States Housing Authority.
The division of authority and conflicting projects made it plain by the time of Pearl Harbor that housing efforts should be centralized in one body. This was done in February 1942 when Congress brought all of the Government agencies then dealing with housing under the overall jurisdiction of the National Housing Agency, the housing projects themselves to be administered by the Federal Public Housing Authority.
So far as the Norfolk Navy Yard was affected the Portsmouth Housing Authority was to continue to operate the projects which had been built under its supervision, while the FPHA was to take over all other public housing.
One of the results of this merger of housing agencies was that the Yard was advised in a dispatch on March 13, 1942, from the Navy Department (N4(40) that an executive order had provided for transferring of ownership, maintenance and management of all housing projects not on Naval reservations to the new National Housing Agency. The change was to be effective July 1, 1942.
Accordingly New Gosport was taken over by the public housing authorities. The Yard Management, however, was dissatisfied with this method of administration and requested the Navy Department to arrange retention of control of the project.32 After a considerable amount of negotiation the Yard won its point and the management of New Gosport was returned to the Yard on September 1, 1942. On April 1, 1944, title to the property was also returned to the Navy. (BuDocks ltr 26 May 1944.)
32 Cdt. ltr BuDocks, 22 Jul. 1942, N4(40) provides an excellent and detailed review of the controversy over New Gosport.
For their untiring efforts to provide adequate housing for Navy Yard workers, both Admiral Simons and Admiral Gygax (See First Citizen Award, Ch. XXII, Sec. 3) won praise despite their frequent pointed criticisms of community failures.
Said the Portsmouth Star in an editorial on April 4, 1940: "We have had no Commandant in the Navy Yard in recent years who has taken a greater interest in our local community than had Admiral Simons." His "clear criticisms" of the City were referred to by the paper as public spirited and constructive.
On May 6, 1941, the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce recognized Admiral Simons' community contribution in a letter to him signed by J. M. Overton, Secretary, which read in part:
". . . At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce held May 6, 1941, many complimentary expressions were made concerning the interest manifested by you in civic matters and the general welfare of the City of Portsmouth. As an expression of appreciation the following resolution was unanimously adopted."
"Resolved: The Board of Directors of the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce heartily commend Admiral Manley H. Simons and the Commandant's Housing Committee for their interest and activity in promoting housing in Portsmouth and surrounding areas."
Upon his detachment from the Yard in June 1941, Admiral Simons was paid a tribute by civic leaders and businessmen of Portsmouth and Navy Yard civilian employees at a testimonial dinner. (Nfk.Vgn-Pilot, 28 June 1941). The Commandant was lauded for his progressive interest in the community.
Despite these amenities the Admiral even in his farewell remarks spoke his mind. Said he: "We are close to war. The further we lag behind our ability to successfully fight Germany, the closer we will get to war. The better equipment we get, the less anxious will any of the Axis powers be to fight us."
"I can well understand your chagrin," he continued, "and the surprise of your thoughtful and patriotic citizens at your futility to arouse Portsmouth from its apathy in helping the national defense and for the absolute lack of interest Portsmouth has shown in solving its civic problems."
Additional Projects
By late summer of 1941 newcomers said that the Portsmouth area was taking on an almost Florida boom appearance because of the hundreds of new dwelling units which were spring up. But, despite the rapid construction of new housing projects, the No. 1 worry of new people arriving in Portsmouth was still housing. New dwelling units filled up as rapidly as they were completed, and still it was estimated that there were many scores of families living in inadequate accommodations.
This situation, which was by then common to defense centers all over the country, prompted the USHA on July 7, 1941, to issue a ruling that no existing dwelling, however substandard, could be torn down as a part of a slum clearance program. Every available housing unit was needed, and from that time on the USHA projects which had begun as slum clearance porjects became straight out defense housing.
Additional public facilitiess completed and opened in 1941-1942 included Dale Dormitories near Dale Homes in Prentis Park, providing 1,248 units, erected by the Farm Security Administration for single male defense workers; and Williams Court, 400 units, and Barlow Place, 265 units erected by the Public Housing Administration with the management later being assumed by the FPHA.
In 1943 Williams Court Apartments, 400 units, was built by the FPHA; William Craford Homes, 400 units by the Housing Authority of the City of Portsmouth; and Wendell Neville Dormitories, 496 units for single women workers also by the HACP. In addition scores of private houses were erected.
But many factors continued to complicate the housing picture. Yard employees and other war workers complained of increasing rents, for example, and the union organizations in the Yard appointed committees to investigate many claims of rent gouging and unjustified charges. Countless newcomers, they said, were driven away from the City because of excessive rents. To deal with the situation, a Fair Rent Committee was appointed in the City of Portsmouth.
Other problems had to be met. Community centers, stores and shops had to be provided for the mushrooming Federal housing projects, and a vast expansion of such community services as schools, streets and sidewalks, fire protection, police protection, sewage disposal and utilities services, electricity, gas, water and telephone had to be provided on a scale undreamed of even a year before the expansion began. Health and recreational needs became a pressing problem. Additional hospital facilities and new recreational activities were primary needs. Indeed the request for Federal funds to round out the defense program in the Portsmouth area ranged from a few thousand dollars for new fire engines to many thousands of dollars for building new schools and hospitals. Even the purchase of additional ferry boats was sought. Many such allocations were made, the funds being assigned under provisions of the Lanham Act of September 1941, which provided for supplemental community needs in connection with the defense program.
But still the employment increased and the housing needs grew. To determine as nearly as possible the needs, the Yard in response to a dispatch from the Bureau of Yards and Docks issued a housing questionaire to every employee on the rolls as of September 2, 1941. (N4(40). The payroll then had reached 23,971. Replies were received from 20,605 and the tabulation showed that 6,284 Yard employees were in need of housing.
As a result of this survey, Admiral Gygax advised the Bureau of Yards and Docks (ltr. dtd. 26 Sept. 1941) that "Housing may become a serious bottleneck in the effort that can be produced by the Norfolk Navy Yard. During the past four months," the Admiral wrote, "the net gain in employment has been 4,705, an average of almost 1,200 in a month."
He stated that the management of the Yard was basing its estimates of operation upon the assumption that employment in the Yard would reach 40,000 by November 1, 1942, upon completion of the additional facilities, Drydock 8, St. Helena, etc., then under construction.
At the rate of gain then current, 10,800 employees it was estimated would need housing by July 1, 1942. The fact that most of the new employees of the Yard were coming from outside the area heightened the probability that the percentage requiring housing would be increased and the overall number without suitable dwelling units might be even larger, the Admiral pointed out. He asked the Navy Department, therefore, that "every effort be made to expedite the construction of additional housing facilities."
Not only did the Admiral express concern. The Secretary of the Navy himself on a visit to the Navy Yard September 29, 1941, declared: "Housing and Recreation facilities in Portsmouth are inadequate." (Nfk.Vgn-Pilot, 20 Sept. 1941). It was his opinion, Mr. Knox said, that private capital was missing an opportunity by not going into the construction of rental houses on a large scale.
"Norfolk is bound to be engaged in Naval work for many years to come because we shall have a big Navy," he said. "When this war is over, if people still don't realize the necessity of maintaining a dominant sea power, we are dumber than I think we are."
Alexander Park
Pearl Harbor brought the housing situation in Portsmouth to a crisis. All of the existing projects, as the Commandant had noted earlier in the fall of 1941, were not enough and emergency measures had to be undertaken. With the employment already more than 20,000 greater than it had been a little over two years before, the prospects were that another 20,000 might very easily be added.
Alexander Park was the result. The Yard had to take on more employees and it was obviously impossible to take on more workers without providing places for them to live.
The Federal Public Housing Authority, therefore, moved to erect in Norfolk County some five thousand units of a demountable type of dwelling. The plans were quickly made and by February 15, 1942, a site had been selected at Alexander's Corner in Norfolk County. It was proposed to erect one, two and three bedroom dwelling units of prefabricated materials in one of the vastest housing projects of the war.
On February 12, 1942, a contract was let for the construction of five thousand dwelling units to the Homasote Corporation, 4,250 white and 750 colored (Douglas Park), the project to be completed in the incredibly short time of five months. The cost was to be $15,000,000.
Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining the site, however, and valuable time was lost in getting the project started.
On April 4, 1942, the Commandant wrote to the Secretary of the Navy via the Bureau of Yards and Docks (N4(40) stating:
"The housing situation for the civilian employees at this Navy Yard is steadily becoming more acute each day. At the present time there are over 34,000 civilian employees and the ship construction and repair demands are constantly increasing. It is expected that the required number of employees will exceed 40,000 in six months. However, the employment of these additional men and consequently the accomplishment of ship construction and repair work is being seriously interfered with for the lack of housing facilities.
"It has been approximately six months since the last projects for civilian workers were completed and all of these accommodations have long since been filled. Since the completion of these projects, the force at the Navy Yard has increased by about 9,000 and the temporary relief from these housing projects has disappeared.
"One cannot emphasize too strongly that the factors which are delaying progress on the 5,000 additional defense homes as outlined by the Navy will seriously handicap the work of the Yard and the war effort. It is urged, therefore, that this situation again be brought to the attention of the National Housing Agency and that every assistance possible be given to this agency to help expedite the completion of the houses. It is understood that the principal delay at this time is in the acquisition of the sites. It is urgently recommended that the National Housing Agency institute condemnation proceedings in order to permit the contractors immediately to enter upon the land and to proceed at once with erection of these much needed houses."
The preliminary arrangements were completed soon after, and on May 11, 1942, Admiral Gygax turned the first shovel of earth, beginning work on the project which was to become Alexander Park.
The vast project at Alexander Park took shape swiftly and the houses were erected with incredible speed. A prefabricating plant was put up by the contractor on the site and houses went up in time counted in minutes.
Erection of houses alone was not the answer to the problem, however. Those houses had to be equipped with electricity, water, plumbing and the normal utility services. This part of the project was seriously delayed because of inability to get priorities high enough to permit the installation of this essential equipment despite the fact that the houses themselves were erected under the highest priority.
Consequently the Navy Yard's employment continued to keep far ahead of the number of houses needed. Said Admiral Gygax (ltr. BuDocks, 5 Sept. 1942, N4(40)):
"No housing program serving the Norfolk Navy Yard has ever been ready for occupancy by the time it was needed - at best it has temporarily eased a very critical situation. Programming and construction has been characterized by 'too little and too late'.
"Lack of suitable housing is causing a severe labor turnover and seriously interfering with the building up of a proper force to meet the war effort required of this Yard."
As a result of the many difficulties that had been encountered, Admiral Gygax wrote further to BuDocks on November 26, 1942, as follows:
"It is my belief that the large (labor) turnover and the leveling off of the employment curve are in a large measure due to the extremely unsatisfactory local housing situation.
"The construction of the 5,000 demountable housing project . . . providing necessary services, sewers, roads, water, electricity and not only the erection of the houses, has been extremely slow of realization and has been inexcusably delayed by lack of coordination and timing to assure completion of essential services with the completion of the houses themselves.
"I, therefore, recommend that the additional houses to serve the Norfolk Navy Yard be constructed as Navy projects under the direct supervision of the Public Works Officer of this Yard with funds allocated to the Navy for this property as was done in the case of the New Gosport Project . . that housing so provided be managed by the Navy. It is my considered opinion that this is the quickest and most satisfactory means for providing essential housing in locations best serving the needs of the Norfolk Navy Yard."
Housing, however, remained under NHA control, BuDocks stating on January 7, 1943, in a letter to the Commandant that the Bureau opposed Navy Yard control of housing. The letter stated that control of all civilian housing under the national war effort had been centralized by executive order in the National Housing Agency and the powers, responsibilities and housing properties of other agencies had been transferred and consolidated with FPHA as an operating agent. The letter added, however, that if the NHA failed in its responsibilities again, the Navy would consider taking over housing.
On Armistice Day 1942, the first family moved into Alexander Park. Admiral Gygax himself was present for the occasion, presenting the first tenants with the key to their new home. By that time some 250 units had been completed.
Already finished were the 750 units of the same type housing for colored occupants in Douglas Park, these having been finished on September 1, on which date the first families moved in.
The management of Alexander Park was able to move about 300 families a week into the project as the units became available. However, moving was made difficult by the fact that the City did not afford a sufficient number of moving vans and moving crews to put Navy Yard workers and their families into the dwelling at a more rapid rate.
The project, completed at a later date than scheduled, filled slowly at the outset. Inability of many tenants to get furniture with which to outfit the dwellings contributed to the delay. Furniture, like many other civilian articles, had become extremely scarce. But the vast project was filled by the summer of 1943 with an estimated 24,000 persons making up its population.
To ease the strain of the tremendous overcrowding meanwhile, many of the in-migrant war workers turned to trailers, and to supplement the housing a huge trailer camp project of hundreds of expansible-type trailers supplied by the Farm Security Administration was undertaken.
This project was in Highland Park. At the peak approximately 2,500 trailers were in use, although the Yard's attitude toward the use of trailers was always that this type of house was temporary. The trailers were brought into use purely as a matter of expediency. In retrospect, however, it seems that they provided the margin that enabled the Yard to carry its load.
Trailers were used pending the completion of Alexander Park, and after its completion the trailers housed the overflow. Occupants were moved out as soon as more permanent housing could be obtained, and because of the turnover trailer dwellers did not have to remain in their temporary quarters for excessive periods. By the early summer of 1945, the Yard's complement had dropped to such a point that it was possible to vacate the trailers completely, and many of them were moved to other centers of greater need.
A sidelight on trailer housing occurred in the latter part of August 1942 when the owner of a tract of land lying across State Highway Route 337 from the Barracks B area increased the rental which he was charging trailer dwellers.
The Navy Yard workers who occupied these trailers protested the rent boost and refused to pay the increase, whereupon the owner of the property turned off the City water which he furnished. The Navy Yard management, entering the controversy in an effort to protect its employees, procured new parking space for the trailers in Highland Park, provided equipment to move the trailers and shifted approximately 50 trailer units to new locations.
On June 2, 1943, a Commandant's memorandum announced the establishment of a Navy Yard housing office in the Personnel Relations Division to coordinate all phases of housing for commissioned, enlisted and civilian personnel attached to the Norfolk Navy Yard. The Housing Officer was to maintain current listings and serve in a liaison capacity in housing matters.
This office performed extremely valuable service to Yard personnel (Sec. 7), but its services could have been well used much earlier in the emergency.
As a final evidence of the extent of the housing problem, the population figures for the City and County should be examined, The 1930 census figures for the City of Portsmouth listed a population of 45,704. By 1940 this figure had grown to 50,745. On V-J Day the population of the City was estimated at approximately 81,000, this count being the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce's figure based on a check of ration books and other information available to war agencies such as the War Food Administration and the OPA. The growth of Norfolk County in which many of the housing projects are located has been even more spectacular. Approximately 25,000 persons lived in Norfolk County on the Portsmouth side of the river in 1940, this figure being arrived at by taking 70 percent, the estimated Portsmouth-side concentration of the county's total population, 35,828 at that time. The population of the county on the Portsmouth side at the conclusion of the war was estimated by the Chamber of Commerce at approximately 80,000. Thus from a City-County total of approximately 75,000 in 1940, the population had soared to an estimated 161,000 at the end of the war.
Summary
An aspect of the housing problem which deserves considerable attention is the fact that most of the war housing was located on the outskirts of the City on vacant land and throughout the war presented a great problem in transportation. (Ch, XX).
It is obvious that the ideal location for the housing would have been adjacent to the Navy Yard rather than requiring additional transportation facilities during a period when there was a shortage of equipment and manpower. Much of the existing housing near the Navy Yard is substandard and should in public interest be demolished. Originally it was proposed that this existing housing be demolished and modern housing accommodations erected adjacent to the Navy Yard. However, the net gain in housing accommodation would have been reduced by the demolition of existing structures, substandard though they were. With an acute shortage of manpower and materials facing the country, the Federal Government was forced to establish a national policy that no existing housing be demolished in connection with the development of additional war housing.
This was a logical decision, but as a safeguard in the event of any further national emergency, it would be advisable to acquire the slum properties now bordering the Navy Yard and convert the area into a public park with parking facilities for Navy Yard workers. Then in the event of any future national emergency, additional temporary housing could be erected immediately adjacent to the Navy Yard on this park property where water, gas, electricity and other public utilities would be available and eliminate the necessity of developing housing at a great distance from the Navy Yard and the construction of streets and the provision of public utilities. At the termination of such a national emergency, there would be no question as to the disposition of the temporary housing since the land would then revert to park properties.
An additional important aspect of the general housing history was the housing of in-migrant civilian war workers (Ch. XVI) and the housing of naval personnel. The war brought about mass migrations of the population unknown before in American history. Millions of civilians left their home communities to take employment in areas where war production was concentrated. In addition, millions entered the Armed Forces and were scattered throughout the country at considerable distances from their homes.
Prior to Pearl Harbor and in the first few months after Pearl Harbor, the public housing program endeavored to house civilian families and families of men in military service. However, when it appeared that the country was faced with an unprecedented utilization of manpower and materials, it was obvious that there was not sufficient manpower and critical materials available to provide housing for all displaced families both civilian and military, and also build ship, guns, aircraft, etc. Proposals were made to build barracks for in-migrant civilian war workers. However, it was clear that Congress was unwilling to pass any legislation for universal conscription. The top policy makers in WPS and NHA agreed that without work-or-fight legislation, civilian workers would not seek employment in war production localities unless they could bring their families.
Therefore on July 16, 1942, the Army, Navy and NHA issued a joint directive that first preference for accommodations in war housing projects, both private and public, would be given to in-migrant civilian war workers. This policy was probably the greatest source of dissatisfaction during the war on the part of military personnel. They naturally felt that since they were risking their lives for their country they deserved as much consideration as the well-paid civilian war workers. It was difficult, if not impossible, for a man who had been separated from his family for two years to understand why he could not rent a house when a civilian war worker who had just arrived here was able to get one immediately.
The policy described in the previous paragraph was undoubtedly necessary, but through the war the Navy Yard made every effort to mitigate its effect insofar as service personnel were concerned. Specific examples of exceptions to the policy are listed below:
(1) Throughout the war, 25 houses owned by the Defense Homes Cooperation in Simonsdale were set aside for commissioned officers.
(2) At New Gosport, the Navy-owned housing project, only service personnel were accepted as tenants and beginning with the summer of 1944 this was further restricted to enlisted personnel.
(3) First 200, then 300, then finally 400 trailers were fully equipped at the request of the Navy Yard by the Federal Public Housing Authority with linen, china, glassware and cooking utensils and made available to enlisted personnel temporarily ashore from combat duty.
(4) 150 furnished apartments in Williams Court Apartments were completely equipped with linen, china, glassware and cooking utensils and made available to commissioned officers temporarily ashore from combat duty.
According to the records of the Housing Office from six to seven thousand Navy men a year were able to have their families with them while they were temporarily ashore because of the availability of the accommodations listed in the 3rd and 4th numbers above. In addition, the Housing Office solicited and received listings of private houses and private rooms which were made available to Naval personnel. Efforts were made to have the Navy or FPHA erect additional temporary housing for transient Naval personnel but unfortunately these efforts were unsuccessful. The critical manpower and material shortage generally proved to be an insurmountable obstacle insofar as obtaining approval for the construction of facilities which would have been conducive to morale but which were not absolutely essential to the war effort.
A statistical report on the activities of the housing office during the last year of the war throws light on the job which was done: 33
Month Aug. '44 Sept. '44 Oct. '44 Nov. '44 Dec. '44 Jan. '45 Feb. '45 Mar. '45 Apr. '45 May '45 Jun. '45 Jul. '45 Aug. 45 Total Housing Placements: 20,448
33 From His. Memo Housing, 27 Sept. 1945, A12(3)
The figures above add up to totals that may appear excessive, however, it must be remembered that there was a tremendous turnover both of naval personnel and civilian personnel.
During the summer and early fall of 1944, occupancy of the housing projects continuously increased, and requests by the Yard for the construction of additional housing were given favorable consideration. Finally in January 1945 the work-or-fight legislation debate brought a tremendous influx of new employees into the Yard. Housing accommodations were filled to the saturation point. Not only were the war housing projects filled to capacity, but all trailers and dormitories were occupied. Arrangements were made to take care of men on cots in the community buildings both at Dale Dormitories and at the trailer camp. When there were finally no accommodations left, it became necessary for a temporary period to put men up in the barracks in the Navy Yard. (Ch.XVI). Because of the shortage of housing it became necessary to cease hiring for a short period.
After the threat of work-or-fight legislation had subsided, a gradual exodus took place. The defeat of Germany accelerated the exodus from the locality, and when it became obvious there would be an ample supply of housing available the Housing Office entered into negotiations with the NHA with a view to make such vacancies available to naval personnel. The NHA agreed to this policy and only shortly after such approval, Congress enacted Title V of the Lanham Act which gave equal consideration to both service men and veterans as well as civilian war workers. This measure considerably eased the housing situation. The defeat of Japan brought very prompt action on the part of the NHA in modifying its policy to meet the changed conditions.
The NHA throughout the wartime period had stated that temporary housing was temporary and that it would be disposed of as rapidly as possible and as soon as conditions permit. The prompt action of that agency after the defeat of Japan should be assuring to real estate investors and the general public. On August 21, 1945, it stated that no tenants were to be accepted in trailers or dormitories and that these projects were to be liquidated as quickly as the present tenants could be moved. It furthermore said that it would accept no more civilian tenants in war housing projects both in temporary and permanent projects but would accept as tenants only families of servicemen and distressed veterans.
The question of the disposition of emergency and war housing after the war has loomed importantly in all considerations of the housing situation in Portsmouth. During the last months of the war the question brought forth many comments as to what should be done with the houses that would be surplus with the departure of war workers. Although this matter is somewhat beyond the scope of this discussion, it should be noted that the Commandant of the Navy Yard was asked by the Portsmouth-Norfolk County Committee for the Disposition of Public War Housing to serve in an advisory capacity. The Commandant was asked specifically to comment on the Committee's "Plan for Disposition of Temporary Public War Housing". (As published by the Committee in pamphlet form in July 1945 offering a program for disposing of war housing.)
In his reply the Commandant, Admiral Jones, stated he believed that the "general approach to the disposition problem deserves commendation." However, the Admiral made a number of pertinent comments regarding the disposition of war housing which are quoted therewith: (N4(160)(MEH), July 19, 1945).
"(1) According to the 1940 census only 7,808 or 58.3% of the dwelling units in the city of Portsmouth had private indoor flush toilets, 1,231 families were forced to share toilet facilities with others, 4,183 had either an outside toilet or privy and 139 had neither a toilet of privy. The percentage of 58.3 dwelling units with private indoor flush toilets in the city of Portsmouth compare with a national percentage of 86.4 in cities with populations of 50,000 or more. Of the 191 cities in the United States with population of 50,000 or more, only 10 other cities had records as poor as Portsmouth insofar as private toilet facilities were concerned.
"(2) The dwelling units in the war housing projects which the committee recommends be disposed of, all have bathrooms and the majority of them have electric refrigerators. Despite the fact that they are not the type of housing accommodations in which our workers should be housed permanently, they are far superior to the substandard dwelling units now in use in the community.
"(3) In view of the conditions outlined in (1) and (2) above, endorsement by the Navy Yard of the disposition of war housing projects must be subject to the following conditions:
"(a) No family should be forced to move from a war housing project to substandard housing accommodations.
"(b) A sufficient number of decent housing accommodations at rentals or prices within the financial means of our workers should be available to attract and maintain an adequate supply of labor.
"(c) For the general welfare of this community, in which the Navy Yard is deeply interested, steps should be taken to eliminate the existing slum conditions.
"(d) Pending the elimination of slum conditions and the erection of permanent housing for families now living under substandard conditions, vacant war housing projects should be utilized for the temporary housing of such families."Housing, a problem at the beginning of the war, was still a problem at the war's end.
XX. TRANSPORTATION
Public carriers
High on the list of other problems which the management and employees of the Norfolk Navy Yard had to face during World War II was the problem of transportation -- the daily moving of as many as 40,000 workers back and forth from their home to their jobs.
The City Manager of Portsmouth, Arthur S. Owens, in a letter to Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia on January 20, 1945 (Copy in NyNor file LL/P13(22)) summed up the situation thus:
"The transportation system (in Portsmouth) operated under directives of the Office of Defense Transportation is atrocious, and after witnessing thousands of persons waiting for buses with children and packages in their arms, I would not blame any of them for returning to their native cities. There should certainly be a 50% increase in transportation facilities . . "
Public transportation, like many other public facilities, was not prepared or perhaps did not prepare itself, for the tremendous load which it had to carry in the Portsmouth area. The diversion to military uses of materials needed for construction of buses and other vehicles made it difficult for commercial carriers to get the needed equipment, and, in Portsmouth the number of buses was never sufficient. It was necessary to recondition much of the old equipment to keep up with the demands.
As the employment of the Yard reached its peak, a transportation survey was made by the Public Works Division to determine the methods, adequacy and possibility of improvement of transportation facilities for Yard employees. (LL/L20(8-56-MYT), 26 Jan. 1943).
Data was compiled by sending a questionnaire to all personnel within the Yard, including the employees of contractors, and from a study of the facilities and schedules of public transportation.
The study showed the fooling concentration of Navy Yard employees:
TABLE OF NNY EMPLOYEES CONCENTRATION
Area Portsmouth Norfolk South Norfolk Norfolk County
Portsmouth RFDNorfolk County
(Nfk. RFDVirginia Beach Princess Anne County Elizabeth City County Suffolk Nansemond County Isle of Wight County Southampton County York & Warwick County North Carolina Totals: The figure of 45,000 given as the total employment included 2,647 employees employed by contractors in the Yard, the Yard's total at that time standing at 42,353.
The study further showed that 67.9% of the employees were employed on the first shift, 19.7% on the second shift, and 12.3% on the third shift.
Of the total number of employees, 9,729 drove their own cars to the Yard, the rest depending upon other means of transportation.
The report in this connection states: "The public transportation systems, by their own admission to the Office of Defense Transportation, are inadequate." The Virginia Electric & Power Co. on the Norfolk side required at least 100 additional operators and 25 additional pieces of equipment in order to carry their load. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. on the side of Portsmouth then required at least 40 additional operators, and the Community Bus lines which served suburban Portsmouth required at least 20 additional buses.
Working through the ODT in cooperation with the transportation officers of the Navy Yard and the Naval Operating Base, the Community Lines were able to acquire some additional equipment and to revise schedules and routes in an effort to better handle the Navy Yard load.
On December 12, 1943, the Commandant of the Navy Yard requested the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District (ltr N33(26)) for assistance of the Travel and Transportation Officer in completing the traffic survey in the vicinity of the Navy Yard. Action was desired to step up the movement of traffic, remove congestion and improve bus transportation.
This survey was undertaken and as a result it was found that traffic congestion existed because the capacity of roadways was not being fully utilized. (ND5(26)/N33(1)). As a result steps were taken to improve the flow of traffic by changing parking, bus stops, police supervision and the traffic capacity was nearly doubled. The need for an additional traffic artery paralleling Gosport Road was pointed out. (See also Sec. 2). Traffic signal operation on the main streets of Portsmouth was re-timed to reduce delays.
The most important result of the survey, however, was the Navy's effort to help the Community Bus Company in the operation of their lines. The effective capacity of the Virginia Electric & Power Co. was also increased by reducing delays.
The Community Motor Coach Company's capacity was increased by a re-routing of its bus lines and changing its schedules. The report of the survey indicated that about 50% of the equipment was in need of repair and off the road. Assistance was given the Community Motor Coach Co. by the Navy to improve operations and to get idle equipment back into service. Navy Yard mechanics assisted the company in repair of buses in their off-duty periods, and a Naval officer, skilled and experienced in bus operation, assisted the company in improving its operating techniques. The company welcomed the assistance and a considerably improved service resulted. Representatives of the ODT assisted in the efforts.
Improvement of Traffic Routes
At the beginning of the emergency, the streets and highways in the vicinity of the Navy Yard were not adequate for heavy traffic. As the Yard expanded, improvements were made to practically all of the streets leading from the Navy Yard gates in every direction.
Gosport Road, George Washington Highway, Green Street, Fourth Street, Seventh Street, Washington Street, and others in the vicinity of the Yard were widened, repaved and otherwise improved, while new roads at some distance from the Yard were built, such as the Route 13 Bypass connecting the Yard with the Base, although by a circuitous route.
Of particular importance was a new link, Magazine Road, State Route 681, between the Yard and the Ammunition Depot at St. Julien's Creek which also serves Cradock and other housing developments in that vicinity and beyond. Particular importance was attached to the building of Magazine Road for the reason that it provides a safe route for carrying ammunition from St. Julien's Creek to the Yard. Prior to the building of this road, it was necessary to haul ammunition by lighter through the two draw bridges with the attendant possibility of accident.
Closely connected with the construction of this new outlet to the south was the building by the Yard of Borum Overpass, opened on April 8, 1943, across the Belt Line tracks linking the main part of the Yard with Route 337 and the new areas of the reservation beyond the railroad and highway.
One phase of transportation which was not improved during the war, however, was the cross-river traffic to Norfolk. Located on a virtual island, Norfolk and the Naval Base can be reached from the Navy Yard by only three practical routes -- the Portsmouth-Norfolk Ferries, the Jordan Bridge, and the Gilmerton Bridge. The ferries, which are direct from Portsmouth to Norfolk, are toll; the Jordan Bridge, a drawbridge carrying State Highway 337, a somewhat longer route, is also toll; and only Route 460 via the Gilmerton Bridge, considerably longer, is toll free.
In the morning and evening hours during the peak years of the war, the traffic on each of these routes was extremely heavy, the ferries in particular being crowded to capacity, with the result that the trip from Portsmouth to Norfolk took considerable time.
Adding to these difficulties was the fact that the second most important of the cross-river routes, the Jordan Bridge, was put out of commission twice when it was struck by merchant ships moving through the open draw, the first accident occurring on June 2, 1939, and the second on June 13, 1943. In both cases merchant ships bound for commercial plants south of the Navy Yard struck the bridge, the first time causing the vertical lift draw and an adjacent section of the bridge to collapse, and the second time causing the open draw to be jammed at the top of the lift 125 feet above the water. The bridge was out of commission the first time from June to February, 1940, the twisted mass of steel which fell into the channel completely halting river traffic as well as highway movement while demolition crews went to work to pull the steel and concrete from the river.
On the second occasion, river traffic was not halted fortunately but road traffic was again tied up and a serious hazard was caused by the lift being jammed at the top of the towers. This accident kept the bridge closed for approximately three months seriously hampering the flow of traffic to and from the Yard.
In an effort to restore use of the span as quickly as possible, Admiral Gygax, in a letter to the War Production Board on June 19, 1943 (N14(34)) declared that the bridge and highway were one of the "main arteries of traffic between Norfolk and the Navy Yard." He certified that the bridge was "urgently needed for a maximum application of the Government's war effort," and he requested the WPB to assign priority to the project sufficient to expedite repair.
The need for better transportation facilities between Portsmouth and Norfolk was thus thrown into sharp relief.
It should be noted in this connection that the Metal Trades Council of the Navy Yard early in the emergency advocated purchase of the bridge by the Federal Government because of its military importance (N14(54)) ltr 9 Oct. 1942, et seq.) or the Virginia State Highway Commission in order to make the span toll free. They pointed to the cost which use of the bridge imposed on Navy Yard workers and said that the free highway via the Gilmerton Bridge was of little or no benefit to Yard workers because the route was seven miles longer. Funds for such a purchase, however, were not available.
Erection of a new bridge direct from Portsmouth to Norfolk has often been suggested but opposed by officials of the War and Navy Departments because of the possibility that an accident similar to the Jordan Bridge accidents might occur, blocking the channel from the Navy Yard to Hampton Roads. Those who have studied the matter believe it unwise to erect a bridge at any point downstream from the Yard.
The solution, these authorities have said, appears to be the providing of a tunnel between Norfolk and Portsmouth. Such a facility was strongly recommended by the Yard management during the emergency. Admiral Simons in particular pointed out the great military value that such a tunnel would have as a connecting link between the Yard and the Naval Operating Base, a link incidentally which would be invulnerable to bombing and would provide an excellent air raid shelter for downtown Norfolk and Portsmouth.
Rationing
Much of the work which had to be done to ease transportation difficulties devolved upon the Navy Yard itself. Valuable assistance was rendered in this work by the Transportation Committee of the Metal Trades Council, with Labor often taking the lead in efforts to improve conditions. Not only did the union leaders endeavor to get the Government to take over the Jordan Bridge, but they were a motivating force in bringing about the various traffic surveys made in the City and lent aid on completing the improvements which resulted.
A transportation committee composed of shop masters and chief clerks, with a Public Works Division officer as chairman, was first organized on July 30, 1942, in an effort to handle the problems created by rationing of gasoline, tires and cars, and to deal with transportation problems generally. (CC 16/44. N33(56-MS), 9 Aug. 1944). This office functioned as a ration office for the Navy Yard and for the certification of gasoline and tire applications for Navy Yard workers and acted as a liaison office between the Yard and the civilian rationing board.
The office was transferred on October 2, 1943, from the Public Works Division to the Safety Office, and on April 30, 1944, the office was moved into the Personnel Relations Division building. On July 3, 1944, a full time Rationing and Transportation Officer was placed in charge.34 Under the original organization, the transportation and rationing duties were handled by the Public Works Officer who supervised the activities of Shop 020, Transportation. The move to the Safety Section also saw the job handled part time. An adequate staff and adequate office facilities were not provided until the move to the Personnel Relations Division.
34 See also His. Notes, Transportation, A12(3).
One of the most difficult problems for the Transportation and Rationing Section was that of computing mileage from home to work for the applicants. Zones were established using the Fourth Street Gate as the official point at the Navy Yard and distances were measured from that point to a central point in each general locality so that persons in the same vicinity were given the same mileage.
Approval of mileage, of course, was vested in the respective civilian rationing boards, although most boards followed the recommendations of the Yard Transportation Officer to whom applications were submitted.
It was the responsibility of the Transportation and Rationing Officer to see that car pooling was practiced and no application which did not conform with Commandant's Memorandum No. 18/44, which stated that car pooling must be practiced, was forwarded to the Board.
With the ending of gasoline rationing there were approximately 7,000 applications on file of applicants who were driving to the Yard, each carrying approximately 3.8 riders per automobile. The activity of this office did much to help ease the difficult situation created by overcrowded public transportation and lack of sufficient gasoline and tires to operate private cars. The office handled applications of Naval personnel afloat as well as civilians.
The Club Buses
The salvation of public transportation during the war emergency was the privately owned or "club bus system", which at the peak of Yard employment was hauling approximately 6,000 persons to the Navy Yard each day. These buses came from all surrounding points, and in many cases the distance covered each day was in excess of a hundred miles. At one time there were 178 privately-owned buses and station wagons operating to the Navy Yard each day.
The club bus idea traces back further than the war, but its greatest development occurred during the emergency. The first club bus line was started in 1928 to accommodate a group of workers coming into the Yard from Newport News. At first opposition from Commercial carriers was encountered, but the club operators won in a court test, and a Club Bus Charter was approved and recognized by the State Corporation Commission of Virginia. This charter does not place the operators under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission, but allows them to operate private transportation as a "club" for the benefit of the member of the club.
From this beginning, the club transportation idea grew until it became during the war one of the most important methods of providing transportation.
The clubs acquired many types of buses, and the members somehow managed to keep the equipment, much of which was second hand, in running condition.
Scheduling, routing and inside parking had to be planned carefully at the peak, and large parking areas were provided for the fleet of club vehicles.
All quota for gasoline rations cleared through the Transportation Office and new operators were established after surveys determined the necessity for additional transportation. Assistance was given to operators in securing charters and permits from the State Corporation Commission and the necessary insurance. An index was maintained by the Yard of operators and the routes followed both to assist individuals seeking rides and to maintain current information on the status on each bus line.
Water Transportation
A final mode of transportation utilized by the Yard during the emergency was water transportation, principally from various parts of Norfolk to the Yard, most of this travel originating in the Hague Section, Commercial Place and Brambleton. This transportation was supplied by the Navy itself, the commercial ferry, and by privately-owned small boats. During the peak employment it was estimated that nearly 4,000 persons came to work each day by boat. To facilitate this traffic the Navy took over through condemnation proceedings the Atlantic Coast Line Railways passenger station at the foot of York Street in Norfolk to serve as a boat terminal. This Navy landing provided waiting rooms for naval and civilian personnel bound for the Yard and wharf space for naval craft plying between Norfolk and the Yard. Regular launch schedules were maintained and in addition a Yard ferry boat was used to transport civilian workers.
In June 1943 the Norfolk County Ferry Corporation placed in service a special ferry from Commercial Place, Norfolk, direct to the Navy Yard at the end of each shift, as a result of efforts by the Metal Trades Council Transportation Committee and Yard transportation officials. A special ferry slip and waiting room was constructed at Berth 21, the location being accessible to the shops and new construction particularly during the aircraft carrier program. At the peak of this service, which was reached in August 1943, a daily average of 2,178 was carried. This ferry was continued until the end of the war.
In addition to navy and commercial transportation, a fleet of privately-owned small boats carried as many as 1,350 workers back and forth between the Yard and Norfolk each day. This type of boat travel, like the club buses, had been in vogue for many years, having been started in 1920 (His. Notes, Transp., A12(3)). Eight such launches were in daily operation throughout the war, the boats docking at Berths 21, 23 and 40 where floats were provided for their passengers. It is worthy of note that the operators of these boats established a no-accident safety record, and in several instances assisted in rescuing victims of harbor accidents.
Yard Transportation
Getting the people to the Yard was one problem, getting them around within the Yard was still another. It was estimated that during the period of heaviest employment approximately 27,000 persons were transported daily to and from various points within the Yard by Yard transportation. (His. Notes, Shop 020, A12(3)).
Whippett trailers which had been used at the New York World's Fair were first utilized for the job of carrying Navy Yard personnel to various points on the reservation with each trailer accommodating about 20 persons. The vehicles at that time did not stop at any regularly appointed bus stops and as a rule many of the passengers got on and off "on the fly".
This system was greatly expanded during the war by the establishment of regular bus and trailer routes operating from the First Street Gate to the farthest points of the reservation, running at intervals of only a few minutes. Regular bus stops were established and maps of routes and schedules prepared and distributed.
The effective way in which the Navy Yard met its internal transportation problem indicates that external transportation difficulties might have been as effectively surmounted by the establishment of navy-operated bus lines for the transportation of Yard employees.
* * * * * * * * * *
Continued on nnyww2-5
