Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 14, 313-
324
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
by
SAMUEL P. BATES.
PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 313
PART I. GENERAL HISTORY.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG.
GENERAL LEE was now satisfied that a further attempt to maintain the contest
would be fruitless, and consequently determined to yield to the inevitable, and
make good his retreat. And now was seen the great strategic advantage to him of
the possession of Gettysburg; for he was able to control the shortest routes to
the Potomac. Had the Fairfield road been under the control of the Union army,
Lee's retreat could have been cut off. But his army lying across the two
shortest roads leading to Williamsport, he was able to retire without the danger
of serious interruption. In his report, Lee says: "Owing to the strength of the
enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the
engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies
rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as
were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field,
were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th,
and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield." This was the most
direct road. But the wounded who could bear transportation were started back
during the night of the 3d; and all day long of the 4th the two roads - the one
by Fairfield and the other by Chambersburg, until the mountain was passed, and
thence by Greenwood and Waynesborough - were incessantly filled with the trains.
As already noticed, Colonel Stone, of the Bucktail brigade, was wounded
severely in the action of the first day, and fell into the enemy's hands. His
Adjutant-General, Captain John E. Parsons,
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 314
afterwards Colonel of the One Hundred and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania regiment,
unwilling to desert his bleeding chief, remained to care for him and was also a
prisoner. During the rest of the battle, he was kept under guard at a rebel
hospital. In the following letter he records the varying hopes and fears by
which his bosom was swayed as the dreadful hours wore on, and points out the
first intimations which he interpreted as evidence that victory had at last
crowned the Union arms: "On the morning of the 2d of July," he says, "I obtained
permission from the rebel General Hood to move Colonel Stone, and to remain with
him. With the assistance of two soldiers, we carried him on a stretcher to a
stone farmhouse a half mile to the rear, and some 200 yards to the north of the
Baltimore pike. We found the house deserted by the family and in a sad
condition; portions of the floor torn up for plunder, the beds ripped open and
feathers scattered over the house, and the hand of the spoiler visible on every
side. We found a soldier of the Iron brigade in the house, mortally wounded.
He died by our side that night.
"During the afternoon of the 2d, the house was taken possession of by the
Surgical corps of Hayes brigade, 'Louisiana Tigers,' as their Brigade Hospital.
The desperate charges made by this brigade on the evening of the 2d brought
ambulance after ambulance of their wounded to the hospital. I could gather
nothing satisfactory from their surgeons or their wounded as to the result of
the day; but they were in good spirits and appeared sanguine of success in the
end. Some of the officers who were slightly wounded, said to me that they were
certain of success, and had marked out on their pocket-maps the line of march to
Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia, and New York. On the evening of the 3d,
however, they seemed depressed in spirits, which first gave me the intimation of
our victory. On the morning of the 4thm they commenced to haul to the rear all
of their wounded that were able to be removed. Then I was satisfied that our
army was victorious and that the enemy was getting ready to retreat. When I
asked some of the officers who were so sanguine only the day before, why they
were hauling their wounded back, they said it was only to a place where water
was more abundant. But their defeat was obvious on all sides. Depressed in
spirits
THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG - 315
and demoralized in manner, they hurriedly took their departure, and next morning
at daylight, I found that the whole rebel army, except a light line of cavalry,
had fled, leaving our hospital and the houses and barns about us filled with the
worst of their wounded. By nine o'clock the cavalry line withdrew, concentrated
on the Chambersburg pike in front of our hospital, and took their departure,
followed in a short time by our cavalry. Colonel Stone was taken in an
ambulance to Gettysburg and our surgeons took charge of the rebel wounded. Both
the Colonel and myself were treated kindly by the surgeons and officers at the
hospital. A portion of the rebel army passed our hospital in their retreat"
The condition of the rebel army was now such that its Commander's best efforts
were required to save it. The great thoroughfares on the direct line to
Williamsport, it is true, were his, and by judicious dispositions and prompt
action, he had a good prospect of bringing it off; but the longer he delayed,
the more precarious his situation became; for, while his own force was
constantly dwindling the Union army was in a fair way to receive important
accessions, the militia in the Cumberland Valley and at Harrisburg, and troops
from the James being already on the way. General Imboden, who had been sent by
Lee with his independent mixed command of cavalry and mounted infantry, for the
destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and had come up into
Pennsylvania by the way of McConnellsburg, had arrived on the field at
Gettysburg a little after noon of the 3d, at the moment when the last grand
charge was in full tide. His men were fresh and to him Lee called and entrusted
the removal of the wounded. Imboden has published an account of the doings of
that night of horrors in which he labored to carry back to Virginia such as
could, and, though in a dying state would be removed:
"When night closed upon the grand scene," he says, "our army was repulsed.
Silence and gloom pervaded our camps. We knew that the day had gone against us,
but the extent of the disaster was not known except in high quarters. The
carnage of the day was reported to have been frightful, but our army was not in
retreat, and we all surmised that with tomorrow's dawn would come a renewal of
the struggle; and we
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 316
knew that if such was the case, those, who had not been in the fight would have
their full share in its honors and its dangers. All felt and appreciated the
momentous consequences of final defeat or victory on that great field. These
considerations made that, to us, one of those solemn and awful nights that every
one who fought through our long war sometimes experienced before a great battle.
Few camp fires enlivened the scene. It was a warm summer's night, and the weary
soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the meadows we occupied,
discussing the events of the day, or watching that their horses did not straggle
off in browsing around.
"About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and delivered a message from
General Lee, that, he wished to see me immediately. I mounted at once, and
accompanied by Lieutenant McPhail of my staff, and guided by the courier, rode
about two miles toward Gettysburg, where half a dozen small tents on the
roadside were pointed out as General Lee's headquarters for the night. He was
not there, but I was informed that I would find him with General A. P. Hill,
half a mile further on. On reaching the place indicated, a flickering, solitary
candle, visible through the open front of a common tent, showed where Generals
Lee and Hill were seated on camp stools, with a county map spread upon their
knees, and engaged in a low and earnest conversation. They ceased speaking as I
approached, and after the ordinary salutations, General Lee directed me to go to
his headquarters and wait for him. He did not return until about one o'clock,
when he came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped in profound
thought. There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was
about. The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of soft silvery
light, almost as bright as day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us,
he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so
betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him, but
before I reached him he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to
rest himself, and fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence upon his
equally weary horse, the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a
statue. The moon shone full upon his massive
THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG - 317
features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine
countenance before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had
passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and
embarrassing, when to break it, and change the current of his thoughts, I
remarked in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue
"'General, this has been a hard day on you.'
"This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied mournfully:
"'Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,' and immediately relapsed into his
thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his
reflections, I said no more. After a minute or two he suddenly straightened up
to his full height, and turning to me with more animation, energy, and
excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in a
voice tremulous with emotion, and said:
"'General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's
division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if
they had been supported, as they were to have been - but for some reason, not
yet fully explained to me, they were not - we would have held the position they
so gloriously won at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have
been ours.'
"After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony:
"'Too bad! Too bad!! Oh! too bad!!''
"I never shall forget, as long as I live, his language, and his manner and his
appearance and expression of mental suffering. Altogether, it was a scene that
a historical painter might well immortalize had one been fortunately present to
witness it. In a little while he called up a servant from his sleep to take his
horse; spoke mournfully, by name, of several of his friends who had fallen
during the day; and when a candle had been lighted, invited me alone into his
tent, where, as soon as we were seated, he remarked: 'We must return to
Virginia. As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have
sent for you, because your men are fresh, to guard the trains back to Virginia.
The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will
be harassed by the enemy's cavalry. I can
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 318
spare you as much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I shall need
all I have to return to the Potomac by a different route from yours. All the
transportation and care of the wounded will be entrusted to you. You will
recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport,
by any route you deem best, without halting. There rest and feed your animals,
then ford the river, and make no halt till you reach Winchester, where I will
again communicate with you.' As I was about leaving to return to my camp, he
came out of his tent and said to me in a low tone:
"'I will place in your hands, to-morrow, a sealed package for President Davis,
which you will retain in your own possession till you are across the Potomac,
when you will detail a trusty commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with
all possible dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President. I impress
it upon you, that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands
of the enemy. If you should unfortunately be captured, destroy it.' . . . .
Shortly after noon, the very windows of heaven seemed to have been opened . . .
. The storm increased in fury every moment. Canvas was no protection against
it, and the poor wounded, lying, upon the hard, naked boards of the wagon-
bodies, were drenched by the cold rain. Horses and mules were blinded and
maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanageable. The roar of the winds
and waters made it almost impossible to communicate orders. Night was rapidly
approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness the confusion would
become worse confounded. About four P. M. the head of the column was put in
motion and began the ascent of the mountain. After dark I set out to gain the
advance. The train was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road. It was
moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails of agony. For four hours I
galloped along, passing to the front, and heard more - it was too dark to see -
of the horrors of war than I had witnessed from the battle of Bull Run up to
that day. In the wagons were men wounded and mutilated in every conceivable
way. Some had their legs shattered by a shell, or minie ball; some were shot
through their bodies; others had arms torn to shreds; some had received a ball
in the face or a jagged piece of
THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG - 319
shell had lacerated their heads. Scarcely one in a hundred had received
adequate surgical aid. Many had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their
ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and hardened with blood - were
rasping the tender, inflamed lips oŁ their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons
had even straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and
rocky. The jolting was enough to have killed sound strong men. From nearly
every wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as these greeted,
the ear:
"'O God! why can't I die?'
"'My God! will no one have mercy and kill me, and end my misery?
"'O!stop one minute, and take me out and leave me to die on the roadside.'
°'I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children! what will become of
you?'
"Some were praying; others were uttering the most fearful oaths and
execrations that despair could wring from them in their agony. Occasionally a
wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans and sobs could be heard.
No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. On, on; we must move on.
The storm continued and the darkness was fearful. There was no time even to
fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the
guards, disposed in compact bodies every half mile, all were wounded and
helpless in that vast train of misery. The night was awful, and yet in it was
our safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could not distinguish
friend from foe . . . . It was my sad lot to pass the whole distance from the
rear to the head of the column, and no language can convey an idea of the
horrors of that most horrible of all nights of our long and bloody war . . . .
After a good deal of harassing and desultory fighting along the road, nearly the
whole immense train reached Williamsport a little after the middle of the day. .
. . The dead were selected from the train - for many had perished on the way -
and were decently buried. Straw was obtained on the neighboring farms; the
wounded were removed from the wagons and housed; the citizens were all put to
cooking, and, the army surgeons to dressing wounds."
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 320
Imboden was unable to obey the instructions of Lee, to pause only to feed his
beasts at Williamsport, and then ford the rive and push on to Winchester; for
the sudden rains of the previous day had converted the Potomac into a raging
torrent, giving it a tide of ten or twelve feet above the fording stage; and
during the absence of the enemy, General French, who was stationed at Frederick,
had sent up an expedition which had partially destroyed the pontoon bridge.
Imboden, accordingly, parked his train, consisting of ten thousand animals and
all the wagons, and disposed of the wounded about the town. Until some portion
of the rebel army should come, he knew that his situation was precarious. He
had twenty-two field guns and one Whitworth siege piece. These he planted most
advantageously upon the hills just above the town, and held his troops, about
three thousand in number, in readiness to repel an attack. On the morning of
the 6th, Buford and Kilpatrick approached, and made vigorous demonstrations,
dismounting their men and assaulting with great determination. But Imboden's
artillery, which was skilfully distributed and effectively served, proved
formidable, and by concentrating his forces upon the point attacked, made
himself more than a match for the assaulting column. Towards evening FitzHugh
Lee with a powerful body came to the relief of Imboden, followed closely by
Stuart, and the Union forces were obliged to withdraw. The rebel infantry soon
after began to arrive, and all further demonstrations were futile.
As has been noticed, General Meade, the moment the result of the grand charge
of Longstreet on the afternoon of the 3d was decided, had ridden to the left of
the line, and ordered a demonstration there, with the intent to put in a heavy
force and assault the rebel position; but the troops were slow in moving, and
before they could be got ready, it was too late to make the attempt. Several
officers have since testified, that they favored such an attack, and strongly
advised General Meade to make one. General Hancock says: "I think that our
lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great
victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade
told me before the fight, that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the
Fifth and Sixth corps on the
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enemy's flank; I, therefore; when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance,
and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if
he would put in the Fifth and Sixth corps, I believed he would win a great
victory. I asked him afterwards when I returned to the army, what he had done.
He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and
moved so slowly that nothing was done before night.'
It is possible that an instant advance by a strong column, had one been in
readiness, might have broken the rebel line. But the probabilities were against
it. There were, at most, but about 18,000 men in the enemy's assaulting column
in the grand charge. Where was the rest of the rebel army? Principally
concentrated upon Seminary Ridge, a good defensible position, running over with
artillery at every point. The very best dispositions had doubtless been made of
all but Longstreet's attacking force, that it was possible to make, to meet any
such counter assault as would naturally be anticipated. Hence there is little
doubt that a direct assault upon that line would have proved to the Union side
as disastrous as had that of Longstreet to the rebel.
During the evening and night of the 3d, the enemy's line on Seminary Ridge was
greatly strengthened. Ewell's entire corps was drawn in and placed behind it,
and ample security taken for defending every point. It was a position nearly as
strong by nature as that where the Union army was planted. It is true, that the
rebel army had suffered severely. But so had the Union. Feeling himself strong
in his position, Meade courted attack. May we not believe that Lee, with a
similar sense of security, would have welcomed a Union advance? This view,
reasoning upon the knowledge which the Union Commander then had, had a strong
warrant, and is doubtless that which influenced General Meade in withholding an
attack. By information since obtained, we learn that such was the fact.
Swinton, in his 'Army of the, Potomac,' gives the testimony of General
Longstreet, who said to him: "I had Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I
had a heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing better than to have
been attacked, and have no doubt
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 322
I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received."
But while Lee was invincible for the moment, he had no preparation for holding
out any length of time. Accordingly, as soon as darkness had closed in on the
evening of the 4th, the main body of his army was put in motion towards
Williamsport, leaving only a strong rear guard, to hold the Union forces in
check should they attempt to follow, and before morning was beyond the reach of
its pursuers, taking the two shortest roads which he completely controlled. Lee
himself, with his staff, had started at a little after midnight of the 3d,
breakfasting on the morning of the 4th near C. Mussleman's house on the
Fairfield road.
In the Union camp, on the evening of the 4th, a council of war was called, at
which the four following questions were propounded: "Shall this army remain
here?" "If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?" "Do you deem it
expedient to move towards Williamsport through Emmittsburg?" "Shall we pursue
the enemy, if he is retreating, on his direct line of retreat?" Birney,
Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren voted in favor of remaining until there was
unmistakable evidence that the enemy was really on the retreat. Newton,
Pleasanton, and Slocum were for moving at once; and Howard was doubtful. The
council was unanimous in favor of moving by the left flank, instead of following
the direct route taken by the enemy, only sending cavalry supported by a small
infantry force to operate upon his rear. Two reasons impelled to this last
decision: first, the condition always imposed upon the Army of the Potomac, to
cover Washington and Baltimore in addition to fighting the enemy; and second, to
follow on the track of the foe would have no advantage, as the enemy, having the
direct, short route to the Potomac, and having a night's march the start, was
sure to reach there before either his flanks or his rear could be attacked to
much effect, a strong rear guard being at all times ready to make a stubborn
resistance. His trains being already there, or at least well out of the way,
and the roads all clear for his infantry, one night's march was ample to
preclude all possibility of overtaking it, or of bringing it to bay.
As soon as it became apparent, on the morning of the 5th, that
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the enemy was retreating, the Sixth corps, which had been held in reserve, and,
so far as fighting was concerned, was fresh, though worn down with rapid
marching, was put upon the pursuit on the Fairfield route. At the Fairfield
pass the column was halted, as Sedgwick did not deem it advisable to attack
here, the enemy holding a strong position where he could easily repel many times
his number. Accordingly, Neill's brigade of infantry was detached, and, with
the cavalry, followed the direct line of retreat by the Fairfield road, as did
also another cavalry force by the Cashtown route, while the rest of the Sixth
corps moved on through Boonsboro, and after crossing a little stream near the
latter place, took up a position near Funkstown.
The main body of the army remained at Gettysburg during the 5th, and large
details were made to gather up the wounded and bury the dead. On the 6th the
army moved, halting a day at Middletown for needed supplies; and, after crossing
South Mountain, and passing Boonsboro, came up with the enemy on the 12th, who
had formed upon a line extending from Hagerstown to Downiesville, which he had
fortified. Lee had been unable to cross the Potomac, on account of its swollen
condition. Finding that his trains and wounded could not be got over, nor moved
higher up without great danger, he determined to defend himself there; and
though to fight a battle, with a raging and impassable river at one's back, is
not an alternative to be chosen, it was one into which he was forced. The
ground favored his designs, and immense labor was bestowed to make it defensible
and safe. On the evening of the 12th, the Union army having by this time come
up, a council of officers was held, at which all voted against an attack except
two. Accordingly, the blow was withheld, and the 13th was given to
reconnoitring. The result of that examination was such as to induce Meade to
order the whole army to move up on the following morning at daylight with a view
of assaulting. But, during the night of the 13th, Lee commenced to withdraw,
Ewell's corps fording the stream, and Longstreet and Hill crossing upon the
pontoon bridge which had been reconstructed from parts of the old one recovered,
and others improvised. The stream was still at high tide, and Ewell's men found
much difficulty in stemming it; but they "linked
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 324
arms; and thus "interlaced and steadied, forded the river in mass, nearly
shoulder deep, with the loss of but three men."
Lee says, in his report, that the crossing was not completed until one P. M.,
when the bridge was removed. If any considerable force did remain so late as
this, he manoeuvred to preserve a strong front, and foiled every attempt of the
Union troops to injure him.
The management of the Battle of Gettysburg, on the part of the opposing
armies, has been the subject of sharp criticism. It is right, yea, it is the
duty of a people who maintain military schools, and pretend to defend their flag
by force of arms, to question closely the conduct of every battle, by the light
of the established principles of military science, and endeavor to detect the
errors committed, as well as the exemplification of meritorious conduct. It is
only by such a critical search, that the useful lessons of the past may be
garnered.