Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 7, 158-
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
by
SAMUEL P. BATES.
PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 158
PART I. GENERAL HISTORY.
CHAPTER VII.
PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER.
No part of Virginia, which in the late war was everywhere ploughed by battle,
has more stirring associations, than that bordering upon the Rappahannock. At
the head of navigation, upon the right bank of this stream, is Fredericksburg,
and a dozen miles above this, on the same side, but a little back from the
river, is Chancellorsville. For nearly a year, from October, 1862, to June,
1863, the two contending armies, that of the Potomac, and that of Northern
Virginia, had lain stretched out upon the opposite banks, warily watching each
other, but principally concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg. Twice
during that time the Army of the Potomac had crossed and offered battle, first
under General Burnside at Fredericksburg, on the 13th of December, 1862, a most
inclement season, and again under General Hooker, at Chancellorsville, on the 2d
and 3d of May. In both of these engagements, that army had been repulsed, and
had returned decimated and dispirited to its old camps.
In the latter battle, the rebel army had achieved a victory with only a part
of its ordinary strength, heavy columns, upwards of 40,000 men, having been sent
away under some of its most trusted Generals, Longstreet, Hill, Picket, Hood,
Garnett, Anderson, Jenkins, and Pettigrew, to operate against the Union troops
south of the James, principally at Little Washington, North Carolina, and at
Suffolk, Virginia, with the design of regaining all that coast. Failing in
carrying either of those places either by assault or by direct approaches, the
siege of the latter, which had been conducted by Longstreet in person, had been
raised on the very day that the most desperate fighting was in progress at
FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO GETTYSBURG [map]
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 159
Chancellorsville. The new rebel department which had been erected in that
locality, and over which General Longstreet had been placed, was broken up, and
the troops thus released were hurried away to join General Lee upon the
Rappahannock.
Elated by two great victories, and made confident by the large accessions of
strength he was receiving, the rebel chieftain at once began to meditate a
systematic invasion of the North. In this he was seconded by the Government at
Richmond. If a permanent lodgment could be made on Northern soil, great
advantages were promised, and the hope, from the beginning cherished, of
transferring the theatre of war to that section, would be realized; the great
network of railroads concentring at Harrisburg could be broken up; the supply of
coal from the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania, the almost sole reliance for
the entire navy of the Union, could be deranged; the casting of heavy guns for
both the army and navy, at Pittsburg, could be impeded; and foreign Governments,
seeing the vitality displayed, might thereby be induced to recognize the new
power as a nation. Doubtless political considerations at home also urged on the
leaders to this enterprise. But greater than all these, the rebel President had
learned that Vicksburg must fall before the victorious armies of Grant, and he
hoped by a brilliant campaign on Northern soil to break the crushing weight of
the blow thus impending from the West. An invasion seemed to promise some if
not all of these advantages. Having gained victories so easily upon the
Rappahannock, General Lee argued that he could gain them with equal ease upon
the Susquehanna. Turning to the Union army, now commanded by General Hooker, he
saw in its condition ample matter of encouragement. It was dispirited by
defeat. There was a want of harmony among its Generals, and especially between
its Commander and the General-in-chief of all the armies, Halleck. Besides, the
time of about 40,000 nine-months' men had expired, and the places which they had
left vacant had not been filled. But there was one untoward circumstance, the
importance of which, in his overweening self-confidence, he had failed to
recognize. On that evening in May, at Chancellorsville, when with the force of
an avalanche his massed columns had been precipi-
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 160
tated upon the Union army, Stonewall Jackson, that thunderbolt in war, who had
led his legions victorious in almost every battle, had fallen, mortally wounded,
and borne forever from the theatre of mortal strife. In his confidence the
whole army and the entire South shared, and on the morning of the 3d of June,
just one month from the close of the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee put his
columns in motion for a campaign in the North. He, however, skilfully masked
his movements, leaving Hill's corps to occupy his old camps upon the immediate
Union front, upon the Rappahannock, and to hold, apparently with his accustomed
strength, the intrenchments along all the heights, and sending clouds of cavalry
to hover upon his right flank. He also exercised unceasing vigilance to prevent
any one from crossing the river who could carry intelligence of his purposes
into the Union lines, and all of Hooker's scouts who had been sent across to
ascertain what movements were in progress were seized, not one of them
returning.
But nothing could escape the keen eye of Hooker. The most insignificant
change of camp was noted, and its interpretation divined. As early as the 28th
of May, he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton: "It has been impossible for me to
give any information concerning the movements of the enemy at all satisfactory.
I have had several men over the river, but, as they do not return, I conclude
that they have been captured. The enemy's camps are as numerous and as well
filled as ever. It was reported to me this morning, by General Gregg, that the
enemy's cavalry had made their appearance in the vicinity of Warrenton, on the
strength of which I have ordered on to that line Buford's division, to drive
them across the river and to keep them there. If necessary, I will send up
additional forces. . . . In the event a forward movement should be contemplated
by the enemy, and he should have been reinforced by the army from Charleston, I
am in doubt as to the direction he will take, but probably the one of last year,
however desperate it may appear - desperate if his force should be no greater
than we have reason to suppose. The enemy has always shown an unwillingness to
attack fortified positions; still, you may rest assured that important movements
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 161
are being made, and, in my opinion, it is necessary for every one to be
watchful. The enemy has all his cavalry force, five brigades, collected at
Culpeper and Jefferson. This would indicate a movement in the direction of the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and this it is my duty to look after."
We see in this dispatch already prefigured in the mind of Hooker the probable
course which the rebel army would take. Intimations continued to come to him
from various sources strengthening this opinion. A Savannah paper had published
an outline of the contemplated invasion, which had reached the Northern press.
The movement of rebel troops northward was also discovered and reported to him
from a signal station in the First corps.
To enable the rebel army to move with assurance of success, its commander had
been allowed to draw every available man, taking the columns from before
Suffolk, from North Carolina, from Virginia in the direction of Tennessee, and
from the rebel Capital. A like concentration was not attempted on the Union
side. Dix was at Fortress Monroe, Peck at Suffolk, Foster in North Carolina,
Heintzelman in the Department of Washington, Schenck at Baltimore, Tyler at
Harper's Ferry, and Milroy at Winchester. Over the troops in these several
districts, General Hooker had no control, and when a detachment from one of them
near Harper's Ferry received an order from him, its commander refused to obey
it, as did General Slough at Alexandria, when a brigade of the Pennsylvania
Reserve corps was ordered up to the front. Against this isolation Hooker
remonstrated repeatedly. In concluding an important dispatch of the 5th of
June, he said; "In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I
cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of his Excellency, the President, the
necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have
an influence on those of Lee's army. Under the present system all independent
commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others - at least such is my
situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement,
as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it as I feel the necessity
for concert, as well as vigor of action." But his appeal was not heeded,
whether from lack of confidence in his
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 162
ability to direct operations on so large a scale, or whether it was deemed
better to have minor movements under the control of the head of the army at
Washington, is not apparent. In the midst of his efforts to harmonize
counsels, and centralize the Union forces, intimations thickened from all sides
tending to the one conclusion, that Lee's army had been largely reinforced, and
that it was secretly moving on an important campaign, either of invasion, or to
turn the right flank of the Union army. Should he find the former supposition
to be correct, General Hooker, in the communication quoted from above, desired
permission to cross the Rappahannock, and fall upon the isolated portion left in
his front. The reply of Mr. Lincoln is characteristic, and illustrates
remarkably the clearness of his conceptions, and the homely but pointed similes
with which he enforced them: "Yours of to-day," he says, "was received an hour
ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I
have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with
his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and
that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would
by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at
Fredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments,
and have you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point,
while his main force would be getting an advantage of you northward. In one
word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox
jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a
fair change to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of
the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive
according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But
these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of
yourself and General Halleck."
The opinion of Mr. Lincoln, expressed in his quaint but forcible way, must be
acknowledged remarkably just, and withal is so modestly propounded that it
cannot fail to commend itself to the most violent advocate of the opposing view.
A small force in the intrenchments, upon those frowning heights which had
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 163
been before attacked with such disastrous results, would have been equal to a
much larger one in the attacking column.
That he might, however, discover what was really behind the works on his
front, the Sixth corps was ordered down to Franklin's crossing of the
Rappahannock a little below Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 6th of June,
and a portion of it, under command of General Howe, was thrown across. A strong
demonstration showed that the enemy was in heavy force in front, and that the
heights, for a distance of twenty miles, were still firmly held, Hill's entire
corps of 30,000 men being present. But that he might seem to threaten the rebel
rear and retain his troops as long as possible, Hooker kept the Sixth corps in
position at the river, with the Fifth at Banks' and the United States Fords, and
as late as the 12th threw across two pontoon bridges as if to pass over. Lee,
in his official report, says: "General Hill disposed his forces to resist their
advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than
attack, the movements in progress were not arrested.
Determined to be satisfied of the real position of the rebel infantry,
Pleasanton, who commanded the cavalry, was ordered to cross the Rappahannock at
the fords above, at daylight on the morning of the 9th, with a strong column,
stiffened by 3000 infantry, and attack the enemy's cavalry camp, - supposed to
be located in the direction of Culpeper. A severe battle ensued in the
neighborhood of Brandy station, in which the enemy was roughly handled. But the
rebel infantry coming to the rescue, Pleasanton was obliged to withdraw. From
information obtained and official papers captured, it was learned that the
enemy's cavalry, which, by accessions from the Shenandoah Valley and from North
Carolina, now numbered 12,000 men, and had, the day before, been reviewed by
General Lee, was on the following morning, the 10th, to have started on a raid
into Maryland and Pennsylvania.
The result of this reconnoissance was two-fold, and proved very important to
the Union commander. It crippled the enemy's cavalry in such a manner that it
did not recover so as to be effective in the campaign upon which it was about
entering, giving an evil omen to its opening scene; and it disclosed the fact
that
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 164
two corps of the enemy, those of Ewell and Longstreet, were well on their way
towards the Shenandoah Valley. It also demonstrated the very unpleasant fact
that Lee's cavalry was at least a third stronger than Hooker's. Having abundant
force to seize and hold all the fords of the river, the enemy was secure from
attack while on the march, and when the valley was reached, by holding the
passes of the Blue Ridge, he was completely protected by this great natural
wall.
Convinced that the movement of the opposing army was not a feint, but the
opening of a real campaign northward, on the morning of the 12th, Hooker ordered
General Reynolds to assume command of the right wing of the Union army,
consisting of the First, his own, Third, and Eleventh corps, and all the
cavalry, and proceed with it along the line of the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad, to Manassas, a movement correspondent to that which the enemy was
making, though upon an inner circle, with Washington as a centre; and on the
following day ordered the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps into motion
northward. The moment the Union forces disappeared behind the hills of
Stafford, Hill withdrew from his position and followed Lee. Ewell, who was in
the advance, had crossed the Shenandoah river at Front Royal and passed down
behind the great mountain range which walls it in on the south; but Longstreet,
seeing the Union army moving away from him, felt secure in marching by the more
direct route on this side of the Blue range, and entered the valley by Snicker's
Gap. Hill moved upon the track of Ewell. That his left flank might be
protected from incursions from West Virginia, Lee sent Imboden with a body of
cavalry toward Romney, who destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
effectually cutting off communication from Union forces operating in that
direction.
The old counsel of keeping a force at Harper's Ferry to guard the mouth of the
valley, and prevent incursions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, had been
persevered in, and when the enemy's cavalry sent forward under Jenkins
approached, closely followed by the infantry of Ewell, they found a Union force
at Winchester of 7500 men under General Milroy, and another at Harper's Ferry
under General Tyler of 10,000, - too many troops to throw
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 165
away, and too few to cope with the numbers brought against them, enough to tempt
to enterprise, and give zest to the play. Again was this the field of shame,
disaster, and defeat. By a strange oversight, neither General Halleck nor the
Secretary of War had informed General Milroy, who was first to be struck, that
the rebel army was moving in force down the valley, and he had no intimation of
the fact until the head of Ewell's column was upon him. He made such resistance
as was possible, but was speedily routed, and all his guns and many of his men
fell into the enemy's hands. On the night of the 14th, having ascertained that
two corps of the rebel army, numbering 60,000 men, were upon his front, and
being convinced that further resistance was useless, he had determined, in
council of war, to cut his way out. He accordingly spiked his guns, and leaving
all his trains which had not already been sent away, marched at two in the
morning of the 15th; but at a point four miles out on the Martinsburg pike, he
encountered a heavy column under Johnson posted to intercept him, and though
making a gallant fight was unable to move the foe. His forces were broken, and
while many of them escaped and made their way into the Union lines, the killed,
wounded, and missing numbered more than half of his command.
That Lee should not out-manoeuvre him, and by powerful demonstrations
northward, suddenly turn and come in upon his rear, Hooker moved slowly, keeping
himself constantly informed of the progress of the main body of his antagonist's
force, and sending the Second corps to Thoroughfare Gap, and a division of
cavalry supported by the Fifth corps, to Aldie. At this point a brisk action
occurred with the cavalry of Stuart, wherein the latter was pushed back through
Upperville into Ashby's Gap, by the division of General Gregg, supported by
General Kilpatrick. "We took," says General Pleasanton, "two pieces of
artillery, one being a Blakeley gun, together with three caissons, besides
blowing one up. We also captured upwards of sixty prisoners, and more are
coming in, including a Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and five other officers,
besides a wounded Colonel, and a large number of wounded rebels in the town of
Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field. Of the former I
saw
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 166
upwards of twenty. We also took a large number of carbines, pistols, and
sabres. In fact, it was a most disastrous day for the rebel cavalry. Our loss
has been very small both in men and horses. I never saw the troops behave
better, or under more difficult circumstances."
It was now thoroughly apparent to Hooker that the rebel army was intent not
merely on crossing the Potomac but on pushing the invasion as far north as the
Army of the Potomac would allow. He had, on the 15th, six days before this
latter engagement, telegraphed to the President: "I now feel that invasion is
his settled purpose. If so, he has more to accomplish, but with more hazard, by
striking an easterly direction after crossing than a northerly one. It seems to
me that he will be more likely to go north and to incline to the west. He can
have no design to look after his rear. It is an act of desperation on his part,
no matter in what force he moves." Hooker never appears to better advantage
than in the few sentences here quoted, except it be in the manoeuvres
preliminary to Chancellorsville. He seems as conversant with his adversary's
plans and purposes as does that adversary himself, and his movements are timed
with a skill unexampled to completely shield Washington, and to be in readiness
to strike should the opportunity be presented. This is now made apparent by
General Lee's own report. "The position occupied by the enemy," he says,
"opposite Fredericksburg, being one in which he could not be attacked to
advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose
embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied
the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the
transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. . . . In addition to
these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by
military success."
What those valuable results were, may be inferred from the rumors which found
their way into the Southern press, and were commented on in the most extravagant
and visionary manner. The Richmond Whig, of July 1st, counting confidently on
success, said: "If it be true that the Confederate forces occupy Harrisburg,
the attention of the Commanding General will no doubt be
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 167
directed to the coal-fields, which lie within forty or fifty miles of that city.
His first aim will be to cut all the railroad connections, and thus put a stop
to the transportation of fuel. His next will be to destroy the most costly and
not easily replaced machinery of the pits. Whether he would stop at this is
questionable. He might set fire to the pits, withdraw the forces sent out on
this special duty, and leave the heart of Pennsylvania on fire, never to be
quenched until a river is turned into the pits, or the vast supply of coal is
reduced to ashes. The anthracite coal is found in large quantities in no other
part of the world but Pennsylvania. Enormous quantities are used in the United
States navy, the countless workshops and manufactories of the North, in the
river boats and even upon locomotives. It cannot well be replaced by any other
fuel. The bituminous coal which is found near Pittsburg would not answer the
purpose, even if it would bear the cost of transportation. Our troops already
hold the railroads and canals leading from the Cumberland coal-fields. All that
is needed is to seize the anthracite fields, destroy the roads and machinery of
the pits, set fire to the mines and leave them. Northern industry will thus be
paralyzed at a single blow. These views may have induced General Lee to move
upon Harrisburg. We doubt whether he would fire the mines, but the destruction
of the Mauch Chunk Railroad and pit implements would be as legitimate as blowing
up tunnels and aqueducts, or burning bridges. Of one thing we may be sure, that
whatever is best to be done will be done by General Lee, and if he thinks proper
to destroy the Pennsylvania mines they will certainly be destroyed."
Three days before this was written, General Lee records in his report:
"Preparations were now made to move on Harrisburg," showing that the Richmond
papers, though mistaken as to the result, were correctly informed of the
purposes of the Confederate chieftain.
While the armies of Hooker and Lee were moving northward, only separated from
each other by a mountain chain, the States north of the Potomac, which lay
directly in their way, began to take the alarm. But a narrow section of
Maryland had to be traversed before the southern border of Pennsylvania would be
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 168
reached, a country luxurious with waving grain, plenteous flocks and herds, and
orchards bending with mellow fruit, tempting the hand of the spoiler. For the
defence of the border no preparations had been made, and no power existed
capable of arresting the march of the veteran army of the enemy, other than an
equally strong and well disciplined force. The attempt to have kept a body of
militia, or even of trained soldiers unskilled in battle, to guard it, would
have been as impracticable as it would have been useless. But to prepare for
temporary defence, and to succor the army of the Union in its grapple with its
adversary, which was sure to come, was now the part of discretion; and
accordingly, on the 9th of June, two military departments were erected, one
embracing all that part of Pennsylvania east of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill
range, with headquarters at Harrisburg, at the head of which Major-General
Darius N. Couch was placed, and the other, the portion of the State west of that
line, together with parts of West Virginia and Ohio contiguous, with
headquarters at Pittsburg, and to the command of which Major-General William T.
H. Brooks was assigned. These officers were charged with organizing troops
within their respective districts, under the title of departmental corps. In
this work they were powerfully aided by Governor Curtin, who issued his
proclamation on the 12th, assuring the people of the danger impending, and
urging them to enlist in the proposed organizations, and on the 14th especially
called upon citizens of African descent to rally around the standard of the
State.
But little progress was made in the work of gathering troops. Men were slow
to come. It was at a season of the year when every laboring man was needed to
gather the maturing crops, and every walk of life had been already depleted to
swell the ranks of the National armies. It would seem, too, that even those in
authority were not impressed with the belief that an invasion by the whole rebel
army was meditated. In his proclamation, Governor Curtin said: "Information
has been obtained by the War Department, that a large rebel force, composed of
cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry, has been prepared for the purpose of
making a raid into Pennsylvania;" and General Couch, in his order announcing the
formation of his corps: "To pre-
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 169
vent serious raids by the enemy, it is deemed necessary to call upon the
citizens of Pennsylvania to furnish promptly all the men necessary to organize
an army corps of volunteer infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to be designated
the Army Corps of the Susquehanna."
Unfortunately for getting an immediate strong force to act for the emergency,
it was announced by General Couch that the troops "would be mustered into the
service of the United States, to serve during the pleasure of the President, or
the continuance of the war." The majority of men were deterred, by this
condition, from enlisting, who, to meet the emergency, if one really existed,
would have come promptly forward. The inference derived from the language of
Governor Curtin, and of General Couch, left the impression that no invasion in
force was anticipated, but that the General Government was desirous of taking
advantage of the threatened rebel advance to obtain soldiers for the National
armies. In the two former years, these rumors had been frequent, but had never
resulted in any material harm to the State, and it was now scarcely credited
that the enemy would be so adventurous as to come, with all his legions, upon
Pennsylvania soil.
But the disposition of the enemy to advance became daily more apparent. On
Sunday evening, June the 14th, affrighted contrabands from the Shenandoah Valley
commenced arriving in Greencastle, the first town in Pennsylvania over the
border, and soon after reached Chambersburg, bringing intelligence of the route
of Milroy, and the rapid advance of the head of the conquering rebel column. As
it was known that at Winchester and Harper's Ferry there was a strong army
corps, it was now perceived that the enemy was coming in earnest. "On Monday
morning," says Mr. McClure, in an article published in the Chambersburg
Repository, "the flood of rumors from the Potomac fully confirmed the advance of
the rebels, and the citizens of Chambersburg and vicinity, feeling unable to
resist the rebel columns, commenced to make prompt preparation for the movement
of stealable property. Nearly every horse, good, bad, and indifferent, was
started for the mountains as early on Monday as possible, and the negroes
darkened the different roads northward
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 170
for hours, loaded with household effects, sable babies, etc., and horses,
wagons, and cattle crowded every avenue to places of safety.
The hegira thus commenced received a fresh impetus at nine o'clock on that
morning, by the arrival of the advance of Milroy's wagon train, which had
escaped across the Potomac, and was making haste to put itself beyond the reach
of the enemy. As the long dusky train wound through the town, and for hours
continued to wend its weary way, affright seized the inhabitants and spread
wildly through the country. Valuable stock of all descriptions was put upon the
road northward, and did not halt in its course until the Susquehanna had been
left behind. The more common and less valuable was hurried away to the
mountains and by-places. The great covered bridge across the Susquehanna at
Harrisburg presented a scene of ceaseless activity, and never was such a toll
business done there before. Milroy's train reached it first, and in its rear
came an endless stream of human beings of every age and size, and beasts and
four-footed things innumerable. By night the steady tramp and rumble of the
heavy teams lulled the senses of the weary, and through the long hours of the
sultry June day, a cloud of dust rose constantly far down the valley, reaching
forward and across the stream, as far in the opposite direction as the eye could
penetrate. With the fine impalpable particles settling down ceaselessly, rider
and horse, vehicle and occupants, flocks, herds, all were enveloped, until thick
folds wrapped them like a garment.
Not until the 15th did the General Government seem to be fully impressed with
the seriousness of the situation, or realize that the predictions of Hooker,
made ten days before, were the words of truth and soberness. On that day, the
President issued a proclamation for 100,000 men from the States immediately
menaced, to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged; 50,000 from
Pennsylvania, 30,000 from Ohio, and 10,000 each from Maryland and West Virginia.
Governor Curtin seconded the call by a proclamation, in which he said: "That it
is the purpose of the enemy to invade our borders with all the strength he can
command is now apparent. Our only defence rests upon the determined action of
the citizens of our Commonwealth. I therefore
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 171
call on the people of Pennsylvania, capable of bearing arms, to enroll
themselves in military organizations, and to encourage all others to give aid
and assistance to the efforts which will be put forth for the protection of the
State, and the salvation of our common country." Indications of mischief
thickened so rapidly at Harrisburg, that preparations were commenced for
removing the archives of the Government, and in the hours of a short summer
night, the papers of all the departments, even to the 28,000 volumes of the
State Library, and the fine old portraits of the Governors, were securely put
upon cars and moved to Philadelphia. The excitement likewise ran high at
Pittsburg. Fears were entertained that the rebel army, or at least a strong
detachment, might bear westward, especially if, in a general battle, the enemy
should prove victorious. Engineers were accordingly employed in locating and
planning forts, and thousands of busy hands were at work in constructing them.
The merchants and mechanics organized themselves into military companies for the
defence of the city; business was suspended, all the bars, restaurants, and
drinking saloons were closed, and the sale or giving away of liquors stopped.
On the 15th, General Jenkins crossed the Potomac, and cautiously made his way
northward. The rebel army was in need of transportation and supplies, and
Jenkins from the first kept a sharp look out for these. Greencastle was
possessed without opposition, and in due time Chambersburg. Of his entrance to
the latter place Mr. McClure, in the article above quoted, gives a facetious
account, though it was to his own sore spoliation. "Jenkins," he says, "had
doubtless read the papers in his day, and knew that there were green fields in
the 'Green Spot;' and what is rather remarkable, at midnight he could start for
a forty-acre clover-patch belonging to the editor of the Repository without so
much as stopping to ask where the gate might be found. Not even a halt was
called to find it; but the march was continued until the gate was reached, when
the order 'file right!' was given, and Jenkins was in clover. Happy fellow,
thus to find luxuriant and extensive clover, as if by instinct. By the way of
giving the Devil his due, it must be said that, although there were over sixty
acres of wheat, and eighty acres of corn and oats,
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 172
in the same field, he protected it most carefully, and picketed his horses so
that it could not be injured. . . . For prudential reasons the editor was not at
home to do the honors at his own table; but Jenkins was not particular, nor was
his appetite impaired thereby. He called upon the ladies of the house, shared
their hospitality, behaved in all respects like a gentleman, and expressed very
earnest regrets that he had not been able to make the personal acquaintance of
the editor. We beg to say that we reciprocate the wish of the General, and
shall be glad to make his acquaintance personally - 'when this cruel war is
over.' . . . General Jenkins also had the fullest information of the movements
of the editor of this paper. He told, at our house, when we had left, the
direction we had gone, and described the horse we rode."
For nearly a week, Chambersburg and all the southern part of Franklin county
was occupied by the rebel forces, busy in gathering horses, which were regarded
as contraband of war, and in seizing whatever goods of every variety that could
be of use to them, pretending payment by delivering in exchange their worthless
Confederate scrip. Though falling upon all this afflicted region with a
crushing weight, yet in telling the story, their chronicler, Mr. McClure, yields
to a grim humor. "True," he says, "the system of Jenkins would be considered a
little informal in business circles; but it's his way, and our people agreed to
it perhaps, to some extent, because of the novelty, but mainly because of the
necessity of the thing. But Jenkins was liberal - eminently liberal. He didn't
stop to higgle about a few odd pennies in making a bargain. For instance, he
took the drugs of Messrs. Miller, Spangler, Nixon, and Heyser, and told them to
make out a bill, or if they could not do that, to guess at the amount and the
bills were paid. Doubtless our merchants and druggists would have preferred
greenbacks to Confederate scrip, that is never payable and is worth just its
weight in old paper; but Jenkins hadn't greenbacks, and he had Confederate
scrip, and such as he had he gave unto them. Thus he dealt largely in our
place. To avoid jealousies growing out of rivalry in business, he patronized
all the merchants, and bought pretty much everything he could conveniently use
and carry. Some people, with antiquated ideas of business, might call it
stealing to take
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goods and pay for them in bogus money; but Jenkins calls it business, and for
the time being what Jenkins calls business was business. . . . Jenkins, like
most doctors, don't seem to have relished his own prescriptions. Several horses
had been captured by some of our boys, and notice was given by the General
commanding that they must be surrendered or the town would be destroyed. The
city fathers, commonly known as the town Council, were appealed to in order to
avert the impending fate threatened us. One of the horses, we believe, and some
of the equipments were found and returned, but there was still a balance in
favor of Jenkins. We do not know who audited the account, but it was finally
adjusted by the Council appropriating the sum of $900 to pay the claim.
Doubtless Jenkins hoped for $900 in 'greenbacks,' but he had flooded the town
with Confederate scrip, pronouncing it better than United States currency, and
the Council evidently believed him; and, desiring to be accommodating with a
conqueror, decided to favor him by the payment of his bill in Confederate scrip.
It was so done, and Jenkins got just $900 worth of nothing for his trouble. He
took it, however, without a murmur, and doubtless considered it a clever joke."
Of a piece with the above is the account of Jenkins himself: "He graduated at
Jefferson College in this State, in the same class, we believe, with J. McDowell
Sharpe, Esq., and gave promise of future usefulness and greatness. His downward
career commenced some five years ago, when in an evil hour he became a Member of
Congress from Western Virginia, and from thence may be dated his decline and
fall. From Congress he naturally enough turned fire-eater, secessionist, and
guerilla. He is of medium size, has a flat but good head, light brown hair,
blue eyes, immense flowing beard, of a sandy hue, and rather a pleasant face.
He professes to cherish the utmost regard for the humanities of war, and seemed
sensitive on the subject of his reputation as a humane military leader."
The sudden removal of horses, flocks, and herds, into the mountains, and
across the Susquehanna before his arrival, greatly interfered with the purposes
of Jenkins; yet he succeeded in sweeping together a vast body of plunder, which
he hurried away to the Potomac, and into the folds of the main force. He came
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 174
down upon the fairest and wealthiest portion of Franklin county, and, as he
retired, separated into squadrons, which scoured every road and byway, spending
some time at Greencastle, Waynesboro, and Welsh Run, and at Mercersburg a
detachment crossed Cove Mountain and penetrated to McConnellsburg, passing on
down the valley from that point. It would appear that Lee had hoped by this
demonstration to have induced Hooker either to rush forward and cross the
Potomac, and thus uncover Washington, or to have tempted him to attack the rebel
army while on the march northward, when a rapid concentration would have been
made, and a defensive battle fought, in which Lee felt confident of a victory.
These purposes are plainly disclosed in Lee's report. He says: "With a view to
draw him (Hooker) further from his base, and at the same time to cover the march
of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg from
the valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from
Culpeper Court House on the 15th, and advancing along the east side of the Blue
Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. . . . As these demonstrations
(Jenkins') did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to leave
Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by
Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General
Hill having already reached the valley."
But Hooker was too wary to be caught in either of these traps, and while
beating back the enemy through the passes of the minor range of mountains which
still interposed between himself and Longstreet, and guarding well his flank, he
was in no haste to advance into Maryland. Mr. Lincoln, in his great anxiety to
protect the entire territory of the North, and to ward off the disgrace of
invasion, had telegraphed to Hooker on the 16th: "Your idea to send your
cavalry to this side of the river may be right, probably is; still, it pains me
a little that it looks like the defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair
chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line
stretched from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania." But to this Hooker says:
"With all deference to the views of his Excellency, the President, it appeared
to me that the wisest course for me to pursue was to move the army on a
concentric but inner circle to
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 175
the one followed by the enemy, and endeavor to keep abreast of his main column.
This would relieve me from all embarrassment concerning my communications and
supplies, and would enable me to act promptly, with my force concentrated, in
thwarting the general designs of the enemy. To have followed the plan
suggested, it seemed to me that I would be marching the army away from the point
at which it was most needed."
Close upon the heels of Jenkins followed Ewell, who, with 12,000 men and
sixteen pieces of artillery, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 15th,
the same day that the former reached Chambersburg. He did not advance far,
however, remaining between the bank of the stream and the borough of Hagerstown,
and, like an attentive gallant, gracefully handing the plunder of Jenkins across
to Lee. From the 15th to the 22d, this delightful work was continued without
material change, Lee receiving much needed stores, and bringing up the rear of
his army.
In the meantime, the troops called out to meet the emergency gathered slowly.
On the 16th, Governor Curtin addressed an appeal to the people of Philadelphia,
in which he exhorted them to come forward at once, to close their places of
business, and apply their hearts to the work. But the apparent halt in the
rebel column at the Potomac, and its inactivity beyond that of gathering
supplies, created the impression that the main body was not coming. The leading
editorial of the Philadelphia Press on the morning of the 17th contained the
following view: "As we understand the situation, as it appears at midnight,
there is less ground for alarm than prevailed during the day. The rebels have
occupied Chambersburg; but beyond that point no force is known to be advancing.
. . . This suggests to us that the rebels have too great a dread of Hooker to
divide themselves in his front, and that, while they might rejoice in the
opportunity of occupying and holding Pennsylvania, they would not dare to do so
with a powerful army on their line of communications."
Great consternation, however, prevailed at Harrisburg, and endless trains
still continued to move out of the valley across the Susquehanna. Rifle-pits
were thrown up in Harris' Park to command the ford just below the island. A
large fort, inclosing several acres, was surveyed by competent engineers on the
bluff
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 176
just above the heads of the bridges leading to the city, and messengers were
sent through every street requesting the inhabitants to set out empty barrels
upon the side-walks to be used in constructing it. Day and night the work was
vigorously pushed. Just beneath the soil was a loose shale, not of sufficient
solidity to require blasting, but so much so as to render the labor difficult.
A heavy earthwork was finally completed, with dry ditch and numerous platforms
for guns. Half a mile in advance was a minor work erected upon a bold spur
which commanded the valley on all sides. The few clumps of trees which dotted
the fields here and there were swept away, as was also the grove, grateful for
shade, and relief of the prospect from the city's side which stood upon the
utmost summit, where the main fort was located. A span of each bridge was
severed, ready for instant destruction, but supported by props until the
necessity should arrive for its demolition.
Jenkins, having brought in his cattle and horses gathered during the week to
the Potomac, worshipped on Sunday with Ewell at Hagerstown, and early Monday
morning, the 22d, headed again towards Chambersburg, now accompanied by the
infantry of Ewell's corps. Rodes and Early, the division commanders of Ewell,
moved in advance, the former reaching Chambersburg on the 23d, followed by
Johnson. Maryland was by this time thoroughly aroused. The Councils of
Baltimore had appropriated, on the 16th, $400,000 for defence, and the labor of
fortifying was vigorously pushed, earthworks being erected around the north and
west sides of the city. To provide against a sudden incursion of cavalry, the
streets were barricaded with barrels and hogsheads filled with bricks and sand,
where it could be effectually stopped. At Harrisburg, the camp which had been
established began to swarm with volunteers, and the white tents were spread out
far and wide. On the 19th, Captain William H. Boyd, who had been instrumental
in saving Milroy's train, was dispatched with his company from Harrisburg on
cars to Shippensburg, where, finding the road impassable, he mounted and rode to
Greencastle, back to Chambersburg, and forward again to Greencastle before he
found an enemy. Here he had a smart skirmish with the head of the hostile
column, now on its second advance. Boyd continued
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 177
upon its front, observing and reporting its progress, and dashing in upon its
trains at every favorable point. On the 20th, a force under the command of
Brigadier-General Knipe, consisting of E. Spencer Miller's Battery and two
regiments of militia, moved down the Cumberland Valley to occupy Chambersburg.
But, finding on his arrival near that the rebel cavalry were already there, with
infantry advancing to their support, he fell back, skirmishing as he went, until
he reached Carlisle. In the meanwhile, General Imboden, of the rebel cavalry,
who had been sent out by Lee upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, having broken
up that line and rendered the canal useless, thus preventing troops from West
Virginia from coming suddenly upon the flanks of the rebel main force, in
obedience to his orders struck boldly out towards Fulton county, and after a
short skirmish with a fragment of the First New York Cavalry, occupied
McConnellsburg.
Early on Sunday morning, the Philadelphia City Troop, an organization which
had been preserved since the days of the Revolution, and which in that struggle
acted as body-guard to Washington, now composed of about forty members, some of
them the descendants of its original members, with holy memories of that early
service, arrived in Gettysburg, and in company with a small body of mounted
militia, under Captain Bell, moved out upon the Chambersburg Pike towards the
South Mountain. At Monterey, a little village on the way, they came up with a
party of rebel skirmishers, with whom they exchanged shots. These
reconnoissances were repeated on the 23d, and on the following day Colonel
William W. Jennings, with the Twenty-sixth regiment of the Pennsylvania militia,
one company of which, under Captain F. Klinefelter, was composed principally of
students from the Pennsylvania College and from the Theological School, both
located at Gettysburg, arrived in town. Major Granville O. Haller, of General
Couch's staff, had been sent by that officer to represent him at this point, and
assume command of all the Union forces. His conduct of affairs was most
unfortunate. At the moment when veterans of the enemy were advancing on the
town, he ordered this regiment of undisciplined men out to meet them - a most
suicidal policy, which must have resulted in its
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 178
certain capture had not Colonel Jennings, who was an officer of experience,
skilfully withdrawn it in time. Major Haller was subsequently dismissed from
the service, "for disloyal conduct," strengthening the belief which was
entertained at the time, that he was not devoted to the cause he represented.
At Chambersburg, General Ewell separated his two advance divisions, sending
Early in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rodes towards Carlisle and Harrisburg.
Early reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of Friday, the 26th, with Gordon's
brigade of 5000 men, and took possession unopposed, having been preceded by a
battalion of cavalry, which dashed in, uttering demoniac yells, and delivering
an indiscriminate fire from their pistols. He made large demands for sugar,
coffee, flour, salt, bacon, whisky, onions, hats, and shoes, amounting in value
to $6000, or in lieu thereof, $5000 in money. The town council pled poverty,
and he appearing to be satisfied that the place was poverty-stricken, abandoned
his suit, getting neither goods nor money. Early remained in town over night,
but his forces hurried on to Hanover and York, that they might come upon those
places before all the valuables they contained had been spirited away, and they
be found as bare as was Gettysburg. At Hanover Junction the work of destruction
on the Northern Central Railroad began, as it had likewise been practised on the
Gettysburg Branch. Bridges were burned, tracks torn up, rails twisted, and
rolling stock demolished. Soon after the departure of Early from Gettysburg, on
Saturday the 28th, three mounted Union scouts came in from Emmittsburg, where
the advance of Pleasanton's cavalry then was, who captured two of the enemy, one
of them a chaplain, bearing a dispatch from Ewell, then at Shippensburg, to
Early, cautioning the latter about advancing too fast. At noon of the following
day two regiments of Union cavalry, under General Cowpland, arrived from
Emmittsburg, on a reconnoissance. They encamped for the night near by, and
departed on the following morning in the direction of Littlestown.
The Twentieth regiment of emergency militia had been sent out from Harrisburg,
under Colonel Thomas, to guard the Northern Central Railroad and the
Wrightsville branch. But as
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 179
the veteran troops of Early advanced, Thomas was obliged to fall back, a part of
his regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, towards Wrightsville, and the
remainder towards Harrisburg. Major Haller, with the City Troop, had also
retired before the rebel advance, and had reached Wrightsville for the purpose
of defending the passage of the magnificent bridge which there spanned the
Susquehanna. Early was likewise eager to grasp that rich prize, as it would
afford, if once securely in rebel hands, ready means of throwing Lee's entire
army across a wide and difficult stream, that would otherwise prove a formidable
barrier in his way. Its importance had been recognized by General Couch, who
had four days before sent Colonel Frick, with the Twenty-seventh emergency
regiment, with instructions to hold it to the last extremity, and subsequently
ordered, if likely to fall into the enemy's hands, to destroy it. Upon his
arrival, he was met by the City Troop and a part of the Twentieth, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, and was joined by four companies of militia, three
white and one colored, from Columbia, situated at the eastern head of the
bridge, a detachment of convalescent soldiers from the hospital at York, and the
Petapsco Guards, in all less than 1500 men. Frick took position on commanding
ground, a half mile back from the western head of the bridge, and proceeded to
fortify.
Early, who was doubtless kept constantly advised of the number and character
of the forces set to guard the bridge, had no sooner reached York, than he
hurried forward Gordon's brigade, well provided with artillery, to seize it.
Frick made a stubborn resistance, and in the fighting which ensued, had several
wounded. Having no artillery with which to meet that of the enemy, and being
greatly outnumbered by veteran troops, he soon saw that he would be compelled to
yield. He had ordered his engineer to prepare one span of the bridge to be
blown up in case it became necessary to abandon it. When, therefore, he was
forced back, he ordered the match to be applied; but the train failed to ignite
the powder, and the only alternative remaining was to apply the torch, and that
immense structure, more than a mile and a quarter in length, lighting up the
heavens for many miles around with its flames, was utterly consumed.
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 180
At York, Early found a profusion of those things which he had failed to obtain
at Gettysburg. He had come with five brigades of infantry, three batteries of
artillery, and part of two regiments of cavalry. Being prepared to enforce his
demands, and having a rich old city in his grasp, he made a requisition for
supplies similar to that at Gettysburg, and in addition, for $28,000 in money.
Should it be complied with promptly, he agreed to spare all private property;
otherwise, he would take what he could find, and would not be responsible for
the conduct of his troops while in the city. There appearing to be no other
alternative, the stores and money were delivered, and he scrupulously kept his
word, order being strictly enforced, and private property left untouched.
A few facts recorded by Mr. Gall, of the Sanitary Commission, respecting the
condition and habits of Early's men, as seen at this point, will serve as a fair
specimen of the make-up of the entire rebel army: "Physically," he says, "the
men looked about equal to the generality of our own troops, and there were fewer
boys among them. Their dress was a wretched mixture of all cuts and colors.
There was not the slightest attempt at uniformity in this respect. Every man
seemed to have put on whatever he could get hold of, without regard to shape or
color. I noticed a pretty large sprinkling of blue pants among them, some of
those, doubtless, that were left by Milroy at Winchester. Their shoes, as a
general thing, were poor; some of the men were entirely barefooted. Their
equipments were light, as compared with those of our men. They consisted of a
thin woollen blanket, coiled up and slung from the shoulder in the form of a
sash, a haversack swung from the opposite shoulder, and a cartridge-box. The
whole cannot weigh more than twelve or fourteen pounds. Is it strange, then,
that with such light loads, they should be able to make longer and more rapid
marches than our men? The marching of the men was irregular and careless, their
arms were rusty and ill kept. Their whole appearance was greatly inferior to
that of our soldiers. . . . There were not tents for the men, and but few for
the officers. The men were busy cooking their dinner, which consisted of fresh
beef, part of the York levy, wheat griddle cakes raised with soda, and cold
water.
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 181
No coffee nor sugar had been issued to the men for a long time. . . . The men
expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this kind of food, and said they
greatly preferred the bread prepared in the way they do it, to the crackers
issued to the Union soldiers. I asked one of the men how he got along without a
shelter tent. His answer was, 'First rate.' 'In the first place,' said he, 'I
wouldn't tote one, and in the second place, I feel just as well, if not better,
without it.' 'But how do you manage when it rains?' I inquired. 'Wall,' said
he, 'me and this other man has a gum blanket atween us; when it rains we spread
one of our woollen blankets on the ground to lie on, then we spread the other
woollen blanket over us, and the gum blanket over that, and the rain can't tech
us.' And this is the way the rebel army, with the exception of a few of the
most important officers, sleeps. Everything that will trammel or impede the
movement of the army is discarded, no matter what the consequences may be to the
men. . . . In speaking of our soldiers, the same officer remarked: 'They are
too well fed, too well clothed, and have far too much to carry.' That our men
are too well fed, I do not believe, neither that they are too well clothed; that
they have too much to carry, I can very well believe, after witnessing the march
of the Army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. Each man had eight days'
rations to carry, besides sixty rounds of ammunition, musket, woollen blanket,
rubber blanket, overcoat, extra shirt, drawers, socks, and shelter tent,
amounting in all to about sixty pounds. Think of men, and boys too, staggering
along under such a load, at the rate of fifteen to twenty miles a day. On
Tuesday morning, 30th, at about four o'clock, the last remaining brigade passed
through the city, with flags flying and band playing, and took the road to
Carlisle."
While Early was demonstrating in the direction of Columbia, the remainder of
the corps, and much the larger part, under Ewell's immediate command, proceeded
towards Harrisburg. As it went, the Cumberland Valley Railroad was destroyed.
The militia, who had taken post at Carlisle, were quickly driven before the
strong columns of Rodes and Johnson, and the town was occupied. Here many of
the rebels were at home; for some had been educated at Dickinson College, others
had been sta-
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 182
tioned at the United States barracks, and a few had even married their wives
here. But their visit now was not so agreeable as of yore, when, as gallant
young collegians, or spruce officers, they had escorted the blushing maidens of
the city, and been welcome at the firesides of its people.
General Knipe, who was still in command of the force of observation, had
fallen back before the rebel advance, until the night of the 28th, when he
reached Oyster Point, within four miles of Harrisburg. The enemy having
approached, apparently with the design of pushing on still nearer to the city,
Knipe opened upon them with the guns of Miller's battery with good effect,
causing a rapid movement to the rear. This was the nearest approach to the
capital of Pennsylvania of the enemy in force, though his scouts were captured
in and about the city. One, a powerful man, with a sinister face, and evidently
a person of great daring, was taken in the vicinity of Camp Curtin, and was held
under guard at the head-quarters of General Couch, where he was gazed upon by
the curious. Another was seized while in the act of making drawings of the fort
and its armament opposite the town. A little flat boat was overhauled in the
Susquehanna river, on the night of the 1st of July, in which was a rebel with an
ingenious contrivance for discovering the fords of the stream. He had a small
stone suspended by a cord which, as he floated on down the main channel, would
not impede his progress; but the moment he came to a shoal place, less than
three or four feet deep, it would drag upon the bottom and stop his craft. In
this way, the fords of the river were noted. A map was found upon his person,
containing a draft of the river, with the fords above and opposite the city
marked on the Cumberland shore for their entrance.
In the meantime, troops had been rapidly assembling at the camps at
Harrisburg, Pittsburg, and Philadelphia, and regiments were daily organized. As
the enemy advanced, he broke up all means of communication, and was careful to
spread false rumors. In the midst of the wild excitement which prevailed, it
was difficult to sift the true from the false, and arrive at a just conclusion
respecting the numbers, position, or purpose of the rebel army. A judgment
could be formed by balancing probabilities, and the
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 183
most favorable view, the wish sometimes being father to the thought, was
entertained. As late as the morning of the 26th, the New York Herald contained
the following judgment: "We have no idea that General Lee meditates an advance
upon either Harrisburg or Baltimore. In the one case, the trip would not pay
expenses, as the broad, rocky Susquehanna river is in his way, and in the other
case, his army, in getting into Baltimore, would get into a trap, from which Lee
would never extricate it." And the Philadelphia Press of the 27th, but three
days before the great battle began at Gettysburg, expressed the following
opinion: "Our intelligence as to what force of rebels has entered Pennsylvania
is still unsatisfactory and unreliable. Probably Ewell's corps, which is
estimated to number about 34,000 men, is alone in this aggressive movement;
although it would not greatly surprise us to learn that General Lee's entire
force, having crossed the Potomac, is within supporting distance."
So threatening, however, had the aspect of affairs become on the 26th, that
Governor Curtin issued his proclamation calling for 60,000 State militia. He
said: "Pennsylvanians! The enemy is advancing in force into Pennsylvania. He
has a strong column within twenty-three miles of Harrisburg, and other columns
are moving by Fulton and Adams counties, and it can no longer be doubted that a
formidable invasion of our State is in actual progress. The calls already made
for volunteer militia in the exigency have not been met as fully as the crisis
requires. I therefore now issue this my proclamation, calling for 60,000 men to
come promptly forward to defend the State. . . . The time has now come when we
must all stand or fall together in defence of our State, and in support of our
Government."
As the enemy approached Harrisburg, and the dangers of occupation thickened,
preparations for meeting them were hastened. One of the wealthiest and most
powerful corporations in the State, and one which was contributing immensely to
the support of the National Government, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, had
its property of many millions exposed to destruction. Vigorous measures were
taken to save it. Block houses of sufficient strength to resist infantry
attacks were erected so as to cover the bridges, and the great number of
valuable locomotives
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 184
and vast quantities of rolling stock, kept at Harrisburg, were moved to
Philadelphia.
As soon as the advance-guard of the rebel army, consisting of Ewell's corps
and Jenkins' cavalry, had commenced its march for the Susquehanna, striking for
the bridges at Columbia and Harrisburg, Lee, who now had his remaining force in
hand, prepared to follow, and on the 24th and 25th crossed the Potomac, Hill
near Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport. The two columns reunited at
Hagerstown, and moved thence to Chambersburg, where they arrived and encamped on
the 27th. Hooker had no sooner seen that his antagonist was about to cross the
Potomac than he prepared to execute the corresponding movement; and on the 25th
and 26th, one day behind Lee, he likewise passed over, effecting the crossing
upon pontoons at Edward's Ferry.
The Union General now realized that a battle could not long be delayed, and he
was filled with anxiety lest his force should be insufficient to fight it with a
fair prospect of success. He had ascertained by the most trustworthy testimony
that the actual strength of the enemy's army then moving forward in to
Pennsylvania, was 91,000 infantry, 5000 with the artillery numbering 280 pieces,
and 11,000 cavalry, a grand aggregate of 107,000. This was a larger number by
several thousands than he then had in hand, and would be fully equal to his with
all the additions he could receive from the neighboring departments. He,
accordingly, dispatched his Chief-of-Staff, Major General Butterfield, to
Washington to obtain the returns of soldiers under General Heintzelman there,
and under General Schenck at Baltimore, and from these two departments to
organize a column of 15,000 troops to move without delay to Frederick, Maryland.
Though he found under General Heintzelman over 36,000 men, yet it was deemed
inadvisable by General Halleck, in view of the immense depots of material there
accumulated, and the necessity of guarding the Capital, to lessen it. At
Baltimore he found but a small force, there being 12,000 of Schenck's command at
Harper's Ferry, and 7500 at Winchester, the latter having been already broken
and nearly destroyed. Of the force under immediate command, General Schenck
promptly ordered out Lockwood's Brigade, consisting of 2500 men. The force at
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 185
Harper's Ferry, now under the command of General French, was the only
considerable one which Hooker could therefore hope to obtain.
Accordingly, as soon as his army was across the river, he directed General
Reynolds, in command of the right wing of the army, to send detachments to seize
the passes of the South Mountain, at Turner's and Crampton's Gaps; and with the
First, Third, and Eleventh corps to follow and take position at Middletown,
across the Cotocton range, his object being to confine the rebel line of advance
to the one valley in which he then was, and to bring a strong force within
supporting distance should the enemy turn back from Pennsylvania and offer
battle to the force which Hooker was about to send upon his rear. The Second
and Sixth corps he ordered to Frederick. The Twelfth he directed to move to
Harper's Ferry, which he accompanied in person, there to be joined by two strong
brigades from General French's command, whence to march upon the enemy's line of
communications at Williamsport, destroy his pontoon bridge at that point, and
stop the enormous quantities of flour, grain, horses and horned cattle which
were steadily flowing into Virginia. After visiting Harper's Ferry and Maryland
Heights, and finding the point to possess no strategic value, presenting no
obstacle to the invaders, defending no ford of the river, and being itself
indefensible, he decided to abandon the post, and transfer the material
collected there to Washington. This would release 10,000 good troops to join
his army. "After ascertaining," he says, "that the public property could all be
removed before twelve o'clock at night, I seated myself, and was engaged in
writing an order for the abandonment at daylight.
But what was his surprise and disappointment to receive at that moment a
dispatch from General Halleck, saying": "Maryland Heights have always been
regarded as an important point to be held by us. . . . I cannot approve of their
abandonment except in case of absolute necessity." And this, after Halleck had
himself placed the troops at this point under Hooker's control in the following
words, telegraphed on the 22d: "In order to give compactness to the command of
troops in the field covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place
that part
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 186
of the Middle Department east of Cumberland, and commanded by General Schenck,
under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that
arrangement would be agreeable." To this Hooker answered: "Yes, provided the
same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders
direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman."
To send the Twelfth corps alone to Williamsport, without the addition of
French's troops, he did not regard advisable, as the enemy might suddenly turn
upon and overwhelm it before he could bring up his supporting forces. He
accordingly abandoned the movement, and ordered that corps to countermarch and
follow the other troops to Frederick.
He now felt that to have his plans thus interfered with, and his movements in
the face of the enemy cut short when in full progress by one far from the field,
who could not know the exigencies of the moment, would only result in shame and
defeat to the army. He accordingly telegraphed, at one P. M. of the 27th, to
General Halleck: "My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and
Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of
more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I
am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I
earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy."
This desire was immediately granted, and at four o'clock on the following
morning, Colonel Hardie, a special messenger from Washington, arrived in camp
bearing an order relieving General Hooker from duty, and directing him to turn
over the command of the army to General Meade, then at the head of the Fifth
corps.
Of General Hooker's ability as displayed in the preliminary movements at
Chancellorsville, and in the movements up to the moment of yielding his
authority, the best military critics award him very high praise. That he was
right in demanding the use of the troops at Harper's Ferry, and in abandoning
the post, is undisputed, and was virtually acknowledged by General Halleck
himself, inasmuch as he allowed the successor of Hooker to take them. But
Halleck,
PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 187
it appears, had distrusted the ability of Hooker from the first, and when it was
proposed, in September, 1862, to make the latter the successor of General
McClellan instead of General Burnside, and the President and five members of the
cabinet were of that mind, Halleck opposed it, and, with the remainder of the
President's advisers, succeeded in defeating him. Of this opposition to him
Hooker was aware, when, finally, he was placed in chief command of the Potomac
army, and in accepting the position, he made but one request of the President,
that he would stand between Halleck and himself.